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The present thesis aims to increase our understanding of the causes of separatism. The 
inspiration for this topic comes from the fact that separatist conflicts can become extremely 
destructive, and thus a better understanding of why they emerge may help us prevent much 
human suffering by pointing to ways in which separatism can be avoided. 
More specifically, the thesis aims to explain the link between separatism and regional 
development disparities. The argument presented is that inter-regional economic conflicts 
(such as about inter-regional fiscal redistribution) easily emerge between regions at different 
levels of development, and that under certain conditions, particularly prolonged recessions and 
austerity, such conflicts can become an important driver of separatist aspirations. This can 
happen in both poorer and richer regions. The thesis further argues that this entire process can 
only be fully understood if we analyse society through a class prism. 
Given that regional development disparities often lie at the root of inter-regional economic 
conflicts, one of the ways of avoiding such conflicts – and thus also separatism – would be to 
equalize regional development levels. In order to do so, however, we first need to understand 
why regional disparities emerge and persist. Focusing on capitalist countries, the thesis argues 
that the disparities emerge as a natural consequence of the operation of oligopolistic markets, 
which are the dominant market form in capitalism. Regional development policies are explored 
at length, and it is argued that they are generally insufficient to overcome the tendency of 
markets to produce regional disparities. 
All the topics in the thesis are explored at the general level and for a larger number of 
countries, but the main in-depth case study is of regional disparities in the United Kingdom 
and how they relate to Scottish separatism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main aim of the present thesis is to better understand why separatism emerges, in the 
hope that such an understanding can lead to actions that can preempt state dissolution. The 
reason for my interest in this topic is that I was born in a country that dissolved, Yugoslavia, 
and grew up in one of its successor states, Serbia. I have to an extent witnessed the devastation 
that state dissolution can bring. Around 140,000 people died in the Yugoslav wars (including 
the NATO bombing of Serbia), probably many more got injured, and some 4,000,000 got 
displaced at some point. As for the purely economic destruction, estimates vary, but they go to 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Even when state dissolution is not violent, it can still bring 
about all kinds of difficult institutional and economic readjustments in the affected countries, 
as has happened, for example, in parts of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, it seems that 
relatively easy secessions, such as when Norway separated from Sweden or Belgium from the 
Netherlands, are the exception, not the norm. 
When we think of separatist conflicts, the typical explanations of their causes that come to 
mind are nationalism, religion, ethnicity or language. Political conflicts are also a common 
explanation. However, the focus of this thesis is different – it asks whether economic conflicts 
can be a major underlying factor for the desire of some regions to separate from their countries. 
It argues that that indeed can be, and often is, the case – inter-regional or center-region 
economic conflicts, rooted in regional development disparities, do regularly emerge and can 
become the basis for separatist aspirations. The most typical example of such conflicts is inter-
regional fiscal redistribution between richer and poorer regions, but many other types of 
conflicts have emerged, such as around the regional impact of price controls, monetary policies, 
tariffs, and so on. 
The thesis further asks under what conditions such conflicts become particularly sharpened, 
focusing on the role of recessions and austerity. It adopts a political economy framework for 
this analysis, that is, it studies the power and interests of different groups, in an attempt to 
determine what makes them support or oppose separatism. 
However, the thesis goes further than this. If the mentioned conflicts are based on regional 
development disparities, then the fundamental way to solve this problem would be to equalize 
regional development levels. As long as regional disparities exist, conflicts based on them will 
potentially emerge. Thus, while one part of the thesis deals with separatism, the other part deals 
with the causes of regional development disparities, as well as with regional development 
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policies. It attempts to answer where regional disparities come from, and how likely it is that 
attempts to reduce them will be successful. Here, the focus is on the interrelations between 
oligopolistic market structures and regional development, an approach that has been severely 
neglected for decades. 
In the remainder of the introduction (chapter 1), I present a brief overview of the remaining 
chapter structure and the contents of each chapter. While the line of thought that inspired the 
thesis was as described above – starting from separatism and moving onto regional disparities 
– for the thesis structure, it made more sense to start with regional disparities, because without 
understanding them it would not be possible to understand a number of arguments about 
separatism. Thus, the thesis starts by explaining what economic development is and discusses 
development policies and then moves onto adapting this analysis to regional development. This 
is then linked up to the emergence of inter-regional or center-region economic conflicts, and a 
deeper analysis of separatist aspirations. Finally, the entire analysis is applied to the case of 
regional development in the United Kingdom and the Scottish separatist movement. This case 
study was chosen not only because it is a current and live topic, but also because it allows for 
a straightforward testing of the developed framework, seeing as how the position of Scotland 
within the UK does not involve any repression, linguistic differences, or other such factors that 
are usually associated with separatism. 
Chapter 2 is a background chapter, that aims to establish three points. First, by relying on 
traditional development economics, it argues that economic development is centered around 
the structural transformation of the economy, that is, around establishing at least a few 
economic sectors which can have high productivity growth, high economies of scale, and 
numerous linkages to other sectors. Second, by drawing on authors such as Edith Penrose, John 
Kenneth Galbraith, and Joseph Schumpeter, the chapter argues that the process of economic 
development is inextricably tied to the emergence of big firms and oligopolistic market 
structures. Third, the chapter shows that a consequence of the preceding two points for less 
developed economies is that they face extremely difficult challenges if they want to become 
developed. Namely, in order to become developed, they have to move into advanced sectors of 
the economy, but in doing so, they inevitably have to compete against already established 
oligopolistic firms, who are in a far stronger competitive position. This explains why successful 
late developers have had to use highly interventionist policies, in order to help their domestic 
firms for significant periods of time, until they could compete on an even footing against 
established market players. 
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Being a background chapter, there is little new research in it, although I have tried providing 
recent empirical data for the presented arguments, relying, for example, on OECD publications 
about productivity, or on various data sources for R&D investment. Still, in a way, the novelty 
of the chapter is in bringing back certain perspectives into the debates about development. First, 
the importance of structural transformation has to a large extent been neglected (Chang, 2010). 
Second, arguments about the link between economic development and big firms have not just 
been largely forgotten, but numerous currently widespread arguments run directly counter to 
them, such as that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the key to economic development. 
The chapter shows why such arguments do not square with reality. Furthermore, without 
establishing the link between development and big firms, it is not possible to understand why 
regional development disparities emerge, which is the topic of the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 adapts the analysis from the preceding chapter to the study of regional 
development and underdevelopment. It draws on authors such as Myrdal (1964) and Hirschman 
(1970), who offered a macro-level analysis of regional development. They argued that trade, 
investment, and labor flows between richer and poorer regions on balance favor the richer 
regions. However, they did not link their arguments explicitly to market structure. Perroux 
(1971) and, in significantly more depth, Holland (1976a, 1979) did exactly that, but their 
arguments have mostly been forgotten – Perroux’s have been severed from his insights about 
the importance of oligopolies, while Holland has simply and almost completely disappeared 
from debates about regional development. The chapter draws on all four of the mentioned 
authors to make the argument that regional development disparities primarily emerge as the 
consequence of how big firms make decisions about where to locate what investment, as well 
as from their power to outcompete new market entrants (potentially from the poorer regions). 
Those regions that contain market-leading firms, or at least their high value-added activities, 
are more developed, while those regions that do not have such firms, or that house their lower 
value-added activities, are less developed. In order to develop, poorer regions would either 
have to attract high value-added investment or develop their own powerful firms, but both 
options are very difficult to achieve. Regional trade, capital, and labor flows are mostly a 
consequence of this situation. 
The chapter does not present novel arguments per se, but linking regional development to 
market structure and the power of big firms has not been done since Perroux and Holland 
published their analyses several decades ago. Most of the chapter is devoted to analyzing these 
arguments in more detail, and showing in what ways they are still relevant today. 
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In addition, the chapter also looks at whether some regions are more suitable to being 
developed than others (for example, due to having abundant natural resources), arguing that 
evidence seems to show that that is generally not the case. Furthermore, it offers a short critical 
overview of location theory, regional science, new economic geography, and Marxian 
geography, focusing mainly on their methodology, and why they do not offer the same 
explanatory power as the authors I have relied on. 
Chapter 4 focuses on regional development policies and builds on the insights from the 
previous chapters. Regional policies have followed the same trend as other economic policies 
in the post-WWII period, starting with a generally highly interventionist phase and then 
becoming more liberal from the 1980s onwards. The “old paradigm” regional policies generally 
comprised of building infrastructure in poorer regions and giving various incentives for 
investment there, aimed at attracting big firms to choose to locate their activities there. 
However, more interventionist policies, such as location controls on where firms could invest, 
or mandatory investment agreements between big firms and the government, were also used. 
The “new paradigm” regional policies still provide for infrastructure investment, but the firm-
level focus has shifted towards support for local SMEs, skills, training, and other forms of 
“soft” capital. 
The chapter analyses the two periods separately, both from the perspective of whether the 
policies took or take into account the power of big firms. While this has been done before by 
Holland for “old paradigm” regional policies, to my knowledge, a similar analysis of “new 
paradigm” regional policies has not been undertaken, which is one of the two main 
contributions of this chapter. The basic argument is that both old, and much more so the new 
regional policies, did not, and do not, take into account the power of big firms sufficiently or 
at all, particularly their power to outcompete or take over new market entrants from poorer 
regions. They also do not recognize fully that the gains from investing in poorer countries often 
tend to be much larger than any incentives to invest in poor regions of rich countries. 
The other main contribution of the chapter is a short case study of the economic 
development of Nevada. Nevada was picked because it is the only region (states within the US 
are effectively regions within a larger country) that, to my knowledge, used to be 
underdeveloped, but has managed to develop based on an indigenous, new sector – gambling 
– and not due to the location decisions of market-leading firms happening to coincide with 
Nevada’s economic interests. It, therefore, seemed worth exploring in some more depth what 
Nevada did, and whether we can draw any lessons from its experience. As it turns out, what 
seems to have been different is that Nevada was extremely lucky, in that it effectively had 
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internal trade protection that allowed its gambling industry to develop without hindrance. This 
protection was the fact that gambling was illegal everywhere else in the US at the time. The 
chapter tries drawing some lessons from this for other poorer regions. 
Chapter 5 moves the thesis into the study of separatism. As mentioned, the basic argument 
is that regional development disparities create inter-regional or center-region economic 
conflicts and that these can sometimes become particularly sharpened and fuel separatist 
aspirations in both richer and poorer regions. Some more systematic work has been done on 
this topic, notably by Bookman (1993), but the chapter takes the analysis further. 
First, it critically assesses some of Bookman’s arguments about the characteristics of 
typical separatist regions. It also mentions a number of potential conflicts that Bookman did 
not cover and offers a somewhat different categorization of these conflicts than Bookman did. 
Second, it explores under what circumstances inter-regional or center-region economic 
conflicts tend to escalate and become a major driving forces behind separatism, focusing 
specifically on the role of prolonged recessions and austerity and on how they corrode 
institutions set up to manage inter-regional or center-region economic conflicts. Third, the 
chapter analyses the class basis of support for separatism. Since it is individuals, acting either 
as individuals or as members of groups, that enter conflicts, understanding separatism is 
actually not possible without understanding the class structure of society. In particular, the role 
of recessions and austerity in fueling separatism cannot be understood without reference to the 
different impacts that they have on different classes. Finally, the chapter also critically analyses 
some of the typical economic expectations and claims by separatist movements, focusing on 
separatism in poorer regions. Specifically, it shows that, even if many such movements have 
economic grievances, their hopes that their economic situation will improve once they separate 
tend to be overoptimistic, because they seem to largely be unaware that the fundamental thing 
that is keeping poorer regions poor is the unintended consequences of the power of big firms, 
something that will not disappear merely because a region might become an independent 
country. This chapter represents a significant contribution to the literature, in that all of these 
topics have barely been explored thus far. 
Chapters 6 and 7 apply the framework developed in the preceding chapters, linking regional 
development to separatism, to the case of regional development in the United Kingdom and 
the separatist movement in Scotland. This case study was picked primarily because it is one of 
the relatively few cases where the economic bases of separatism stand out very clearly, and 
where they are not interlinked with any sort of repression, historical grievances, ethnic 
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conflicts, and other causes more usually associated with separatism. This has made the analysis 
much easier and allows for a clearer testing of the presented arguments. 
Chapter 6 examines regional development in the UK. It looks at the historical roots of the 
country’s regional disparities, and at the various regional development policies that have been 
employed by UK governments in the post-WWII period to try to equalize regional development 
levels in the UK. A more detailed exploration is undertaken of “new paradigm” regional 
policies, relying, among other things, on a number ONS regional data sources, as well as on 
the Business Population Estimates dataset from the Department of Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy. The latter dataset, in particular, is used in a novel way. Most studies tend 
to use it to see to what extent SME support policies (including regional ones) have been 
successful. While I have used it for that purpose, in addition, I have used it to estimate the 
regional importance of big businesses (relying on their share in regional output and 
employment) and compare that with regional prosperity, arguing that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, data seems to show that those regions that rely more on big businesses than on SMEs 
are significantly more prosperous. This, together with other parts of the chapter, supports the 
argument that the key to understanding regional disparities and the success – or otherwise – of 
regional policies still lies with understanding oligopolistic markets. In addition, the chapter 
also looks more closely at cluster policies, at the recent suggestions to set up regional banks, 
and at EU regional policies (and EU constraints on regional policies and state aid) in the UK. 
All these have not been analyzed thus far from the perspective of the dominant position of big 
firms in modern capitalism, so this chapter contributes to current debates on regional 
development policies in that respect. 
Finally, chapter 7 analyzes the recent Scottish separatist movement, culminating in the 
Scottish independence referendum in 2014. I argue that economic conflicts with Westminster 
have played the decisive role in the rise of support for Scottish secession and that they are 
fundamentally related to Scotland’s relative underdevelopment compared to the richest parts 
of the UK, as well as on resistance to austerity measures pursued by UK governments. This has 
been widely recognized in the current debates, but the chapter goes further than this in two 
respects. First, it argues that class is an unavoidable factor in understanding how relative 
Scottish underdevelopment and the impacts of austerity have fueled the separatist drive. It is 
revealed that, even though the separatist movement is lead by middle-class people, support for 
secession comes mainly from the lower classes and the petty bourgeoisie, while most of the 
middle classes and capitalist elites are firmly opposed to it. Second, it shows that most 
commentators, be they for or against Scottish independence, showed almost no understanding 
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that the fundamental reason behind Scottish underdevelopment is the operation of oligopolistic 
markets. The development policy suggestions for an independent Scotland reflected this lack 
of understanding. 
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2. Big firms, oligopolistic markets and economic development 
 
The present chapter is built on the understanding that there is a stark discrepancy between 
modern capitalist reality and how this reality is ordinarily imagined. On the one hand, markets 
are dominated by a few big firms with very significant market shares – in many sectors the top 
few firms account for a quarter or more of total employment and turnover1 – and extensive 
power to determine prices, influence customer preferences, influence legislation, etc. On the 
other hand, capitalism is imagined by many economists and policy-makers as an economic 
system based on small firms, engaged in price competition, and with no market power. The 
fact that such a discrepancy can even exist is baffling, given that the reality is otherwise widely 
recognized, for example in legislation,2 language3 or even popular culture.4  
These two visions inform very different understandings of how firms and markets relate to 
economic development. The imagined version of capitalism sees development as stemming 
from market efficiency produced by price competition between small firms. For that reason, 
when economists and policy-makers do recognize the actual reality of capitalist markets, the 
reaction is normally to say that markets should be changed to be more like the imagined version 
of capitalism, as it is thought that this would be more efficient. In reality, however, 
development is highly dependent on non-price competition between big firms, and the type of 
competition from the imagined version of capitalism would even be harmful. These topics are 
explored in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, on small firms and perfectly competitive markets, big 
firms and oligopolistic markets, and the relation of the latter to economic development. The 
                                                             
1 For the US, the US Census Bureau’s Concentration Ratios: Business & Industry dataset provides useful 
information. For the EU countries, look at Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics dataset. They all show 
phenomenal concentration of production and employment in a few firms out of hunderds of thousands. 
 (2007), for EU countries at Eurostat (2017), and the data in chapter 6 in this thesis for the UK. 
2 For example, laws governing mergers & acquisitions, competition law, and numerous others, would hardly be 
seen as necessary, if all they were being applied to were small firms. 
3 For example, “Coca-Cola” is supposed to be the second most recognized word in the world, after the word “OK” 
(Pendergrast, 2013:8). It does not matter how reliable this claim is. The mere fact that it seems completely 
plausible is telling enough. It is quite probable that the global brands of international corporations are among the 
most recognized words and images in the world, together with the symbols and the names of the founders of the 
world’s major religions. 
4 For example, the trope of the giant evil corporation has become a staple in many parts of popular culture across 
the world. If giant corporations were not actually omnipresent, it could hardly have arisen. 
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implications of the two visions of capitalism for development policy are explored in section 
2.5. And, prior to all this, section 2.1 sets out the definition of development adopted in this 
dissertation. Given how fluid the term has become,5 it is important to have a clear idea of what 
is meant by it. 
 
 
2.1 Productivity increases, economic sectors, and development 
 
I define development as the simultaneous attainment of high material living standards (both 
personal and collective consumption of goods and services) and increases in available free 
time. Fundamentally, this is enabled by productivity increases,6 because they are the only way 
to provide a large number of goods and services to a population. But, they are equally important 
for a number of other reasons.7 
Productivity increases are the basis for simultaneously increasing production in several 
economic sectors. As productivity in one sector increases, instead of increasing production, the 
same production as before can be kept, but with fewer inputs. These can then be employed in 
other sectors in order to increase their production. If these other sectors are new, then we have 
economic diversification, which is itself important for a number of reasons. A diversity of 
goods and services are obviously necessary for consumption, but also for investment, as 
numerous economic sectors are interdependent and cannot exist without each other. 
Technological progress depends in part on synergies and spill-overs between different sectors, 
which can obviously only happen if an economy is diversified. Diversification also provides 
employment for those who lose jobs due to productivity increases in some sectors, or simply 
for an increasing population. Finally, a diversified economy is more resilient, as even if 
something goes wrong in some sectors, there are others to rely on. 
                                                             
5 See Chang (2010) for a comparison of the traditional meaning of this term, used in this thesis, and several more 
modern ones. 
6 At this level of abstraction, it is sufficient to define productivity simply as some measure of output over some 
measure of input. 
7 This following discussion is clearly based on capitalist economies, but with some modifications, it could be 
made relevant for any other institutional setting as well. 
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As an alternative to all of the above, we can take out productivity increases in the form of 
more free time – instead of increasing production anywhere, we can work less and have the 
same consumption as before.8 
Productivity increases, being the basis of all of the above, are obviously important. But, 
where do they come from? Essentially, they are the consequence of technological and 
organizational improvements in production.9 The key thing here is that different sectors of the 
economy have very unequal potential for such improvements at any given time. This is why 
development is sector-specific – it matters what is being produced in an economy.10 It is for 
this reason that traditional development economists11 primarily focused on industrialization. 
Namely, manufacturing had the greatest scope for productivity increases and the strongest 
linkages to other sectors. Today, the existing evidence suggests that knowledge-intensive 
services can be very propulsive too.12 
It is also important to mention economies of scale. Improvements in technology and 
organization require investment. As these investments represent fixed costs, producers who 
have high fixed costs are forced to increase production volumes, so that they can realize 
economies of scale and make their products affordable. As it happens, sectors that have the 
highest scope for productivity increases are also generally the ones that require the highest 
investment and therefore can have the highest economies of scale. This has obvious positive 
effects on the wider society. 
Productivity increases also usually entail improvements in the quality of existing products 
or the development of new products. Again, the most innovative sectors tend to be the ones 
with the highest economies of scale. 
                                                             
8 See the OECD Average annual hours actually worked per worker dataset. The average annual hours actually 
worked per worker are significantly lower in the richer OECD countries than in the poorer ones. Of course, 
productivity increases do not by themselves guarantee that there will be more free time – this is a matter of power 
relations and the institutional setting of an economy – but they at least create the possibility for it. 
9 On the importance of technological development for economic development and growth, see Mowery and 
Rosenberg (1991). See also Reinert (2008). 
10 On this point, see Reinert (2007). 
11 See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), Lewis (1950, 1954, 2013), the collected texts of 
Ragnar Nurkse in Kattel, Kregel and Reinert (2011), Scitovsky (1954), Rostow (1956), Hirschman (1970), Myrdal 
(1964). For more modern authors, see Chang (2007, 2008), Reinert (2008), Amsden (1989). 
12 See OECD (2016), particularly chapter 3. As the publication notes: “Over the past 15 years, labour productivity 
growth was almost entirely driven by manufacturing and business sector services.” (OECD, 2016:62).  
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Finally, all these effects of productivity increases have feedback effects. Higher productivity 
results in more production and lower costs through economies of scale, thus providing more 
resources for further investment. Diversification also has beneficial effects on technological 
improvements (leading to productivity increases) through spill-overs between sectors. 
The conclusion of all the above is that economic development is fundamentally based on 
technological and organizational improvements and is highly contingent on having at least a 
number of advanced economic sectors, in which productivity increases, diversification, spill-
overs, employment and economies of scale interact and strengthen each other. Thus, if we wish 
to have a developed economy, it is essential to move into such sectors. 
 
 
2.2 Standard theory of the firm and perfectly competitive markets 
 
2.2.1 Standard theory of the firm 
 
What I refer to as the “standard” theory of the firm is the set of explanations of how firms 
function that people generally encounter first when they start studying economics. The theory 
was first formulated in its modern form by Marshall (1997) and was later taken up (in much 
more mathematical form) in all economics textbooks.13 While it is far from the only theory of 
the firm that is taught in economics, it nevertheless exerts considerable influence over how 
people who have learned it understand firms. It is also taken as the benchmark of how firms 
should ideally function. 
The standard theory assumes a firm that produces only one good, can sell as many goods as 
it can produce, is a price-taker, and maximizes profits.14 The behavior of the firm is then 
explained by looking at the relationship between fixed, variable and total costs of production, 
the quantity produced, the price and profits.15 
                                                             
13 See Samuelson and Mandel (2010), Mankiw (2004), Varian (2003). 
14 Different authors sometimes list further assumptions, but the ones I listed are always present, and will suffice 
for my argument. 
15 What follows is not a precise interpretation of the mathematical model with which this theory is presented. 
However, it is the way that the model is usually explained, and is thus what stays with people after they have 
studied the theory. 
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The firm, desiring higher profits, is increasing its production and is selling its products at a 
fixed price. The crucial assumption is that of the U-shaped cost curve.16 Variable costs per unit 
go up as production increases. Fixed costs per unit obviously drop, but since after a point, the 
variable costs per unit start increasing faster than fixed costs per unit drop, total costs per unit 
increase. The well-known consequence of these assumptions is that there is a limit to how big 
a firm will grow, as measured by the quantity of goods that it produces – a profit-maximizing 
price-taker firm will grow only until its total costs per unit become equal to the price.17 
Consequentially, bigger firms are deemed to be less efficient.18 
The conclusion that there is a limit to how big a firm will grow, reached by the most usual 
and widely taught theory of the firm, is rather peculiar given that in reality markets are 
dominated by gigantic firms. Because it is the assumption of rising variable costs per unit that 
lies at the core of this conclusion, the most pertinent question is why these costs would behave 
in this way? Provided that the prices of inputs do not change, the only thing that could lead to 
this is if more inputs were needed to produce product number 2 than product number 1. Why 
would this be the case? 
The most well-known explanation is managerial diseconomies of scale (sometimes also 
called diminishing returns to management), namely, the assumption that the more the firm 
grows, the more complicated it becomes to run it, leading to more mistakes, wasted inputs, etc., 
all of which contributes towards increasing costs.19 There are other suggestions as well (for 
example, increased wear on machines as full capacity utilization is reached), but while they all 
do seem plausible, the real question is, are they true? Even more, do variable costs per unit 
increase at all in reality? 
Evidence indicates that this is not the case. An early attempt to determine how variable costs 
behave is Eiteman and Guthrie (1952). The authors sent out a questionnaire to 1000 US 
manufacturing companies in 47 US states, all with between 500 and 5000 employees. The 
                                                             
16 For a history of the concept of the U-shaped cost curve, see Keppler and Lallement (2006). 
17 These explanations pertain to firms that have fixed capital (“short-term”), but are normally followed up by a set 
of explanations that argue that the situation is essentially the same even if firms can expand their capital (“long-
term”). 
18 Exceptions to this, such as natural monopoly, are deemed interesting but not the norm. 
19 This is the explanation given in any modern economics textbook. Interestingly, it is also the explanation used 
by Coase (1937), in the transaction costs theory of the firm, to explain why the reduction of transaction costs will 
not lead to the entire economy being concentrated within one firm. Namely, the costs of using management rise 
as the size of the firm increases, until they are equal to the costs of using the market system.  
18 
 
questionnaires contained 8 graphs. On each, the axes represented average costs and output (up 
to maximum capacity utilization), and each graph had a different line to represent different cost 
behaviors as output changed. The respondents were asked to pick the graph that best described 
how variable costs in their firm change when output changes.20 
Of the 366 firms that responded, 334 indicated that one curve applied to all their products, 
while the remaining 32 respondents said that different curves applied to different products. The 
first group accounts for more than 90% of all responses, so I will report those findings.21 Two 
graphs were chosen by an overwhelming majority of respondents. 203 firms chose the graph 
representing falling average costs, while another 113 firms chose the one that shows average 
costs falling all the way near to full capacity, and then rising slightly only as full capacity 
utilization is reached. Both these graphs do not conform to the assumption of rising average 
costs.22 This is a very important finding, because it undermines the assumption of rising 
average costs, and thus of this limiting factor to firm growth. 
A much more recent and more encompassing research is Blinder (1998), who conducted 
interviews with a sample of companies representative of the US private, for-profit, unregulated, 
non-farm economy, which accounts for around 71% of US GDP. This was the part of the 
economy where firms are not price-takers, but price-makers to varying extents. Blinder was 
interested in how firms set their prices, in order to test various theories about price stickiness. 
For one of those, though, he had to ask questions about the behavior of costs. 
The interviewees were offered a choice of five graphs showing various behaviors of variable 
costs, and asked how they would “characterize the behavior of your own variable costs of 
producing additional units as production rises”? (Blinder, 1998:216) Only 11% chose rising 
variable costs. Almost 50% chose constant variable costs, and the remaining 40% chose falling 
variable costs. In the words of Blinder (1998:218): “The answers are fascinating, especially 
when juxtaposed against the standard neoclassical assumption that [rising marginal costs are] 
the rule.” 
                                                             
20 Eiteman and Guthrie explicitly asked the respondents to not do an accounting analysis before answering, as 
they were interested in seeing what businessmen think, the idea being that, businessmen will act on what they 
think is true, irrespective of whether it is or is not actually true. Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that the 
people making decisions on the scale of production in big firms would have no actual knowledge of how their 
costs behaved. 
21 The conclusions from the other group are exactly the same. 
22 Firms do not normally operate at completely full capacity, and if they consistently do, they would normally try 
to expand, so the second graph actually shows falling average costs for most relevant situations. 
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Thus, there seems to be very strong evidence against the assumption that variable costs per 
unit increase as output increases. Quite the contrary, they even seem to be falling for a sizeable 
proportion of firms. So, even if managerial diseconomies of scale or something else increases 
variable costs per unit, these increases apparently must be at least offset by something else that 
reduces costs. As we will see, management and other problems do indeed arise as firms grow, 
but they are solvable, and thus do not hamper the growth of firms. For now, though, let us look 
at how markets populated by small, price-taker, profit-maximizing firms are imagined to 
function. 
 
2.2.2 The theory of perfectly competitive markets 
 
Much like the standard theory of the firm, the theory of perfectly competitive markets is 
what people first encounter when they start studying how markets function. While many more 
people are aware that its assumptions and explanations do not match reality, it is still used as a 
sort of benchmark for comparing how other market types function (usually with the assumption 
that they would function better if they were more like perfectly competitive markets), but, more 
importantly, it is thought to point out supposedly essential mechanisms through which markets 
function. 
In its modern form, the theory was first formulated by Marshall (1997),23 with later authors 
taking it up in standard economics textbooks, just with less nuance and qualifications, and more 
mathematics. Marshall described two situations, one in which only the existing stock of goods 
can be sold, and another in which price changes affect output. In both cases, he wanted to point 
out price changes as the essential mechanisms through which markets adapt. 
In the first case, price increases reduce the number of willing buyers, which pushes demand 
down and makes some sellers unable to sell their products. Some of them, therefore, reduce 
prices. This, however, threatens to attract away customers from other sellers, so they too are 
forced to reduce prices. The general drop in prices makes more buyers willing to buy again. 
However, while prices are still low, some sellers may prefer to hold out and wait for higher 
prices. This means that some buyers may not be able to get the goods they want, so they offer 
a higher price. However, this forces other buyers to do the same, pushing the price up again. 
                                                             
23 See specifically chapter II and III of book V. Much earlier, the theory was expressed in nuclear form at the 
beginning of chapter X of Smith’s Wealth of Nations (Smith, 2008). 
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More sellers will then sell. In this way, the price oscillates around an equilibrium level which 
will allow the market to clear. 
In cases when output is affected by prices, Marshall argued that, if the price of a good goes 
up, it will be profitable for producers to employ more factors of production and produce more 
goods, and the opposite will be the case if the price goes down, that is, fewer factors of 
production will be employed and production will go down. 
Marshall did not think his theory was a descriptively accurate representation of markets. It 
relied on a number of assumptions, such as free competition, goods being of equal quality, or 
sufficient knowledge about the prices that others are offering and accepting. But, Marshall 
thought that, by introducing these assumptions, he was able to “neglect those features which 
are special to particular parts of economic science”, so that he could devote “attention to those 
broad relations which are common to nearly the whole of it.” (1997:157) In other words, he 
thought that changes in relative prices were the essential mechanism through which markets 
operated. They are the signals that tell actors how much and what to produce, sell and buy, as 
well as which factors of production to employ and in what proportions. Normally, it is also 
assumed that the more freely prices are formed, the more efficient will the price mechanism be 
in telling actors what to do.24 However, even if there are price distortions, say, due to the 
presence of powerful market actors, the price mechanism is merely assumed to produce less 
efficient outcomes, but it is still considered to be the most important causal mechanism through 
which markets operate. 
But, is any of this true? Marshall only provided casual empirical evidence for his theories. 
As we will see, a more thorough exploration of how markets function provides a very different 
understanding. There is, however, a link between perfectly competitive markets and the 
standard theory of the firm. Namely, only price-taker firms with rising variable costs per unit 
need to decide on output levels based on the market price. Simultaneously, markets in which 
prices are formed according to supply and demand are what ensures profit-maximizing (i.e., 
efficient) levels of production in such firms. So, in order to understand how markets actually 
operate, we need to first get a more realistic understanding of how firms operate. 
 
 
                                                             
24 This is an unavoidable element of the theory, at least as it is usually presented today. Marshall was actually 
more careful in expressing such claims, and was more interested in getting to an explanation of the price 
mechanism, than for arguing for the efficiency of free markets. 
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2.3 Big firms and oligopolistic markets 
 
Contrary to theories that postulate that small firms are more efficient than big firms, there 
is a long line of thought in economics, generally ignored by the mainstream, that sees big firms 
(in absolute terms, and in relation to the total market) as the normal outcome of the operation 
of markets. Marx (1990) was perhaps the earliest author who clearly saw the tendency towards 
market concentration, and his insights were taken up by later Marxists (Lenin, 2010; Baran and 
Sweezy, 1977; Foster, McChesney and Jonna, 2011). A number of non-Marxist authors also 
saw big firms as the basic economic agent in capitalism (Schumpeter, 2008; Galbraith, 2007; 
Sylos Labini, 1969). Some Post-Keynesians, like Eichner (2008), built their macroeconomic 
analyses taking big firms, who behave very differently to small firms, as the main economic 
agent. Finally, major texts in business studies (Berle and Means, 2000; Penrose, 2009; Chandler 
1994; Nolan, Zhang and Liu, 2007a) are devoted to studying big firms and their effects on the 
economy. We shall first look at why and how firms grow, and then explore how markets 
dominated by big firms function. 
 
2.3.1 The emergence of big firms 
 
Penrose (2009)25 has analyzed at length how and why big firms grow. The first question that 
she asks is whether firms have a motivation to grow? For various reasons – loss of control, too 
much work, being averse to risk, etc. – owners of small firms may not wish their firms to grow. 
However, as long as some small firms wish to grow, we need to ask how they grow and if there 
is a limit to how big they can become. 
Penrose sees firms as a collection of resources, which she defines broadly to include both 
material and immaterial things under a firm’s control (machinery, the skills and knowledge of 
employees, patents, etc.). Not all resources are fully utilized at any time, and a firm with a 
strong entrepreneurial drive will always try to find ways to use unused resources. However, 
every change made in order to do so will create further unused resources. For example, wood 
chippings in a furniture factory are a waste product, but an entrepreneur may “convert” them 
into a resource if she starts selling them to a plywood factory. However, the earned cash 
                                                             
25 Penrose based her analysis on industrial firms, but while many of the details of her arguments are applicable 
only to them, the general thrust of her book is of much broader interest. 
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becomes a new unused resource. The newly established contacts with the buying firm are also 
a new resource that may be useful for future expansion. Effectively, every change and 
expansion creates new possibilities, and if it creates problems, then solving these problems can 
also end up yielding new opportunities, knowledge, capabilities, and resources. If at any point 
the firm ends up in the unlikely situation with all resources being fully utilized, it can still make 
a conscious effort to move out of it and expand further. In other words, as long as a firm wishes 
to grow, it should be able to do so. Additionally, the bigger it grows, the more its drive to grow 
becomes institutionalized in the firm’s organizational structures, and it becomes less a question 
of individual desire. 
Is there a limit to how big a firm can grow, though? Penrose explored several possible 
limitations and concluded that none of them are hard limits. 
Penrose argued extensively why managerial diseconomies of scale do not have to be a factor 
limiting growth. Managerial problems do indeed arise as a firm grows, but it is possible to 
solve them. This is done through various techniques for decentralizing management, and 
through introducing new procedures and technology. This overcomes the limited capacities of 
individuals to control what is going on in a firm. Penrose (2009:16) argues that: 
 
The conclusion that the limited capacity of the individual will limit the size of firms has 
not ... been supported by events ... The techniques for decentralizing administrative 
organization have been developed to a fine point… With increasing size both the 
managerial function and the basic administrative structure have undergone fundamental 
changes ... The differences in the administrative structure of the very small and the very 
large firms are so great that in many ways it is hard to see that the two species are of the 
same genus… 
 
In a similar vein, Galbriath (2007) pointed out that it is simply not possible for individuals 
to run modern production since its complexity far surpasses the knowledge that an individual 
can have. Developing modern decentralized management techniques is thus not just a 
possibility – without them, a modern economy could not even exist. Penrose argued that 
management capacities only limit the maximum rate of growth, as it takes time to build them 
up and adapt them. However, even this problem is mitigated through the possibility to expand 
through mergers & acquisitions, in which case a firm is buying already existing management 
structures. 
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The second possible limitation is the demand for a firm’s products and the supply of its 
factors of production. If these are limited, then a firm cannot grow. However, economies 
generally grow all the time, but even if that is not the case, or if the specific market that an 
individual firm is in is stagnant or declining, a firm can still grow at the expense of other firms, 
or it can diversify into other markets. 
Risk and uncertainty are the final possible limitation. Expansion itself involves risk and 
uncertainty, and a larger firm with more operations will be facing more risks on more fronts. 
However, as a firm grows, it also becomes more able to both reduce risks and uncertainty and 
to deal better with the inevitable instances when things do go badly, as we will see in the next 
section. 
The conclusion of the above analysis is not that all firms will both want to grow and manage 
to do so, but rather that some firms will. As long as that is the case, we will have an economy 
with at least some large firms. We now move onto what effect that has on markets. 
 
2.3.2 Competition and planning in modern capitalism 
 
Since some firms will grow and others will not, when talking about competition, we need 
to differentiate between how small firms compete against each other, how small and big firms 
compete, and how big firms compete among themselves. 
With regards to competition between small firms, Galbraith (2007:34, 58) notes that it 
resembles price-based competition in perfectly competitive markets. In other cases, it may 
resemble monopolistic competition as presented by Robinson (1969) and Chamberlin (1962). 
The Austrians (see, for example, Hayek, 1945) focused on the role of entrepreneurship in 
adapting to market signals. The reality depends on the specific market we are looking at, but 
the essential characteristics are that there are few barriers to entry and exit, no firm has decisive 
power in influencing prices or other relevant trading conditions, firms take consumer 
preferences as given, and generally cannot influence the institutional framework. In such 
conditions, the market is split among many roughly equal small firms. 
Regarding competition between big and small firms, the question comes down to whether 
size provides competitive advantages, which it indeed does. In markets for complex products 
and services – the majority of markets in modern capitalism – small firms may simply be unable 
to enter them at all, because of cost and other barriers to entry. In cases where small firms are 
present in the market, they are simply not big enough to have the necessary resources to make 
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the large investments, such as in R&D26 or in commercializing their products,27 that are needed 
to effectively compete in them. Big firms have higher productivity, better technology, a finer 
division of labor, larger economies of scale (and thus lower costs per unit), better brand 
recognition, higher cash reserves, easier access to financial markets, and numerous other 
competitive advantages. If it does look like a small firm may become a threat through future 
growth, a big firm is normally able to either buy it or otherwise draw it under its influence, or 
simply use its superior market position to outcompete it, for example through undercutting its 
prices (which the big firm can do, because it has lower costs and a stronger financial position), 
or even by engaging in illegal activities, such as forcing its own suppliers to not deal with the 
firm in question or by using price dumping. Of course, we do know that even in advanced 
sectors small firms can and so survive, but Penrose (2009) argued that they do so in 
“interstices”. These can be markets which big firms have not yet come to dominate, niche 
markets that are too small to be of interest to big firms, or it may simply be the case that big 
firms are letting small firms survive for public relations reasons. However, we should not 
mistake the existence of these interstices for a genuine competitive advantage of small firms – 
in principle and in most cases, big firms could come to dominate these interstices as well, if 
they so wished. 
It is for these reasons that most markets are split among a few big firms, as it is only big 
firms that can withstand the competition from other big firms. Even if a market starts with 
many small firms, a few of those will grow faster than others and thus become more 
                                                             
26 For example, the 2016 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard (European Commission Joint Research 
Centre, 2017), apart from tracking the top 1,000 EU companies by R&D investment, also tracks the top 2,500 
world companies by R&D investment. The total R&D investment of the 2500 in 2015/16 was almost €700 billion. 
(This is over 50% of total world R&D investment, when compared to total world R&D investment according to 
World Bank data). The companies it tracks in, say, the automobiles & parts industry invested a total of €107 
billion. One company, Volkswagen, accounted for €13.5 billion, so, 12.5%. This is many times higher than the 
total sales of many smaller automobile producers. Not incidentally, in 2015, Volkswagen accounted for almost 
11% of total world motor vehicles production (OICA, 2017). Volkswagen is also the biggest investor in R&D 
overall, at almost 2% of the total of these 2500 companies. Of the entire 2500 companies, the top 50 accounted 
for 40% of all R&D investment. See also the various data on R&D done by US companies broken down by firm 
size at National Science Foundation (2016), which shows a huge concentration of R&D in the top few firms by 
size. 
27 For example, Amison and Bailey (2014) note how local firms in automotive design in the West Midlands in the 
UK do have enough state support for early stage R&D, but have significant problems in commercializing their 
products. 
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competitive, and it will not take long before the market becomes dominated by a few big firms, 
that is until it becomes oligopolized. However, we should note that markets do not need to ever 
have a phase dominated by small firms. It is quite possible that existing big firms are the ones 
that move into, or create, a new market from the start. Actually, today this is the norm. As 
pointed out by Chandler and Hikino (1999:33), it was mostly the dominant firms of the second 
industrial revolution (say, in steel, machine tools, oil, automobiles, etc.) that ended up 
dominating the third industrial revolution (petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical 
appliances, etc.), with the very significant exception of software. This is because most new 
technologies and products today are more complex than an individual or a small group can 
create. 
Competition between big firms is vastly different from the above descriptions of 
competition between small firms, and between them and big firms. Growth comes from 
investment, which creates illiquid material and immaterial assets, often highly specific to their 
planned use. If whatever the plan for them was does not happen as intended, they cannot be 
easily repurposed or sold, and the firm stands to make considerable losses. For that reason, the 
overarching concern for big firms is risk reduction and ensuring stability. 
Risk comes from various sources, but market changes, and particularly price changes, are 
one of the foremost ones. Firms can invest in market research to be better able to plan and 
reduce risk in that way. But, Galbraith (2007:24-41) explored how big firms, due to their size, 
have numerous options for suppressing markets and replacing them with planning. They can 
integrate vertically, thus completely replacing markets with internal planning. Alternatively, 
their size as both buyers and suppliers makes them very important to other firms, so they can 
use that to dictate prices and other conditions. They can also enter long-term contracts which 
stabilizes market conditions.28 When it comes to ordinary consumers, a big firm can devote 
substantial resources to advertising, making it likely that consumers will want to buy the 
products that the firm wishes to sell.29 Finally, given that advanced sectors, often crucial to an 
economy, are the ones that are most dominated by big firms, governments are often willing to 
guarantee purchases and prices to big firms. 
Big firms, though, face the biggest risks from other big firms. However, it is widely 
understood that they avoid price competition (Galbraith, 2007, Schumpeter, 2008, Penrose, 
                                                             
28 Obviously, any firm can do that, but only big firms are ordinarily stable enough to be able to keep to the bargain. 
29 According to the Forbes (2017b), companies with the most valuable brands in the world spend billions of dollars 
on advertising. The top 10 companies by advertising spending spent almost $54 billion in 2016. 
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2009, Cowling, 1983).30 If one firm reduced prices, due to its sheer size, this would be known 
to those concerned, and the firm could make the needed adjustments to meet the increased 
demand. Its competitors could reduce their own prices, but this would return everyone to where 
they were relative to each other, just with lower revenues. If a price war ensued, everyone 
involved would suffer losses. It is also possible that, due to other firms having long-term 
contracts or strong brand loyalty, a price cut would not generate sufficient extra demand to 
justify it, so it could happen that the firm doing the cuts merely ends up with lower revenues 
and no particular competitive gains. For these reasons, big firms ensure they do not engage in 
price competition, either through active collusion or simply by observing what everyone else 
is doing and sticking to similar pricing.31 
Instead, as explored extensively by Schumpeter (2008), Penrose (2009), Cowling (1983), 
Cowling and Sugden (1987), and numerous others, oligopolistic markets are characterized by 
non-price competition. This is based on developing new and improved products, new 
technologies, entering new markets, cutting costs, improving branding, introducing new 
management techniques, and a host of other actions – this type of competition, as Schumpeter 
(2008:84-85) noted: 
 
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of 
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than [price competition] as a 
bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door, and so much more important that it 
becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary sense 
functions more or less properly; the powerful lever that in the long run expands output 
and brings down prices is in any case made of other stuff. 
 
Such competition normally entails further growth. Still, this competition is in a way 
routinized – for example, big firms are not really taken by surprise when a competitor puts out 
a new product – and in that sense, it does not pose the same type of unpredictable risk that price 
changes would. 
 
                                                             
30 See particularly chapters 16 and 17 in Galbraith (2007) on the role of prices in modern capitalist markets. 
31 Of course, if a big firm does actually manage to get a decisive cost advantage over its competitors, then it may 
reduce prices, but in this case, if other firms follow suit, they will suffer losses. 
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2.4 Big firms and development 
 
As is evident, there are striking similarities between oligopolistic non-price competition and 
economic development. Economic development is based on moving into advanced sectors of 
the economy, where technological and organizational innovations lead to productivity 
increases, economies of scale, diversification, increases in employment, and create the potential 
for increased free time. These things are the effects of competition between big firms. In other 
words, economic development is partially the effect of such competition.32 
Baumol (2004) explored another way in which big firms’ business behavior has beneficial 
effects on development. He showed that big firms often treat technology just as another 
resource, and are therefore willing to sell it or license if that fits into their plans. They also 
often engage in joint research projects, patent swaps, and a host of other arrangements for 
mutually beneficial technology sharing.33 In some cases, even distributing technology for free 
may be a part of the core strategy of the firm – Google’s development of the Android operating 
system under open license is probably the best-known example. The benefits for society of 
faster technological spreading are clear. 
There is another benefit that comes to society from oligopolistic markets. Namely, unlike in 
competition between small firms, in which those who are not doing well generally disappear, 
big firms that fail do not normally disappear completely. Instead, entire firms or at least some 
of their parts are usually bought out by their competitors in order to acquire valuable assets. 
Cowling (1983) and Cowling and Sugden (1987) have, for example, noted the massive extent 
of mergers and acquisitions in modern capitalism, with Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2007b) 
providing more recent evidence. This does not mean that no one suffers from a firm’s closure, 
but it does often ensure that accumulated knowledge and capital do not disappear. Stability is 
important to any economy, and big firms are themselves very stable, due to their ability and 
need to plan, but by buying up failing competitors, they provide another source of stability (and 
incidentally grow further in the process). 
Of course, development does not come only from big firms. Infrastructure, education, or 
healthcare are usually provided directly or indirectly by government. Much technology, 
                                                             
32 For a very thorough account of the key role that big firms have played in the development of a number of 
today’s advanced capitalist countries, see the relevant chapters in Chandler, Amatori and Hikino (1999). 
33 While this may not change the relative position of firms engaged in such arrangements, these firms will all 
achieve an advantage compared to firms outside of such arrangements. 
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particularly basic research, is developed in government and non-profit institutions and 
universities. Also, it is possible for the government to operate a big firm which is not exposed 
to oligopolistic competition, but is nevertheless highly innovative and run efficiently. We 
should also not forget that the dominance of big firms has plenty of negative effects too, from 
their undue political influence, to unproductive competition, to the fact that they rarely pay 
much attention to how their business decisions affect anyone’s interests but their own, which, 
due to their size, can have enormous impacts on society.34 Still, while we should be mindful of 
these things, if we wish to understand development, we have to acknowledge the positive 
effects as well. 
 
 
2.5 Development policies 
 
If development is tied to big firms, then those economies that have more market-leading big 
firms should be more developed than those who have fewer or none. At the global level, that 
is what we observe. Both the Fortune 500 (Fortune, 2017) and Forbes 2000 (Forbes, 2017a) 
list of the largest companies in the world show that they are hugely concentrated in the world’s 
rich countries. 
However, this means that the entire above analysis has a flip-side. Namely, if an economy 
wishes to become developed, it has to move into advanced sectors of the economy by building 
up big firms in them. But, these sectors are already dominated by existing big firms. I already 
argued that small firms are at a huge disadvantage compared to big firms, so starting small and 
gradually building up a competitive position is not really an option. Besides, in many sectors 
technologies that allow viable small-scale production simply do not exist anymore. Of course, 
it is possible to gather enough resources to immediately set up big firms with advanced 
technologies, but they will still be at a disadvantage against existing market leaders, because 
there are numerous other sources of competitive advantage apart from pure size, such as proper 
                                                             
34 For a well known recent criticism of various negative effects of large corporations, see Klein (2005). On various 
forms of unproductive competition, such as massive advertizing, preventive patenting, or keeping large excess 
capacity, see Cowling (1983). Cowling (1983) also explores oligopolistic competition in detail, as well as the 
power of management over workers, and concludes that markets dominated by large corporations will end up 
stagnating, due to the potentially falling rates of profits and the falling shares of wages in income. See also 
Cowling and Sugden (1987, particularly chapter 4) and Cowling (1994) for a criticism of the political power of 
large corporations.  
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management, branding, or established business connections. This puts less developed 
economies that wish to develop in a very problematic position (Nolan, Zhang and Liu, 2007b). 
It is here that our understanding of how firms and markets function becomes essential. If we 
believe that small firms are more efficient than big firms, and that markets operate through the 
price mechanism, and that the freer they are, the more efficient they are, then our suggestions 
for proper development policies will revolve around setting up an economic system that 
resembles these theories. We will also miss the fact that development is sector-specific. But, in 
reality, development comes from big firms and oligopolistic non-price competition in advanced 
sectors of the economy. Prices in such a system are not determined freely on the market as the 
unintended consequence of the actions of many actors, but are set by price-maker firms, and 
are generally not an important signaling mechanism. From this perspective, development 
policies should help firms to achieve efficient scale of production, and to build up other 
competitive advantages. 
Both types of policies have been tried. We can generally call those policies based on the 
idea that markets operate through the price mechanism, that firms are constrained in how big 
they can grow, and that small firms are more efficient than big firms, as Washington Consensus 
policies.35 They have been applied throughout the world, but for this thesis, their effects in 
former communist countries are particularly interesting, given that many of these countries did 
actually have numerous advanced economic sectors with big domestic firms. 
A paradigmatic article discussing Washington Consensus policies in former communist 
countries is Lipton et al., (1990). The authors espouse the erroneous belief that SMEs are the 
main driver of growth in capitalism, claiming that SMEs are: “the kind of firm that plays such 
a vital role in growth in the Western industrialized economies.” (Lipton et al., 1990:82). The 
authors blame the situation in Eastern Europe on the fact that “the absence of markets and 
meaningful relative prices in the economy means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish between enterprises that should and should not survive.” (Lipton et al., 1990:85, 
emphasis mine). In the same vein, they also contrast central planning and the market system in 
the following way: “The organization of industry is designed to facilitate top-down planning, 
rather than market competition, with a heavy orientation toward large firms integrated both 
horizontally and vertically.” (Lipton et al., 1990:82, emphasis mine). The authors’ policy 
                                                             
35 This term was coined by Williamson (1990). The types of policies that have become associated with the term 
are not completely those that he proposed. This is discussed in Williamson (2004). Nevertheless, I am using the 
term the way it is usually used today. 
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suggestions were deregulation, liberalization, free trade, and breaking up of state monopolies, 
quite in line with trying to make the real world resemble more how they imagine capitalism to 
function. 
As should be clear, the authors’ description actually fits both advanced capitalist and former 
centrally planned economies. The results of applying the policies they suggested were as should 
have been expected. The communist countries had advanced economies, but not as advanced 
as those in the West, and when they were exposed to competition from stronger foreign firms, 
their own firms were generally outcompeted, with negative effects on their economies. They 
never recovered from this shock, and have moved into less advanced sectors, or serve as 
sources of cheap labor for Western companies.36 The same effects happened even when 
middle-income capitalist countries, such as those in Latin America, prematurely engaged in 
competition with far stronger competitors. Truly underdeveloped countries suffered even more 
from the application of such policies. 
Conversely, as shown by numerous authors,37 those countries that directly helped their 
domestic firms to develop, with the understanding that it would take a long time before they 
became competitive against already established market leaders, fared much better. Chang 
(2007) calls the policies used to support them activist ITT (industrial, trade and technology) 
policies. They generally included: 
 
a) protection of domestic markets in order to reserve them for domestic firms, so that they 
could survive, and achieve minimum efficient scales of production and develop supplier 
networks, 
b) various forms of financial support for firms so that they could undertake the large 
investments needed to enter markets for complex products and services, 
c) help to achieve export competitiveness, such as through tariff rebates and export 
subsidies, both because domestic markets were not large enough to achieve economies of scale 
and because there was much need for foreign currency, 
d) diverse technological policies, to help domestic firms import and adapt foreign 
technology and/or develop their own, 
                                                             
36 This has been discussed by Reinert and Kattel (2004), Rajic (2011). For a comparison with the different policies 
pursued by China, see Nolan (1996). 
37 See, in particular, Chang (2007, 2008), Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Reinert (2008). 
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e) setting up various institutions to reduce risk and uncertainty, such as guaranteed purchases 
by the state, credit guarantees, and the like, 
f) numerous policies to control foreign investment so that foreign firms would create 
backward and forward linkages in the domestic economy, 
g) general macroeconomic policies that put high investment as the main goal, and 
subordinated other goals, like inflation control, to it. 
 
Werner (2003) has presented extensive evidence of another important policy, namely, 
directed credit through new money creation supported by the central bank. He argues this was 
a key ingredient in Japan’s development during the Second World War and after it. Leading 
Japanese policy-makers, such as Osamu Shimomura, the author of Japan’s successful income-
doubling plan in the 1960s, “knew well that the credit control mechanism was the core of the 
successful system of a mobilized economy and the key tool to create high noninflationary 
growth.” (Werner, 2003:66).38 
Activist ITT policies have not always achieved their goals, but this was due to the political 
economy of the countries that failed, not due to the policies themselves. As Evans (1995) 
argued, what is needed for successful late development is a state that has built up the skills to 
lead an industrial policy, but that is also autonomous enough from various interest groups so 
that it can continue pursuing such policies, even when there are opposing forces. At any rate, 
notwithstanding a few very specific cases, such as Hong Kong, only activist ITT policies have 
managed to help late developers catch up to the leading countries. However, as we will see in 
chapter 4, a number of these policies cannot be used for regional development purposes, as by 
design they cannot be used within countries. 
There are other development policies that only partially rest on the assumptions about firms 
and markets that have been discussed thus far. For example, the World Bank’s influential 
Doing Business reports39 are based on the idea that markets should operate freely, but that there 
are transaction costs that should be reduced. They argue for regulatory reform that makes it 
easier for firms to enter and exit markets, for more transparency in corporate governance, for 
setting up “one-stop shops” where firms can do all the administration they need in one place, 
                                                             
38 For an argument about the interplay between economic growth and the need to maintain price stability, see 
Prebisch (1961). Also, note that centrally planned economies, with their monobanks, practically by definition used 
this approach to monetary policy. 
39 The latest one is World Bank (2017). 
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and various other policies. The reports do have an implicit neoliberal bias in some areas (for 
example, less protection for workers is seen as being better for doing business), but, in many 
others, they do point towards quite reasonable improvements. This sort of thinking seems to 
have been influential in newer regional development policies, so it is worth noting that, 
whatever the merits of such policies on their own terms, they do not address the underlying 
causes of underdevelopment, namely, that poorer economies have fewer and weaker big firms 
than more developed economies. Unless the regulatory framework is of a severely predatory 
nature, a determined firm can find ways to deal with regulatory hurdles, but it is much harder 
to deal with dominant market players. 
Similar criticisms can be raised against micro-credit policies, as has been done by Chang 
(2010). Essentially, while they may help some people secure a somewhat better existence, they 
do absolutely nothing in terms of structurally transforming an economy and pushing it towards 
developing big firms in advanced sectors. 
Various policies to stimulate entrepreneurship are also usually pursued together with 
reforms such as the ones suggested in the Doing Business reports or with micro-credits. This 
may be helpful for individuals, but since most innovation today requires big investments, small-
scale entrepreneurship does not offer scope for structural transformation. The situation is 
different if entrepreneurs are working within big firms, or if we are focusing on those sectors 
where innovation can still be done by small teams, who can then integrate their firms into the 
value chains of big firms, but neither of these is what policies to promote entrepreneurship 
focus on. 
 
*** 
 
The present chapter has argued that development depends on productivity increases and 
their various positive effects, such as diversification or economies of scale. It was also argued 
that development is sector-specific, that is, that at any point in time, only some sectors of the 
economy have the potential for significant productivity increases and that if an economy is to 
be developed, it has to have at least some such sectors. 
In addition, development is inextricably tied to big firms and oligopolistic competition. It is 
generally only big firms that have the capacity to make the significant investments in 
technological and organizational upgrading that productivity increases are based on. They are 
forced to make these investments due to competition from other big firms. On the other hand, 
small firms have little chance to compete successfully against big firms, as they suffer 
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numerous competitive disadvantages. This means that markets in advanced capitalist markets 
are highly oligopolized, divided between a few giant market-leading firms. 
The negative side of this for less developed economies is that, if they want to become 
developed, they have to develop their own big firms in advanced sectors or attract high value-
added investment from existing market-leaders. Neither thing is easy to do because they are 
facing competition from already highly developed economies. This explains why successful 
late developers have had to use highly interventionist economic policies, in order to counter 
the operation of markets, and give their own firms time to become internationally competitive. 
This chapter is an essential background chapter for the rest of the thesis. It established what 
it means to be economically developed, it tied this to market structure, and explored the hurdles 
that less developed economies face in their development, and the appropriate development 
policies that they have to pursue. The next chapter adapts this analysis to regional development 
within countries, while chapter 4 adapts the analysis of development policies to the regional 
context. As we will see, there are numerous parallels between country-level and region-level 
analyses, and understanding regional development and underdevelopment cannot be 
understood without the arguments presented in the current chapter. 
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3. Regional development and oligopolies 
 
The previous chapter established what development is, how it is related to big firms and 
oligopolistic non-price competition, what problems this creates for underdeveloped economies, 
what development policies have been used, and how successful they have been. This chapter 
adapts that analysis to regional development within countries. Are the same mechanisms that 
keep some countries underdeveloped also keeping regions within countries underdeveloped? 
And what development policies can be used to foster the development of poorer regions? 
The first step is to define a region. A functional economic definition of a region could be 
that economic agents within it have stronger connections between each other than with agents 
outside of the region, or that certain types of economic activities are predominant in the entire 
region. The administrative definition is that a region is whatever is defined as such by a relevant 
authority, for example, the central government. Administrative regions often, but not always, 
have regional authorities, which can have widely varying levels of power. Obviously, 
administrative and economic regions do not have to coincide. While for the purposes of this 
thesis it would be preferable to use the functional economic definition, statistical data is 
normally gathered according to boundaries of administrative regions, so this is the definition I 
use throughout. 
We can conceptualize regional economies as separate but interlinked, much like we do with 
national economies. Those regions where the operations of oligopolistic firms, such as 
production, administration or R&D, are located, are likely to be developed because the 
beneficial effects of their presence (employment, technological advances, economic stability, 
etc.) are located there. In contrast, those regions which have fewer big firms, or less competitive 
big firms, are likely to be less developed. Alternatively, since big firms normally have 
operations in numerous places, it may be the same firms that are present in both poorer and 
richer regions, but the internal distribution of value added may be such that operations in poorer 
regions receive less than operations in richer regions. Although a firm could, in principle, 
choose to distribute its value-added in any way it wants between its operations, almost without 
exception it is routinized production and simpler services that are low value-added activities, 
while prototype and pilot production, headquarters functions, R&D, and other knowledge-
intensive services are high value-added. 
 Poorer regions find it difficult to develop because they would either have to attract big firms 
to invest in higher value-added activities in their territories, or they would have to develop their 
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own big firms. However, market-leading firms do not often choose to locate their more 
advanced activities in poorer regions – if they did, they would not be underdeveloped – and, as 
argued in the previous chapter, it is next to impossible for new firms to go up against established 
market leaders. For these two reasons, poorer regions need to be supported through regional 
redistribution and/or helped in their development through regional development policies. 
Regional development policies are explored in the next chapter, while the rest of this chapter 
examines more closely the economic mechanisms that keep some regions underdeveloped. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 examines the mechanisms of 
regional development and underdevelopment. Section 3.2 asks if some regions are simply 
inherently more suitable for development than others. Section 3.3 looks at some theories of 
regional development that, in my opinion, have not contributed too much to our understanding, 
but are nevertheless prominent enough to have to be addressed, even if only briefly. 
 
 
3.1. Mechanisms of regional development and underdevelopment 
 
Substantial work has been done on how the situation described above – the power of market-
leading firms and where they choose to locate their higher and lower value-added activities – 
plays out internationally. Notable examples looking at the macro-picture include Hymer (1975) 
and Cowling and Sugden (1987). Hymer argued that a small number of corporations from 
developed countries would come to dominate the world economy and that the international 
division of production will reflect the internal division of labor within these firms – their higher 
level activities will be located in the developed countries (specifically in a small number of 
global cities), their mid-level activities will be spread across subordinate cities, while the lowest 
level activities will be spread across the world. This development has indeed happened. 
Cowling and Sugden (1987:90-91), on the other hand, focused on explaining the location 
choices of market-leading firms from the perspective of the attempts of management to curb 
the power of workers. Spreading production over a number of locations reduces the power of 
workers in every individual location, as the firm can threaten to use production from a different 
location if its demands, say for wage reductions, are not fulfilled. This creates low pay 
economies, except where more complex activities are located, for which wage costs are not 
necessarily the main consideration. Cowling and Sugden do note that this happens even when 
the production is spread regionally within a country, but focus almost their entire analysis on 
36 
 
the international spreading of production, because workers find it particularly difficult to 
present a common front across borders. 
However, this sort of analysis – tying the location of development to the intra-firm conflicts 
between capital and labor, to internal location choices, and to the power of big firms – has been 
adapted to intra-country regional development by only a few authors. Two authors stand out in 
putting big firms and oligopolistic competition at the center of their analyses of regional 
development: François Perroux (Perroux, 1971, 1988) and Stuart Holland (Holland, 1976a, 
1979). Their analyses are based on exploring how oligopolistic competition plays out in space, 
so they essentially see regional development and underdevelopment as side effects of big firms’ 
actions. Additionally, Myrdal (1964) and Hirschman (1970), while not exploring market 
structures and firms in detail, nevertheless had a clear understanding that competition between 
regions at different levels of development puts the less developed regions at a disadvantage, 
much like competition between rich and poor countries puts the latter at a disadvantage. All 
four authors also analyzed broader regional economic interactions, such as migration, trade and 
capital flows. Together, they provide a thorough understanding regional development and 
underdevelopment. 
It should be noted here that Perroux’s and Holland’s insights about oligopolies have been 
almost completely forgotten. Perroux is best known for his theory of growth poles, but, as we 
will see below, he criticized the fact that too often people have talked about them while 
completely neglecting the fact that they are inextricably tied to oligopolies. Similarly, on one 
of the rare occasions that Holland is even mentioned, Gardiner et al. (2013:900-901) say that 
his basic argument revolves around regional labor and capital flows and how they increase the 
maximum potential growth in richer regions. This, however, was simply not Holland’s basic 
argument. Factor flows between regions were for him first and foremost a consequence of how 
oligopolistic competition plays out in space. 
 
3.1.1 Growth poles 
 
Perroux (1971) introduced the concept of the “growth pole”. This has mostly been 
associated with geographical growth poles – regions or single cities in which economic activity 
is concentrated and stimulates economic activity in other areas or in the cities’ hinterlands – 
but Perroux actually starts with explaining the importance of structural transformation. He 
notes that structural change consists of things such as the appearance and disappearance of 
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industries, the varying rates of growth of different industries, the establishing of links between 
industries, and the stimulating effect that some industry’s products have on inventions in other 
industries (1971:278-279). However, some industries, which Perroux calls propellant, have a 
greater ability to effect structural change than others. He recognizes that such industries are 
“large modern industr[ies]” in which “the separation of the factors of production from each 
other, the concentration of capital under one control, the technical separation of tasks and 
mechanization” are more advanced than in other industries (1971:280s). He also notes that 
competition in them is that of monopolies and oligopolies (1971:284), and remarks on how the 
dominance of large firms over small firms, oligopolistic competition, and state policy, can 
change the structure of markets (1971:286) and the entire economy. 
Only after establishing this does Perroux add a spatial dimension to his analysis. A 
geographically concentrated urban-industrial pole – an area containing propellant and 
“impelled” industries – produces a number of effects. On the consumer side, it “produces 
consumers with more varied and progressive consumption patterns than those of rural 
agricultural environments” (1971:287). This consumer demand stimulates further industrial 
improvements. Urban-industrial poles, however, do not only increase individual needs and 
wants but also collective ones. Accommodation, transportation and various public services 
become complex to satisfy, and finding ways to do so spurs further development of the 
industrial pole. From the side of producers, an industrial pole concentrates and creates “various 
types of producers, entrepreneurs, skilled workers and industrial labour [which] influence each 
other, create their traditions, and eventually share common interests” (1971:287). What 
Perroux is talking about is what we would today call agglomeration economies in the broadest 
sense – positive effects for consumers and producers arising from their geographical 
concentration. This idea is hardly new,40 but Perroux was the first to connect it to oligopolies. 
Urban-industrial poles affect their immediate surroundings, by stimulating food production 
in the rural areas around them. They can also stimulate the emergence of other industrial poles. 
For example, the concentration of steel production and associated activities stimulates the 
establishment of industrial poles built around the extraction of coal and iron. Perroux concludes 
that the actual geographical growth of markets “is quite the opposite of growth equally shared; 
it operates through concentration of the means of production in points of growth from which 
then radiate arrows of exchange.” (Perroux, 1971:287). 
                                                             
40 According to Reinert (2008), the recognition of such effects has existed for centuries, although economists tend 
to associate the idea with Marshall. 
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This provides an explanation of how development spreads geographically, but what about 
underdevelopment? Perroux looks at the issue very briefly, and from only one angle. He says 
that techniques of production, trade or political factors can change in ways that “favour or 
otherwise the various poles of concentration. The concentration of men and fixed capital, the 
rigidity of the structures which accompanied the development of the pole also make their 
consequences felt when it starts to decline; the pole which was a seat of prosperity and growth, 
becomes a centre of stagnation.” (Perroux, 1971:287). This is basically the geographic aspect 
of a decline of big firms located in a region. Big firms have significant resources, and even 
though they require stability, they are able to adapt and change. However, sometimes 
conditions change too much even for them. Still, although this account provides a satisfactory 
explanation of regional economic decline, it does not explain why some regions never get to 
develop in the first place. In fact, Perroux does not even mention this latter question, even 
though it is as important as industrial decline for understanding regional disparities. 
Perroux’s analysis did not change much over the later decades. In Perroux (1988), he 
essentially set out the same theory and devoted much attention to criticizing how the concept 
of the growth pole had been (mis)interpreted, particularly in policy discussions. Namely, 
people had ignored that it is based on an understanding of oligopolies and merely focused on 
its geographical aspects – as if the emergence or decline of poles could be understood without 
looking at the underlying market structure and the emergence or decline of propellant 
industries. 
 With regards to regional disparities, Perroux did elaborate somewhat more on them. He 
noted that an industrialized country “is made up of economically active and surplus-producing 
regions, and … less active and deficit-producing [ones]” (Perroux, 1988:54). The surpluses and 
deficits refer to the flows of raw materials and people, which go from less active to more active 
regions. This may empty some regions of their resources, but it is necessary if the economies 
of the active regions are to expand. However, Perroux argues that we cannot stop the analysis 
at this “attraction” phase, but have to also look at the “expansion” phase which comes 
afterward. By this, he meant the propulsive effects that active regions exert on other areas, and, 
in the aggregate, on the entire economy (Perroux, 1988:58-59). Furthermore, it is not 
necessarily the case that the resources that are drawn from less active to more active regions 
were employed before, so it is not clear whether the less active regions lose out even in the 
attraction phase. 
Here we see a basic theory of regional development and underdevelopment – during certain 
periods some regions have to lose out so that others can develop, but in later periods they too 
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will receive investment and attain higher living standards, exactly because other regions have 
become developed and are now producing positive effects for the whole economy. 
 
3.1.2 Interactions between richer and poorer regions 
 
Myrdal (1964), Hirschman (1970) and Holland (1979) explored these interactions between 
poorer and richer regions in more detail, looking at migration, capital flows, and trade. Myrdal 
and Hirschman, whose analyses are nearly identical in almost all respects, predominantly 
stayed at the theoretical level. They divided the interactions between poorer and richer regions 
into those that favor the latter and those that do not. Myrdal calls the positive mechanisms 
“spread” effects, while Hirschman calls them “trickle-down” effects. Myrdal’s term for the 
negative effects is “backwash” effects, while Hirschman’s calls them “polarization” effects. 
Holland tried mustering as much empirical evidence as possible about these mechanisms. I will 
focus only on the effects on the poorer regions since I am interested in the possibility for 
structural transformation there. 
 
Migration 
 
 Myrdal (1964:27-28) and Hirschman (1970:188-189) argue that on average young, active, 
enterprising, educated and skilled people emigrate from poorer to richer regions. This denudes 
the poorer regions of exactly those people who are essential for development, while 
simultaneously leaving behind those who need more support, such as children, the old and the 
sick. Hirschman noted that the net effect at the aggregate level is uncertain – it is possible that 
the gains in the richer regions are smaller than the losses in the poorer ones. An additional 
negative effect that neither Myrdal nor Hirschman mention is that investment made in the 
poorer regions for the benefit of the future émigrés (for example, in their education) is 
effectively lost from the point of view of those region. This may be particularly problematic if 
the investment was made into something that will continue to incur costs even after the people 
who benefited from the investment emigrate, for example, empty houses which still need fire 
protection. 
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Hirschman did note that emigration may also help a poorer region by reducing (often 
disguised) unemployment.41 If unemployed people emigrate, there is no reduction in the income 
of the poorer region (due to the fact that the unemployed have zero or negative marginal 
productivity), but a reduction in population leads to an increase in income per capita. However, 
the crucial (implicit) assumption here is that the unemployed are supported by incomes 
generated in the poorer region. But, if they are at least to an extent supported by incomes 
generated in the richer regions – for example, through unemployment benefits, provided state 
revenues do not derive only from the poorer region – then Hirschman’s argument does not 
necessarily hold. At the very least, the increase in income per capita will not be as large as it 
would have been in the first instance. 
Strangely, neither Hirschman nor Myrdal mention that those who emigrate often send 
remittances back to their region, which would be another way through which emigration could 
help poorer regions. Still, this additional income would have to be measured against the losses 
incurred by the emigration. Furthermore, the gains may be temporary. A person may emigrate 
to a richer region and send money, say, to his family, but if they emigrate as well, the 
remittances could stop, which might have further negative effects by removing demand from 
the local economy. 
The strength of the negative effects and the balance between these and any positive ones 
cannot be determined at the level of theory. Holland (1979)42 offered an empirical assessment 
by drawing on research for the United States and Italy. He concludes that there is a definite 
flow of labor from the poorer to the richer regions. In terms of age and gender selectivity, there 
is a clear bias towards young males. There was insufficient evidence about skills selectivity, 
but lots of concern that poor regions were being denuded of skilled workers. 
Holland also argued that the positive effects of emigration through a reduction in 
unemployment in the poorer regions do not necessarily happen. He noted that there is 
significant reluctance to move far in search of higher wages and employment. In fact, migration 
tends to have intermediate steps. If people live in deprived rural areas, they usually first move 
to regional urban centers, where they often linger in unemployment, underemployment or 
poorly paid jobs. Because of this, agricultural areas get depopulated, while poor cities, which 
                                                             
41 Hirschman was writing in the 1950s, so he must have had in mind poor agricultural regions. The common 
understanding was that these had high levels of disguised unemployment – agricultural laborers with zero 
marginal productivity, who were effectively supported by their families and communities. 
42 See in particular his chapter 4. 
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have little resources to deal with a population influx, simultaneously get over-populated and 
pockets of severe urban deprivation are created. Meanwhile, the population of the poorer 
regions does not decrease, and its income per capita obviously cannot increase based on that. 
The move to more developed regions tends to come afterward. Once it finally happens (if it 
does), it is also not irreversible, since many people do not succeed in their new region and return 
home. Due to these and other reasons, in the period that Holland examined, the respective 
“souths” of the US and Italy had an outmigration approximately equivalent to their population 
increases, which means that their population actually remained approximately the same 
throughout the post-war period. 
The other problem is that even if population decreases and there is an increase in income per 
capita, there is no guarantee that what is usually assumed will happen, namely that the 
additional income will be used for productive investment. Looking primarily at Italy’s 
Mezzogiorno, Holland noted that the extra income per capita resulting from emigration, in the 
form of higher agricultural surpluses, may not be large enough to enable investment. 
Furthermore, the nature of the production that is yielding the surpluses may be such that 
investment is anyway impossible. In the case of the Mezzogiorno, emigration was mostly 
coming from poor mountainous areas, where substantial increases in productivity cannot be 
achieved due to the terrain and the types of crops grown. Even in better terrain, it is possible 
that there are no cash crops that can be grown there that are also in demand. Or, agricultural 
production in such terrain may already be well capitalized, and under the control of capitalist 
producers, and no further gains in productivity can be made.43 The type of land ownership may 
also prevent investment. For example, if it is landless peasants who are emigrating, it is not 
likely that their remaining families would use their extra income to invest in the landlord’s land, 
not least because the landlord could easily increase the rent and appropriate the extra income 
the investment would bring. Even for farmers with their own land, it is not guaranteed that they 
will be entrepreneurial enough to undertake investment – many people are too set in traditional 
ways of doing things or do not wish to take on the risk associated with investment. Or, they 
may simply need the increased consumption. 
It is not difficult to adapt this analysis to non-rural deprived areas. The picture is even 
bleaker. Productivity increases in agriculture may often be obtained fairly easily – some simple 
machinery, fertilizer, and basic irrigation systems can increase productivity by a large margin. 
                                                             
43 In that case, the advanced agricultural activity in question is obviously insufficient to lift the entire region out 
of poverty. 
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In contrast, productivity increases in urban activities, and particularly in those that are actually 
needed for development – manufacturing and advanced services – happen in big firms, and 
there is no direct way in which these can benefit from remittances or increased per capita 
incomes due to emigration. Perhaps this extra income could be captured through some financial 
mechanisms, but it is questionable whether it would be large enough to enable the needed 
investments. 
 
Trade 
 
Myrdal (1964:28-29) and Hirschman (1970:188-189) argue that trade between richer and 
poorer regions can have negative effects. Firms in richer regions may be strong enough to 
outcompete firms in poorer regions. Hirschman also notes that, if a country is trying to 
industrialize – with the efforts being concentrated in the richer regions – and there are tariffs in 
place, then poorer regions may be forced to buy more expensive domestic products from richer 
regions rather than cheaper foreign ones. 
With regards to potential positive effects, the expanding economy of a richer region may 
stimulate demand for products from poorer regions. This can increase production in poorer 
regions, or the prices for their products, or both, all of which is clearly favorable to the poorer 
regions. However, Hirschman notes that things can work out differently as well. The elasticity 
of production in poorer regions may not be high, and this may slow down growth in richer 
regions, or it might force them to turn to other (including foreign) suppliers, or even develop 
their own resource base. This can effectively sever many economic links between the regions 
and lead to a “prolonged split of the country into a progressive and a depressed area” 
(Hirschman, 1970:189). He cites the Mezzogiorno in Italy, Nordeste in Brazil and Oriente in 
Colombia as examples. 
The balance of these effects can only be determined empirically. Holland (1979) presented 
much empirical evidence that firms in poorer regions do indeed get outcompeted. As for the 
positive effects, they are best understood as part of investment flows, which is the topic of the 
next section. 
 
Capital flows 
 
Myrdal (1964:28) noted that the need for investment in the expanding economies of the 
richer regions will tend to outstrip the available savings in those regions. In the poorer regions, 
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there is little investment, and even the low savings resulting from low incomes will not be used 
up fully. He argues that studies have shown that the banking system siphons off savings from 
poorer regions, and channels them to the richer regions unless regulated to do otherwise. 
This argument is based on an erroneous understanding of how banks function. Some 
financial institutions are indeed intermediaries, and they may be doing what Myrdal described, 
but deposit-taking institutions (mainly banks) create new deposits when they make loans. No 
money moves between accounts, and banks thus do not move any savings around when giving 
loans (though they do move money when making payments).44 A more accurate way of 
expressing Myrdal’s argument would be that banks create more money in richer regions through 
extending more loans there. Nevertheless, the final effect is the same – markets will not furnish 
poorer regions with sufficient investment finance. 
Contrary to Myrdal, Hirschman (1970:188-189) sees capital flows as a mechanism that can 
actually help poorer regions. If the economies of the richer and poorer regions are compatible 
to some degree, there is bound to be some investments in the latter that firms from the richer 
region will undertake in their own interest. 
Holland (1979) relied on research on post-war Britain, specifically on Brown (1972), to 
assess these claims. Because data on intra-country capital flows is scant, Brown had to rely on 
numerous assumptions. He did conclude that capital in the aggregate seems to flow from more 
to less developed regions, but Holland noted that this reflects not only the workings of the 
market but also of extensive public investment. Without that, the flow of capital would be from 
the poorer to the richer regions. This is due to the fact that investment opportunities are less 
profitable, smaller, fewer, and riskier in the poorer regions, which runs counter to the 
mainstream arguments that returns on capital are higher where there is less of it. 
But, where Holland really added to Myrdal’s, Hirschman’s and Perroux’s analyses is that he 
explored in much more depth what lies behind investment decisions. The argument is split into 
two parts. First, are there any advantages to being located in a poorer region, that firms from 
those regions may exploit in competition against firms from richer regions? Second, why do 
firms from richer regions not invest in higher value-added activities in poorer regions?  
With regards to the first question, there are some advantages of being located in poorer 
regions, such as higher labor availability, lower wages, lower levels of unionization, lower rent 
and land prices, and various government investment incentives. Are they enough, though, to 
substantially increase the competitiveness of firms from poorer regions? Holland (1976:144) 
                                                             
44 On how banks actually function, see McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014), Werner (2014a, 2014b). 
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argues that this is a possibility, but presents extensive evidence that it does not happen often in 
practice. The advantages that established market leaders have, and the market tactics that they 
can use against potential threats, most often represent an insurmountable obstacle for the 
growth of weaker firms, the more so the longer this sort of a market structure has existed. 
Besides, the advantages of poorer regions must be seen against the advantages of richer regions 
(the agglomeration economies that Perroux described). The problem is that the advantages from 
agglomeration economies are of the type that strengthens advanced economic activities, 
whereas the advantages of poorer regions matter the most for cheaper, simpler production. 
What about attracting investment by market leaders to poorer regions? If only simpler 
investment is attracted, perhaps due to the advantages of poorer regions mentioned above, they 
may get jobs and incomes, but not really undergo structural transformation. If, however, they 
got investment into more advanced activities, then they too may become highly developed. 
Even a simple look at the world shows that the latter case is not happening – if it were, less 
developed regions would not be less developed. Actually, firms routinely locate lower value-
added activities in poorer regions, and higher value-added activities in richer regions, exactly 
to exploit the different location factors in both.45 However, even the location of lower value-
added activities in the poorer regions can be in question. To understand why we have to look 
at how big firms make their location decisions. 
Looking at manufacturing industry, which was the most mobile sector at the time and thus 
could choose its investment locations most freely, Holland argued that if firms “maximised 
locational benefits arising from higher labour availability or lower labour costs … the result 
could be a situation which had no significant regional dimension”, at least in terms of 
employment (1976:139). However, as he showed, big firms do not necessarily maximize 
locational benefits. The main reasons are (1976:151-159): 
a) Firms do not always seek to maximize profits, and thus will not seize every locational 
benefit simply because it would increase profits. Managers do not have unlimited capacity to 
make decisions and may be focused on something else at the moment. They may also be 
comparing their firm’s profits to competitors’ profits, not to potential maximum profits which 
could be obtained, among other ways, through locating new plants in poorer regions or 
relocating existing ones there. Managers may also want to avoid a price war, which could ensue 
if they reduced costs by locating in poorer regions and then transmitted that reduction to lower 
                                                             
45 For a thorough example (of the HDD industry) of how the location choices function at the international level 
between richer and poorer countries, see Gourevitch, Bohn and McKendrick (2000). 
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prices. Besides, if wages are determined at the firm instead of the plant level, then they will not 
be lower in the poorer regions anyway, which takes away one of the more important reasons 
for locating there. Managers may also prefer expanding and improving existing plants, rather 
than opening new ones, especially if good transport connections allow them to easily supply 
the less developed regions from their existing plants. Actually, given that manufacturing was 
rapidly becoming more and more capital intensive and that transport infrastructure was 
improving, most investment did, in fact, go into existing plants. When it comes to relocating 
existing plants from richer to poorer regions, this may not be possible due to union opposition. 
And, whatever the nature of investments in the poorer regions, it may be difficult to get middle 
management to move there. 
The advantages of locating in poorer regions may be more important for smaller firms that 
are supplying the bigger firms, because the benefits of cost reductions may be more important 
for them. However, smaller firms have a harder time moving, and also have incentives to stay 
close to their main buyers. 
b) At least as important as the above reasons is the fact that big firms can locate in poorer 
countries as opposed to poorer regions in rich countries. Wages there are much lower than in 
the poor regions of rich countries, even taking into account the wage subsidies that some rich 
country governments were giving for wages in poorer regions, such as the Regional 
Employment Premium in the UK. For labor-intensive production, this may very well be the 
determining factor in the choice of plant location.46 Additionally, firms located in more than 
one tax jurisdiction can use transfer pricing to obtain massive profits, dwarfing any fiscal and 
financial incentives they may obtain from rich country governments for locating in their poorer 
regions. 
Finally, even if big firms do invest in the poorer regions of rich countries, this does not 
necessarily only have positive effects. A firm may simply take over an existing firm, instead of 
creating new plants and jobs. Actually, it may even cut jobs, disrupt local supply chains, strip 
the local economy of its capacity to make decisions, and so on (Cowling and Sugden, 
1987:119). 
Overall, the general point is not that big firms from richer regions never locate in poorer 
regions, and that they never produce positive effects. Rather, the point is that this often does 
                                                             
46 Here Holland spotted a trend that was just beginning in his time. The shift of labor intensive production to poorer 
countries did later take place on a massive scale. 
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not happen and that we cannot without further consideration count on this mechanism to remedy 
regional development disparities. 
 
3.1.3 Regional redistribution in favor of poorer regions 
 
It seems that Perroux was overoptimistic: there do not seem to be distinct attraction and 
expansion phases in the geographical development of growth poles. Rather, the positive and 
negative effects of the interactions between richer and poorer regions are always present, and 
on balance, it appears the negative effects are stronger. Of course, positive effects may prevail 
in some poorer regions and some regions may even develop into growth poles themselves, but 
in most cases that does not happen. 
For Perroux, what was important is that “unbearable” disequilibria between regions are 
avoided. They occur when the growth in region A imposes such strains on region B “that the 
growth rate of the aggregate declines, or the vital level of consumption in the population of B 
is threatened.” (Perroux, 1988:55). Perroux thought that this could be avoided through a 
combination of private and public planning of development. He argued that such planning is 
essential because oligopolistic firms develop in line with their own interests, and do not take 
into account the needs of other actors. As we will see in chapter 4, regional development 
policies have generally not been too successful, so the “vital level of consumption” in poorer 
regions is normally threatened. 
This problem is mitigated through redistribution from richer to poorer regions. Such 
redistribution can come from many sources, but that done through the public sector is the most 
important. If we have two regions, redistribution happens if expenditures per capita in both 
regions are the same, but one region pays a larger share of its income in taxes, or if both regions 
pay the same share of their incomes, but one gets higher expenditures per capita. Of course, 
some combination of these two things is possible as well. 
On the revenues side, it is the income tax that is usually progressive, effectively taxing a 
higher share of the income in richer regions. However, other taxes may be either proportional, 
or even regressive, so the net effect has to be determined empirically. 
On the expenditures side, there are numerous expenditures that may be the same in per capita 
terms in all regions (though this is by no means necessarily the case). For example, 
governments often provide the same level of public services, such as healthcare and education, 
in all regions, and they invest in infrastructure throughout the entire country. But even if such 
47 
 
policies result in the same per capita expenditures in all regions, the absolute sums might still 
be higher than what poorer regions could muster on their own, so in that sense, they are 
redistributive. Other expenditures, however, may be higher in per capita terms in poorer 
regions, such as various social benefits or expenditures on regional policies. Like with 
revenues, the exact situation can only be determined empirically for every case. 
Looking at statistical data, substantial regional redistribution must be taking place in most 
countries. For example, differences between regional incomes per capita tend to be much 
smaller than between regional GDP per capita. Actually, in some developed European 
countries, their poorer regions do not have much higher GDP per capita than East European 
countries (for example the former East German states), and yet they undoubtedly enjoy much 
higher living standards than them. This can obviously only happen through redistribution from 
the richer regions.47 As we will see in chapter 5, regional redistribution can be an important 
factor in interregional economic conflicts. 
 
 
3.2 Are some regions more suitable for development than others? 
 
Whether a region is developed depends on the location of various types of activities of big 
firms, but why is it certain regions and not others that get to be developed? If it is because of 
some innate regional characteristics, then the important implications for policy are that it 
should focus on redistribution, and have modest and realistic plans when it comes to regional 
development. Conversely, if regional characteristics that are important for development can be 
changed, then regional development policies should know what these characteristics are. 
Historically, it was primarily natural regional characteristics that determined where different 
economic activities emerged. For example, trading centers could emerge at estuaries or 
confluences of larger rivers, while production which required bulky and heavy raw materials 
emerged near the sources of these materials. Myrdal (1964:26) pointed out, though, that for 
many activities there is no particular reason why they emerged in one place, rather than another, 
apart from chance. The crucial point, however, is that once certain activities are established in 
an area for whatever reasons, powerful forces – various agglomeration economies – tend to 
concentrate further development there, even if the original reasons for locating there have 
disappeared. For example, pottery production could emerge near sources of clay, but even if 
                                                             
47 Look at various data in any of the EU Cohesion reports, for example, European Commission (2014). 
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these are exhausted, the concentration of knowledge and skills in the area might mean that 
pottery continues being produced there, while clay is imported. If other trade links are 
established in the same area, and then perhaps complex administrative structures, the area 
might continue developing even if clay production completely disappears at some point. 
Indeed, many of today’s more developed regions have been more developed for centuries. 
With advancements in transportation and communication technology, natural characteristics 
have become far less important. Many economic activities today could be equally located 
almost anywhere in the world. It seems that this conclusion is borne out by empirical research 
into the location factors that influence firms’ location decisions. 
Broadly, there are two ways to assess empirically which location factors are important: 
econometrically or through company surveys and interviews (Carlson, 2000). In the former 
case, variables like building permits or new firm openings are taken to represent new business 
activity (whether by new or existing firms), and are then regressed against a variety of variables 
taken to represent location factors, such as income levels, wages, working-age population, road 
density, and so on. In the latter case, respondents, normally executives tasked with choosing 
appropriate locations, are asked about the factors that have influenced their decisions. Usually, 
they estimate the importance of various factors that they are asked about or merely indicate 
whether they have been important or not. 
Carlson (2000:2) argues that both surveys and statistical methods offer certain advantages. 
Surveys can ask about variables that are difficult or impossible to quantify, such as “’we wanted 
to locate near the owner’s home’ or ‘quality of life’ factors”. Another advantage is that data 
used in econometric models is usually too aggregate in nature to capture industry-specific 
factors, such as specific needed skills, which can easily be learned about through surveys or 
interviews. Similarly, surveys can also contain open-ended questions. 
Conversely, statistical methods can take into account factors that an individual firm may not 
be readily able to answer. For example, if we are interested if population density is an important 
location factor, it would be difficult to ask directly about it, because the respondent might be 
aware of some of the consequences of population density (for example, high rent), but not the 
underlying cause. Similarly, respondents may not be aware of some of the factors that have 
influenced their location decisions. Finally, a possibility that Carlson does not mention, but that 
may be important, is that respondents may lie. We can be fairly certain that issues like racism 
or tax avoidance will not be readily reported. 
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Irrespective of how we assess location factorswhat comes out clearly is that almost all of 
them are aspects of the economic structure of specific locations, rather than facts of nature.48  
Location factors that regularly come up as important are, for example, labor costs, skills 
availability, proximity to markets and transportation links, transportation costs, access to 
finance, utilities, the presence of suppliers and competitors, taxes, the regulatory framework, 
and so on. Broader social factors can also be important, such as various aspects of the quality 
of life. Of course, some natural factors also come up, such as the availability of raw materials 
and climate, but overall, there are far fewer of those, and for many sectors of the economy they 
are obviously irrelevant. Besides, even some of these natural factors are not completely 
immutable – rainfall, for example, can be affected by cloud seeding, while what is considered 
a raw material is not defined outside of the economic system, but depends on what our 
technology allows us to use. 
The policy implications of the above are ambivalent. On the one hand, most location factors 
can be affected by policy and in that sense the situation is positive. On the other, many attractive 
location factors are actually aspects of economic development that has already taken place. For 
example, if big firms have emerged or located in a certain region, they will train up a workforce 
there, which will attract even more firms. What this means, however, is that to attract 
investment, a region needs a skilled workforce, but in order to have a skilled workforce, it 
needs to attract investment. It is not impossible for a poor region to break out of such a situation 
through conscious policy effort, but we should bear in mind how powerful the forces that create 
regional development disparities are, and thus be mindful that improving location factors in a 
poorer region is not at all easy and certainly not guaranteed to succeed. 
 
 
3.3 Other theories of regional development 
 
There are a number of past and current prominent theories of regional development that I 
have not found too illuminating, but due to their importance, they merit mentioning. 
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3.3.1 Location theory, regional science, and new economic geography 
 
Location theory and regional science 
 
One set of theories, often collectively called “location theory”, was started by von Thünen 
(1910), and later continued by Launhardt (1993), Weber (1929) and Lösch (1954).49 Location 
theory was somewhat modified by Isard (1956), who started what is called “regional science”.  
The most defining characteristic of these theories is the development of mathematical 
models of firms’ location choices. The essential element of their models is a uniform plane, 
with transport costs equal in all directions, and proportional to distance and weight. A further 
assumption is that economic agents wish to maximize profits, and they do this by choosing the 
place on the plane that allows them to produce their output and transport it where needed with 
minimal transport costs. With von Thünen (1910), this was a flat plane surrounding a town. 
Farmers choose freely where and what to grow, and have to sell their produce in the town. They 
choose where to locate based on the rent they have to pay for the land, the weight of their 
products, and the price they can get for them. Launhardt (1993) instead put a market outlet and 
two sources of raw materials on the plane and assumed a producer who needs the raw materials 
to produce a product that is sold at the market outlet (the so-called “three-point problem”). He 
then found mathematical solutions to how the producer can find the least-cost point on the 
plane to locate in. Weber (1929) took the same plane, but added points of low labor costs, and 
used lines called isodopanes to determine whether they will draw away the producer from the 
least cost point.50 Isard’s (1956) modifications of the three-point problem revolve around 
dropping the assumption of the ability to move in any direction, rather assuming that movement 
is possible only between certain points on the plane that are connected by transportation lines.51 
There are, of course, many further details and variations of the described models, but I have 
generally not found location theory illuminating. The basic underlying ideas – for example, 
                                                             
49 See Holland (1979:1-35) and Blaug (1990:614-631) for reviews. 
50 Weber does not mention Launhardt’s work at all in his book. Blaug (1990:621) argues that he was not aware of 
it, and that the “three-point” problem seems to be a genuine case of multiple discovery. 
51 Today regional science has mostly moved away from theoretical models and into econometric modelling (see, 
for example, Nijkamp, Rose and Kourtit, 2015). Their insights are as useful as their methods allow, but since the 
analyses are mostly not based on an explicit theory, I will not explore them here. For a history of regional science, 
see Boyce (2003), Isard (2003), Isserman (2009). See Lawson (2006) for a thorough argument why theoretical 
and econometric modelling are very limited in terms of the insights they can provide. 
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that transportation costs are important – are not problematic, but they are not developed further. 
Instead, the focus is on imagining a set of very contrived conditions and then making 
mathematical models of them. It is not clear what insights can be gained from this. The authors 
themselves were aware of this issue, but while most of them also provided more realistic 
commentary about location choices and regional development, the bulk of their analyses were 
their models, and in my opinion they never provided satisfactory arguments for how they help 
us understand the real world. This leaves the underlying ideas as a potential contribution, but 
since they are mostly trivial, not new, and have anyway been explored thoroughly within much 
more realistic frameworks, the usefulness of location theory as a whole is questionable. 
 
New Economic Geography 
 
A very prominent approach today is New Economic Geography (NEG). Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables (2001) give a good overview of its development, with part II focusing on regional 
NEG models. Like location theory and regional science, NEG builds mathematical models in 
order to explain the patterns of regional development. 
The models are centered around the notion of increasing returns to scale, transportation costs 
and labor mobility. The gist is that there is a constant returns sector which pays the same wages 
to all its laborers and an increasing returns one that pays out higher wages the more laborers it 
employs or that offers an increasingly diversified range of products the more it grows. This 
increasing returns sector attracts laborers to itself, and as their number increases, agglomeration 
economies arise, creating further attraction. One of the key points in the models is that even if 
the geographical distribution of constant and increasing returns activities is even, due to any 
sort of random shock or even pure chance, some areas may get some more increasing returns 
activities. The models show that, due to self-reinforcing effects, these regions will eventually 
get more and more of these activities, leaving the other regions only with constant return 
activities. Thus, a split into a core and periphery emerges.52 There are also transportation costs 
and a number of other factors, which pull in the different direction, namely, towards a dispersal 
of economic activities in all regions. The final effects (the extent of agglomeration or dispersal) 
depend on the set-up of the individual models. 
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Just like with location theory and regional science, the basic underlying ideas are not 
problematic, but what is is that NEG does not develop these ideas further. Rather, it puts them 
into very contrived settings and then makes mathematical models of them. How this is useful 
for understanding regional development is not argued. As a matter of fact, Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables even admit, after enumerating some of the unrealistic assumptions that they are going 
to use, that they “are aware that this lends the analysis a certain air of unreality, that this book 
sometimes looks as if it should be entitled Games You Can Play with CES Functions. 
Nonetheless, we regard the advantages … as overwhelming for our purposes.” (Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables, 2001:6). The issue is, their purpose is not to illuminate the real world, 
but to build models. 
Martin (1999) has offered a much more thorough criticism of NEG53 than I can do here. He 
notes that NEG deals with abstract, not real, space, ignores numerous important factors that 
contribute to uneven regional development and deals with unrealistic assumptions. As for the 
underlying ideas, Martin argues that not only are they not new, but there is already copious 
existing and ongoing empirical research on elaborating and examining them further. He 
contrasts this with empirical research in NEG, which is both more limited in number, and 
conceptually problematic. 
There is no need to go further than this. Overall, I have not found NEG to be a useful 
approach, but its prominence has meant that I needed to explain at least briefly my choice not 
use it at all. 
 
3.3.2 Marxian geography 
 
Marxist geographers (Harvey, 2007; Smith, 2010) are primarily interested in explaining the 
changing geographical patterns of regional development based on a Marxian analysis of 
overaccumulation and economic crises. According to their understanding, firms choose where 
to locate based on a series of factors. Smith points out that they go to where the profit rate is 
the highest, while Harvey (2007:388) lists a larger number of factors, such as the costs of 
capital, transportation to markets, interest rates, land prices, existing services, natural resources, 
labor costs, the power of organized labor, and so on. However, due to overaccumulation and a 
falling profit rate, a devaluation of capital occurs, and entire regions can get devastated as 
investments, particularly fixed ones, are abandoned. The destruction of existing capital is seen 
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by Harvey and Smith as necessary for starting a new round of accumulation, where also new 
regions may be drawn into the cycle of investment, overaccumulation and devaluation. Smith 
calls this the “see-saw” of capital. 
Unfortunately, I have found Marxian geography to be too abstract. There is in principle 
nothing wrong in interpreting industrial decline in certain regions as a consequence of 
“overaccumulation”, the ensuing bankruptcies and the like as a “devaluation of capital”, and 
the business decisions of firms as being based on “exchange value”, as opposed to the “use 
value” of the investments made, although to me it is not clear why we would ever want to use 
more rather than less complicated terms. The real problem, though, is that however we decide 
to call events, they still need to be thoroughly empirically researched, but, as noted, Marxian 
geography remains mostly abstract.54 
Furthermore, I do not believe that either Harvey or Smith provided sufficient evidence for 
a cyclical movement of capital between regions. Had they done this, it would have been a very 
important finding. Due to the abstract nature of their texts and their sparse use of examples, it 
is not always easy to know what Harvey and Smith have in mind when setting out their 
arguments. Still, it does often seem plausible that they are thinking of traditional industrial 
regions in advanced capitalist countries when talking about overaccumulation and devaluation 
of capital, or, say, of raw material producers stripping out a region of resources and then 
moving away. However, these are discrete events that need to be explained, but they do not 
seem to happen cyclically. For financial capital there may be more reason to think it might be 
moving cyclically, but even there what would be important to know is why and how decisions 
to move it are made, not simply to note that the movement is cyclical. Smith and Harvey both 
refer to financial capital in their analyses, but there too they remain mostly abstract. 
Like with the other schools of thought explored in this section, there is no need to go further 
than this. It was simply necessary to briefly explain why, even though I have taken a heterodox 
approach to regional development, I have not integrated into my work a well known example 
of it. 
  
                                                             
54 Smith, in addition, drew heavily on postmodern geography (specifically Lefebvre, 1991), so his analysis is also 
very convoluted, as he has clearly been influenced by postmodernism’s predilection for complicated and invented 
words, unclear arguments, and dabbling in mathematics and physics. More than half of his book is actually 
devoted to the “production of space” and the “production of nature”, where even the relativity of time, curved 
space and Einstein are present, topics obviously “relevant” for understanding regional development in capitalism. 
For a critical review of postmodern geography, see Unwin (2000). 
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4. Regional development policies 
 
In the post-WWII period concern about poorer regions – their lower employment and 
incomes, worse infrastructure, high emigration, worse public services (if they were funded from 
local revenues), etc. – grew substantially. This pushed numerous governments to enact policies 
aimed at helping them develop. These regional development policies have been very diverse, 
and can be classified according to various criteria, such as whether they are aimed at capital or 
labor, according to what tools they use (fiscal, monetary, financial or regulatory), whether they 
are incentives or disincentives, whether they are aimed at poorer or richer regions, etc. The 
classification used in this chapter is whether the policies employed are generally interventionist 
or not. Like with other economic policies, there was a shift from the former to the latter in the 
1980s and 1990s, so sections 4.1 and 4.2 roughly correspond to the pre-1980s and post-1980s 
periods. 
As we will see, the interventionist policies were generally aimed at attracting or directing 
manufacturing investment to poorer regions, either from richer regions or from abroad. The 
main, but far from only, policy tool were financial incentives, although location controls on big 
firms’ investment were extensively used as well. The policies were successful to an extent, but 
they mainly attracted investment in routinized production, not in higher value-added activities. 
This provided jobs, but did not lead to full structural transformation in the poorer regions. 
The non-interventionist policies are mostly aimed at helping the development of indigenous 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in poorer regions. While they may be successful in 
stimulating the growth in their number, and providing jobs through that, they seem to have had 
no success in creating structural transformation. This is not surprising, given that they do not 
take into account that it is the oligopolistic nature of capitalism that is fundamentally 
responsible for regional underdevelopment, and SMEs cannot change that. 
One case of genuine structural transformation coming from within a region is the US state 
of Nevada, which was a mining economy prone to boom and bust cycles, but became the leading 
gambling center in the world. This transformation is explored in section 4.3, which shows that 
the circumstances that enabled it were extremely specific and dependent to a significant extent 
on luck. They are thus obviously hardly replicable. Several more general implications are drawn 
for regional policies, but the main argument is that, rather than providing hope, the case of 
Nevada rather highlights the dismal prospects of poorer regions. 
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All the policies discussed in this chapter need to be differentiated from policies such as 
centrally funded healthcare, education, defense, social benefits, and the like. These provide 
higher levels of such public services than poorer regions could afford on their own, and some 
can be an essential ingredient for development. However, since they are not directly 
developmental themselves, while noting their importance here, I will not consider them in this 
thesis. 
Also, it should be noted that there are a number of negative effects for richer regions that 
stem from regional development disparities. Perhaps the foremost one is the steady stream of 
immigration, which, particularly in the first few decades after the Second World War, created 
significant urban congestion problems. These were manifested in, for example, problems in 
providing adequate public services and housing or in rising rents and inflation. Thus, some 
regional policies were actually aimed at ameliorating the consequences of regional disparities 
in rich regions and their cities. I will not look at the mentioned effects (or policies) here, but 
they are important to mention, because, as we will see in the next chapter, they have been a 
source of inter-regional economic conflicts. 
 
 
4.1 Pre-1980s interventionist period 
 
Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980) is a comparative study of regional policies in the then members 
of the European Community. In the first decade or so after the Second World War, the primary 
focus of economic policy was on reconstruction, not on reducing regional disparities. 
Additionally, the gap between the more and less developed regions was still not as high as it 
would later become. Thus, regional policy, to the extent that it existed, was primarily based on 
building and upgrading infrastructure in the poorer regions (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980:217). 
By the late 1950s, however, reconstruction was over and regional disparities had also 
become more pronounced. Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980:13) identified unemployment as the 
most pressing problem in the poorer regions, and argued that its cause was an overreliance 
either on agriculture or on slow-growth or declining industries, “like coal mining, iron and steel, 
textiles or ship building” (1980:214). The reason for the decline of some heavy industries was 
that the high demand for their products due the reconstruction effort was over. Later these and 
other industries, such as textiles, also started facing increasing foreign competition from newly 
industrializing countries, which had both the latest technology and much lower labor costs. An 
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additional reason for the rising unemployment was that the labor intensity of manufacturing 
was decreasing, so fewer new jobs were being created, and even existing jobs were lost. Those 
regions most heavily dependent on manufacturing were obviously the hardest hit by this. 
To counter these developments over the next two decades European Community states 
increased the coverage of assisted areas, the range of regional policies, and expenditures on 
them (in addition to continuing infrastructure investment). The geographical extent of the 
assisted regions, measured by the percentage of total national population they contained, was 
between 17% and 45% depending on the country and period, but mostly hovered around 35% 
(Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980:216). Expenditures were also high. For example, at their height in 
the UK in 1975, expenditures just on direct regional policies55 amounted to 0.7% of GDP 
(Scott, 2009:354). Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980:219) call this period the heyday of regional 
policy, both due to the extent of the covered areas, the range of policies, the high expenditures, 
as well as the attempts in some countries to link up the policies to general development 
planning.  
Demko and Fuchs (1984:88-92) divided the policies employed in Western European 
countries56 according to whether they provided incentives or disincentives, and whether they 
were aimed at employing organizations or individuals and families. Their overview is given in 
Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
55 So, including policies such as investment subsidies given for investments in certain areas, but excluding policies 
such as subsidies directed at shipbuilding irrespective of where it is located (even though it was heavily regionally 
concentrated, thus making such subsidies effectively a tool of regional policy). 
56 A broader focus than in Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980), but with no essential differences either in the types of 
policies or the problems they were meant to address. 
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Table 4.1. Regional policy tools in Western European countries 
 
Directed 
towards 
                                                              Policy emphasis 
Incentives Disincentives 
 
Employing 
organizations 
 
Special promotional and co-ordinating agencies 
 
Public infrastructure development for industry, 
including new towns and industrial parks 
 
Agricultural infrastructure programs 
 
Grants and loans for industrial development, 
including capital investment subsidies 
 
Tax incentives, including special depreciation 
allowances for industrial development 
 
Tax rebates and concessions for industrial 
relocation 
 
Tax and manpower subsidies for relocation of 
tertiary sector 
 
Rent subsidies 
 
Land expropriation and reclamation 
 
Technical assistance 
 
Employment or labor-cost subsidies to industries 
 
Transport adjustments and subsidies 
 
Preferential government procurement policies 
 
Social security payment concessions 
 
Municipal and community loans for buildings, 
sites, etc. 
 
Export profit tax relief 
 
 
Permits and licences or other controls on new 
industrial plant construction 
 
Permits and licences for office building 
construction 
 
Tax or other financial penalties for investments in 
congested areas 
 
Rationing of building materials 
 
Dispersal and relocation of government, industries, 
offices, agencies 
 
Disclosure of major new industrial investment or 
expansion plans for approval 
 
Compulsory government supply contracts to 
companies and industries in lagging regions 
Individuals and 
families 
 
Job training and human resource programs 
 
Relocation and settling-in grants 
 
Social infrastructure investments (hospitals, 
universities, cultural services) 
 
Housing (public and loans for private) 
 
Physical planning and environmental amenity 
improvement programs 
 
Imposition on metropolitan residents of full costs 
of water and sewage facilities 
 
Zoning practices 
 
Discriminatory treatment of non-residents, e.g. 
local government employment, education, etc. 
Source: Demko and Fuchs (1984:89-90) 
 
Of this large number of regional policies, the most significant were the numerous fiscal and 
financial incentives given mostly to manufacturing companies (manufacturing being the most 
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mobile sector of the economy) to open new plants in, or relocate existing plants to, problem 
regions (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980:14; Demko and Fuchs, 1984:92). Virtually all countries 
had such incentive packages, and they variously included capital grants for investment, 
subsidized loans or subsidies for interest payments, tax concessions, depreciation allowances, 
or labor cost subsidies, all of which could be automatic or discretionary (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 
1980:228-232). In order of importance, Demko and Fuchs rank them similarly: “capital grants, 
interest subsidies or discounts, tax concessions and depreciation allowances” (1984:92).  
Another policy tool used by a number of countries (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980:218) were 
location controls.57 Firms that wished to invest in areas designated as developed had to apply 
for permission, the idea being to deny them these permissions and steer their investment 
towards poorer areas. Demko and Fuchs (1984:91), however, argue that these were less 
common than the fiscal and financial incentives and less well enforced. A heavy use of state-
owned enterprises, particularly in Italy, to invest in poorer areas was also present. Governments 
also moved some of administrative functions to poorer areas. 
Interestingly, no authors mention regional banks, which were important at least in Germany. 
Werner (2013) argues that Germany has long had a very large number of local private banks, 
which are legally limited to lending only to local companies. This has kept these banks small, 
and thus focused more on SMEs, which might otherwise have been deprived of credit. I have 
already argued that SMEs are not the backbone of any developed economy, but they 
nevertheless do provide many jobs, and a few may grow or play an important role in big firms’ 
supply chains. At the very least, keeping them supplied with credit can help prevent extreme 
regional deprivation. In addition to the local banks, Germany also has an extensive system of 
public development banks – the KfW and the Agricultural bank at the federal level, while each 
federal state also has its own development bank. The latter have ensured a steady supply of 
credit even in the less developed regions.  
The interventionism of this period shows also in the size of expenditures on regional policies. 
But, more importantly, as we can see, numerous policies that were used – location controls, 
mandatory negotiations with the state about large investment projects, the use of state-owned 
enterprises to invest in poorer regions, subsidies and export subsidies, favoring certain 
companies through public procurement, etc. – would today either be very difficult to do legally, 
be straight out forbidden, or simply be outside of the imagination of policy-makers. 
                                                             
57 For a very detailed exploration of such policies in the European Community, see Wettman and Nicol (1981). 
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One thing that stands out, though, is that the policies did not include tariff protection, import 
quotas, preferential exchange rates and other measures that operate at the national level. That 
such policies cannot be used internally was pointed out by Hirschman (1970:196). Given how 
important they have been for late developers (Chang, 2007), however, we would expect that the 
inability to use them would be a significant impairment for poorer regions. Even if they could 
somehow be used,58 a government would probably not easily decide to use them, as it would 
effectively be directing them against domestic firms from richer regions. The political economy 
of such an action would be very different than when they are directed against foreign firms. 
How successful have these regional policies been? Holland (1979) showed persuasively that 
they were unable to foster the development of firms from poorer regions, because they were 
insufficient to overcome the power of established oligopolies. As for stimulating established 
firms to invest in poorer regions, the problems described in the previous chapter and this one 
were making themselves felt. Since manufacturing was becoming more capital intensive, most 
investment went into upgrading established plants, not in opening new ones, and some 
industries were even shedding jobs.59 Firms capable of international investments were 
increasingly choosing to locate in poor countries. And, when they did choose to locate in one 
of the developed capitalist countries, they often preferred to locate in the richer regions, and the 
threat of choosing another country was often enough to make governments allow them to do 
that. This was especially the case during recessions, when governments would rather have 
growth anywhere than nowhere, even if it meant giving up on their regional goals. 
Holland argued that there was no way out of these problems unless the nature of capitalism 
were changed.60 He suggested that several things needed to be done in coordination. Location 
controls should be enforced more rigorously. It should be obligatory for big firms to plan their 
investment in coordination with state planning institutions, in order to steer investment towards 
poorer regions. Fiscal and financial incentives should be kept under control, and possibly 
lowered so that they only cover the actual (in fact not so large) extra costs incurred by locating 
in poorer regions. The threat of nationalization (explicit or implied) should also be used, if 
                                                             
58 It would likely be possible to come up with some sort of institutional setting which would allow the use of such 
policies within a country, at least in some modified form, but, to my knowledge, this has never been attempted. 
Multiple exchange rates have been used, but for different sectors of the economy or different categories of imports, 
not for firms from different regions. 
59 As a response to this, an attempt was made in some countries to direct regional policies at service sectors, but 
this did not prove particularly successful (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980:221). 
60 He set out his argument mostly in chapter 8. 
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companies too firmly oppose the government’s regional development goals. Finally, public 
enterprises should be used to invest in poorer regions where the private sector is reluctant to do 
so. This would induce private companies to do the same, as it would both give an example that 
such investment is possible and threaten them because public companies would have access to 
regional aid and possibly cheaper labor. Also, such public investment would itself be a part of 
the solution to regional problems. 
Holland’s arguments fit into the broader context of the sorts of policies proposed at the time 
by more radical leftists in Europe, including by the left wing of the Labour Party, of which 
Holland was one of the leading proponents. They advocated more decisive steps towards 
socialism.61 However, what came in the 1980s was not a move towards socialism, but a period 
of deregulation and liberalization. 
 
 
4.2 Post-1980s deregulation period 
 
Yuill, Allen and Hull (1980:220) argue that the oil shock in 1973-1974 and the ensuing 
recession made many governments cut back on regional policies. For one, there was less money 
for them. Also, any investment was seen as desirable, so location controls fell into disuse 
because governments were afraid that using them might prevent investment from being 
undertaken at all. Additionally, governments mostly stopped moving administrative functions 
to poorer areas because unemployment was rising even in the richer regions. The immigration 
to richer regions also declined, and some of them even started seeing outmigration, so fears of 
over-congestion subsided. This eliminated an immediate pressing reason for bringing 
investment to poorer regions. Finally, anti-interventionist arguments were anyway increasingly 
heard, and were targeted at regional policies as well. In parallel with all this, partially to counter 
the recession, there was rapid growth in aids at the national and sectoral levels, which “had the 
effect of cutting down on the net advantage conferred by regional incentives” (Yuill, Allen and 
Hull, 1980:223). 
There was an additional problem specific to European Community countries. Namely, the 
Treaty of Rome sets limits to actions that distort trade between the member states. This 
particularly includes state aid. There is an exemption for regional policies, but Yuill, Allen and 
Hull (1980:224) argued that there were a number of issues with how the Regional Policy 
                                                             
61 For Holland’s wider views on these issues, see Holland (1976b). 
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Directorate and the Competition Directorate were interpreting these exemptions, with the 
effects not always being favorable to poorer regions. Many such limitations were later imposed 
by the WTO and other multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements on other 
countries as well. 
Overall, the latter part of the 1970s saw the beginning of a trend towards reducing the 
coverage of assisted areas, reduced expenditures, and less interventionist policies. Eventually, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, location controls, mandatory planning of investment with 
relevant authorities, direct subsidies, the use of state-owned enterprises to invest in poor regions 
(to the extent that they at all remained state owned), and such “heavy-handed” policies were all 
abandoned. They were replaced by what OECD (2010:13) calls “new paradigm regional 
policy”. 
We can identify several important characteristics of these new policies, apart from the 
abandonment of interventionism. First, while some “old” paradigm policies are still in place – 
investments in infrastructure and the use (though much less than before) of financial and fiscal 
incentives – more and more policies are now focused on helping indigenous SMEs in poorer 
regions through measures to develop “soft” capital and make business easier. For example, 
there are policies for training entrepreneurs, or for simplifying regulations in order to improve 
the business environment. As OECD (2010:19) says: “In the past, aid was focused on bringing 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) and providing subsidized facilities for outside investors 
and/or new firms. More recently, the focus has moved to making domestic firms more 
competitive, which has led to an interest in cluster policies and similar instruments to build co-
operation and share knowledge among firms, particularly SMEs”. 
Second, it is no longer only the central government, but also lower levels of government, as 
well as the private sector, NGOs and other actors that are now involved in regional policies. 
Various bodies have been accordingly set up so that these more numerous actors can coordinate. 
Third, the term regional policies has become a bit misleading. Up until the shift to new 
paradigm policies, it referred to policies aimed at poorer regions. However, now many policies 
that are aimed at all regions are called regional policies (OECD, 2012). But, what they really 
are is national policies implemented regionally, and only some of them are offered on somewhat 
more favorable terms in poorer regions. Examples include help for business innovation or for 
the establishment of new firms. This is also reflected in the sorts of sectors that are supported 
through these “regional” policies. For example, OECD (2010:20) mentions a desire to: 
“promote innovation in industries that are traditionally associated with urban areas (e.g. ICT, 
bio-technology and other scientific and medical industries). As a consequence, innovation 
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policy has re-invigorated the idea of urban growth poles which are expected to endogenously 
develop their hinterland.” A poor region with sufficient strengths in these industries for a 
growth pole to emerge would not actually be poor. What such policies are revealed to be is 
support policies for advanced sectors, which are located in rich regions, but they are called 
regional policies because they are partially implemented by regional or city-level bodies. 
Finally, and most importantly, the basic understanding underlying the new paradigm policies 
is different from that underlying the old paradigm policies. The idea behind the old policies was 
that poorer regions were poor because markets produced regional inequality. The way out was 
for them to somehow get the benefits of having more advanced economic sectors. The new 
policies, however, wish to increase “regional competitiveness”. They do acknowledge that the 
regional competitiveness of poor regions is low partially due to market failures, but the way 
these are conceptualized is problematic. Namely, what they have in mind are things like a lack 
of coordination and information, low levels of entrepreneurship, or banks being risk averse and 
not wanting to lend to SMEs. The idea is that if such problems are overcome, then markets will 
operate more efficiently and lead to more growth in the poorer regions. This is fundamentally 
different to the understanding that normally functioning markets create regional inequality, and 
that therefore they have to be repressed or heavily influenced so that the behavior of market 
agents is modified so as to produce the desired regional outcomes. 
The evaluation of new paradigm policies is more complicated than that of the old ones, both 
because the former often have more numerous goals, and because some of them are hard to 
quantify (for example, improving coordination between local economic agents). However, 
things like the number of jobs created through certain policies, the cost per job created, grant 
money paid out and similar measurements are still used. On average, it seems that there have 
been positive effects on these fronts.62 What seems to be missing, though, is the sort of broader 
analysis that Holland (1979) did, that tries to assess whether the policies offer scope for 
structural transformation. 
Overall, it seems that new paradigm regional policies aimed at helping SMEs fail to see the 
role of oligopolies. The policies may help increase the number of small firms, and perhaps help 
some of them to grow to medium size, but there is nothing to then help them make the transition 
to market-leading firms. For that, the power of existing market-leaders would have to be curbed 
                                                             
62 As examples, see European Commission (2016a), Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform 
(2009a, 2009b). 
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in some way, which even old paradigm policies did not do, let alone the new non-interventionist 
ones. 
When the role of market-leading firms is recognized, this often comes in tandem with the 
recognition that development is sector-specific, and results in a focus on cluster policies. These 
are often centered around attracting key investment by big firms, and then stimulating them to 
interlink with local SMEs, in the hope that urban growth poles will emerge.63 What is supposed 
to provide the attraction is essentially attempts at improving the location factors deemed 
important by market leaders, such as boosting the skills of the local workforce, providing good 
transport links, etc. But, as I argued in the previous chapter in section 3.2, having good location 
factors is an aspect of development – to be attractive for the kinds of investment sought, a region 
has to be developed, but to be developed, it has to be attractive. Many regions are attempting 
to break out of this chicken and egg situation, but there seems to be little evidence that it is 
working. Not only do they have to compete with each other, but, more importantly, they have 
to compete against actually developed regions. And in that last context, a point made by Holland 
is extremely pertinent – to attract advanced investment to poorer regions it is not enough to 
provide some investment opportunities, but they have to be better than the opportunities in the 
richer regions. This is a very unlikely proposition.64 
At other times, though, it is not recognized that development is sector-specific. New regional 
policies often aim at tapping “underutilized regional potential” and using “endogenous local 
assets and knowledge” in the poorer regions. But, the “regional potential” of a poorer region 
almost by definition cannot be in an advanced sector – the “local assets and knowledge” needed 
to be good in advanced sectors are mostly created by having those sectors. They do not exist 
prior to them. Of course, some areas (though not whole regions) may do well based on some 
simpler economic activity. For example, a beautiful natural landscape, combined with a low 
population, may bring in enough tourism revenues to provide sufficient income per capita for 
comfortable living standards. But, for how many areas is that a possibility? 
Finally, decentralizing regional policy may bring some benefits, such as being able to base 
policies on better knowledge of local conditions which central government departments do not 
necessarily possess to the same degree. However, Holland (1979) was quite clear about the fact 
that even national governments of developed countries could no longer assume that they were 
                                                             
63 For examples, see European Commission (2016b), OECD (2013). Sometimes, though, the role of leading firms 
is also not recognized, and clusters are supposed to emerge from within the region. 
64 See Hospers (2006) about the numerous regions that are all trying to become the next Silicon Valley and failing. 
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more powerful than big firms when attempting to influence their location decisions. If anything, 
this is even more true today. For one, due to globalization, market-leading firms have become 
bigger and more powerful than ever, and have moved from being national to global giants (see 
Nolan, Zhang and Liu, 2007b). Equally importantly, in the past companies could not easily 
invest in communist countries, and even in the part of the world where they could invest, they 
were normally expecting interventionist policies. Today, not only is virtually the entire world 
open to investment, but most governments also pursue largely non-interventionist policies. A 
government trying to pursue more interventionist regional policy would certainly find 
companies much less willing to accept “meddling” in their business, as their management is not 
accustomed anymore to “heavy-handed” intervention, and the companies could always choose 
to go somewhere else. In this context, it is questionable whether big firms should be made 
relatively even more powerful by transferring regional policies from central governments to 
less powerful entities at lower levels of authority (Hymer, 1975:54-55). This comes on top of 
the problem of inter-regional competition, which can lead to both a waste of resources and a 
race to the bottom in terms of what benefits are offered to big firms. Indeed, it is not just regions 
that can on their own decide to compete against each other, but it is also big firms that actively 
play cities and regions off against each other in order to extract the most benefits.65 
With all of the above taken into account, it should not be surprising that data on regional 
economic and social indicators shows that regional disparities still exist within countries, and 
that they can be even bigger than the differences between country averages.66 In more than a 
few cases, regional disparities have grown, despite the regional policies that are in place. But, 
most tellingly, it is still exactly the same regions as before that are problematic – the Italian 
Mezzogiorno, the south of the United States, Wallonia, the North East and North West in 
England, Wales, Andalucía, the east part of Germany whose economy was essentially crushed 
by the more advanced West German economy after the reunification, and entire East European 
countries (also crushed by free trade with more developed countries) which can be seen as 
regions within a common EU market. There are many other examples, but the basic picture is 
abundantly clear – the drift towards regional disparities in capitalism seems to be at least as 
strong as ever, and at least as difficult to counter. 
 
                                                             
65 Bailey, Cowling and Tomlinson (2015) refer to such cases of interregional competition and of market leaders 
playing regions off against each other in the UK. 
66 See, for example, OECD (2014), European Commission (2014). 
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4.3 Nevada: a case of successful indigenous regional development 
 
One poorer region that has managed to undergo structural transformation based on 
developing an indigenous sector, that even started with small firms, is the US state of Nevada. 
The sector is obviously gambling. Nevada is therefore an extremely interesting example, and it 
would be very useful to ascertain how it has managed to develop. As we will as see, and as 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, it managed to do so due to an unusual amount of luck 
and a set of very specific circumstances.67 
Prior to becoming the center of gambling in the US from the 1950s onwards, the Nevadan 
economy was dependent on mining and limited agriculture (primarily livestock). Now, the 
implicit view of mining as a temporary bonanza is not necessarily correct. Mining is a complex 
economic activity, offering enormous scope for firms to build up competitive advantages 
(Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Indeed, today it is one of the most oligopolized sectors of the 
economy. However, individual mining sites can get exhausted, and if the firms exploiting them 
are located elsewhere, then the longer-term benefits will not be where the mining sites are. This 
was the case with Nevada, which experienced numerous mining rushes, booms and busts, and 
felt the full effects of swings in the demand and prices for gold, silver and copper, from the 
1860s until the 1930s. 
Some more stable economic activities did exist. For example, due to more liberal divorce 
laws – shorter waiting times before a divorce is granted – many people came from California 
to Nevada to get divorced. Their spending while they stayed in Nevada and the fees they paid 
did benefit the local economy. However, in 1927 several other states US made divorce quicker, 
so Nevada had to make its laws even more liberal (Elliott and Rowley, 1987:284-285). This 
shows how “economic” activities in which it is not possible to maintain a competitive advantage 
cannot really be the basis for stable development. After all, the furthest any state can go is to 
make it possible to get a divorce immediately. 
As would be expected from an underdeveloped state, Nevada was reliant on central 
government aid. The federal government was a substantial investor in road construction, 
irrigation, some military facilities, and, most importantly, for the building of the Hoover Dam. 
Such investment was of course useful, but it did not move Nevada into advanced sectors. 
A sign of what was to come, however, coincided with the beginning of the construction of 
the Hoover Dam in 1931. That year gambling was relegalized in Nevada, after being banned 
                                                             
67 This section relies heavily on Elliott and Rowley (1987). 
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since 1910, and it started growing. Of course, gambling was never gone, but legalization meant 
that the state could gather revenues from it. Nevertheless, it did not become big in the 1930s, 
and there is no indication that anyone expected that it would become particularly important, 
and certainly not that it would turn into Nevada’s economic mainstay within 20 years. 
It was the Second World War that really changed things for Nevada. Most importantly, it 
boosted the economy of Southern California where numerous defense activities were 
established. After the war, the westward population drift in the US continued, which, combined 
with natural population increases and foreign immigrants, eventually made California the most 
populous state in the US. Thus, after the war, Nevada found itself right next to an economically 
very prosperous and very populous economy. An expansion of gambling and connected 
activities was made possible due to the large market that they could cater to. 
The first important thing to note is that technological change and upgrading, and the 
consequent increase in incomes, did not primarily happen in Nevada, but in California. The 
fortuitous circumstance for Nevada was that it was geographically near California (particularly 
important before the rise of cheap air travel), and that, at the time of the post-war boom, it could 
offer a combination of services, with gambling at the center, that the increasingly affluent 
population of California wanted to buy. A similar development could not have happened in a 
location more remote from a large economic and population center. 
The importance of geographical proximity can be seen clearly even within Nevada – the 
center of the (rapidly increasing) population moved from the west of Nevada to the south, which 
was nearer to California. Even within the south, proximity to large population centers in 
California played a huge role. In the past, Reno was bigger than Las Vegas. As a matter of fact, 
while Reno had existed as a city since the 1870s, Las Vegas was founded as a city only in 1911, 
and was more or less completely unimportant until it got a boost from the building of the Hoover 
Dam. However, Reno is close to San Francisco, while Las Vegas is close to the much bigger 
Los Angeles. By 1960, Las Vegas had a larger population than Reno, and continued growing 
at a faster pace in the later decades.68 The proximity to Los Angeles was important enough to 
counteract even the fact that Reno had a head start in gambling compared to Las Vegas, both 
because it used to be bigger, and because it licensed gambling businesses more freely after 
gambling was relegalized. It goes without saying that attempts to make gambling into a big 
                                                             
68 Las Vegas had a population of only 5000 in 1931 when gambling was relegalized and the construction of the 
Hoover Dam started. Reno was at nearly 20,000. Las Vegas grew to around 65,000 by 1960, surpassing Reno 
around that time. Today, its population is around 650,000, while Reno’s is around 225,000. 
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business in the east of Nevada, in Ely, the capital of White Pine County and still an important 
town because of copper mining, met with little success. With an extra several hundred 
kilometers of distance from California compared to Las Vegas and Reno, Ely might as well 
have been on the Moon. 
However, there are other poor regions that are close to large and prosperous economies. 
Nevada may have been on the doorstep of a particularly important one, but it is not unique in 
its geographic position. Its enormous luck lay elsewhere. Namely, at the time, barriers to entry 
in gambling were low – it did not require substantial capital, technology or organizational skills. 
But, simultaneously, what prevented other regions from trying to compete with Nevada was 
that gambling was banned everywhere else in the US. It was this combination of geographic 
proximity, easy entry, and, crucially, protection, that ensured that Nevada could develop its 
gambling without the constant threat of new entrants and of price competition (which 
characterizes simpler economic activities) driving wages, profits and investment down. 
And yet, legal restrictions are fairly easy to remove compared to many other competitive 
disadvantages. With the rise of cheap air travel, the market which a gambling center can cater 
to also increases. Could another state also remove restrictions on gambling, and hope to build 
up a big business in it? Things are not as straightforward. 
While gambling may have started small, it did not take long before phenomenal market 
concentration occurred – by 1968/1969, there were more than one thousand casinos licensed in 
Nevada, of which a mere 10 did 46% of all gambling, and just 30 did 96% (Elliot and Rowley, 
1987:337). Today, the 334 casinos in Nevada have combined gaming revenues of more than 
$11 billion. The 40 casinos on the Las Vegas Strip alone account for $6.4 billion of that, or 
56% (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2017a).69 Nevada Gaming Control Board (2017b) reports 
numbers only for casinos with more than $12 million in revenues. There are 273 of them (they 
account for 95% of all gaming revenues in Nevada). Of those, 70 make 80% of the revenues, 
and are owned by only 24 corporations.70 The 273 casinos make another $14 billion from 
rooms, food, beverage and other activities.71 
                                                             
69 Unfortunately, no disaggregated data within that group is available. 
70 There is unfortunately no data available for within this group of 70. 
71 Prostitution is another “economic” activity that always seems to go with gambling. Legal prostitution in Nevada 
is valued at $75 million, but illegal prostitution – mostly concentrated in Las Vegas and Reno – is estimated to be 
worth $5 billion (Flowers, 2011:42). Ignoring here the wider questions about prostitution, this is a very significant 
source of revenue in Nevada. 
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 Nevada actually fought to prevent its gambling companies from investing outside of 
Nevada, once some other states started legalizing gambling, fearing that its incomes would be 
siphoned away (Faiss and Gemignani, 2011). This strategy started failing in the late 1970s, but 
the fears of money flowing out of Nevada proved unnecessary. Nevada had had several decades 
to build up its competitive position. One regulatory change with extremely far reaching 
consequences was introduced in 1969, when a new corporate licensing act was passed. Prior to 
that, all stockholders of a company that applied for a gambling license had to undergo a 
background check. After 1969, this changed to only those stockholders with a 5% or greater 
share of ownership (Elliot and Rowley, 1987:336), allowing large corporations to far more 
easily buy up gambling businesses in Nevada, because their countless small stockholders did 
not have to undergo background checks. This “eventually prompted several large and respected 
companies to begin buying and building hotel-casinos. Hilton, MGM, Holiday Inns, Ramada, 
Hyatt, Del Webb, and others suddenly got into the gaming business. Ownership of the casino 
resorts by Hughes and these other well-known companies legitimized the industry. Investments 
in casino properties soared after passage of the 1969 law” (Faiss and Gemignani, 2011:5).72 By 
the time gambling started being legalized in other US states, nearly a decade later, these 
companies had firmly established themselves in Nevada, and from there took the leading role 
in expanding gambling elsewhere in the US. 
Today, gambling is dominated by large resort hotels, which combine accommodation, 
gambling, food and drink, and various other activities. In other words, large-scale gambling, 
the sort that really brings in incomes, now requires substantial investments and skills to run it. 
This means that any other entrant to the gambling market has to start big, at least if one wants 
to build up a strong economic base in it like Nevada has done. This is certainly not impossible, 
particularly because, despite everything that has been said, gambling is still much easier to 
move into than other more technologically and organizationally complex economic activities. 
Nevertheless, it is a very significant hurdle to overcome. Las Vegas has also had the time to go 
                                                             
72 Incidentally, the large investments required for this sort of business contributed significantly to reducing mafia 
type crime in gambling. Criminals, after all, cannot make people go to their establishments instead of to resort 
hotels, nor can they easily match the money that large corporates can put into the gambling business. Furthermore, 
they cannot employ the same criminal tactics (extortion and the like) against large corporations as they can against 
local small casino owners. Finally, large corporates will generally not risk their entire business by cheating in 
gambling. The additional gains to be had are too small compared to the risks. However, the entry of large 
corporates into the market did usher in the era of corporate, particularly financial, crime. On that, see Farrell and 
Case (1995:57s). 
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unchallenged in building up such a successful brand, that it has basically become almost 
synonymous with gambling. Any new region trying to enter the gambling market thus starts off 
with a disadvantage that Nevada never had. Cheap air travel is then also seen to be a double-
edged sword – it allows a new entrant to cater to a larger market, but it also allows consumers 
to more easily reach Nevada. 
The competitive advantage of Nevada is reflected in the data on gambling in the US. Total 
gaming revenues in the US are nearly $40 billion. Nevada accounts for 28% of that. (The 40 
casinos on the Las Vegas Strip alone account for 16%.) The next closest state is Louisiana, at 
9.5%. Nevada also accounts for 48% of all jobs in commercial gaming, and pays out 56% of 
the wages (American Gaming Association, 2017). 
So, we cannot conclude from Nevada’s success that any underdeveloped region can develop 
simply because it is near a populous and prosperous region. Rather, it has to be able to enter an 
economic sector that: 
 
a) has low entry barriers, 
b) is not already oligopolized 
c) established market leaders in other sectors should not be diversifying into this new sector, 
because, with their full power behind this expansion, they can easily overwhelm new small 
market entrants, 
d) the sector’s products or services have to be in demand, 
e) and have good growth prospects, 
f) it must be possible to build up a strong competitive advantage in the sector,  
g) crucially, the region that is setting up the new sector has to be afforded protection from 
competition until it builds up its competitive advantage. 
 
If the last crucial condition is not fulfilled, what is likely to happen is that numerous regions 
will try entering the same sector, but, due to the nature of markets and oligopolies, only a few 
will succeed. 
It is obviously extremely unlikely for all these conditions to be simultaneously fulfilled. 
Nevada was, indeed, beyond lucky. Of course, one could argue that regions should nevertheless 
try to move into newly emerging sectors that fulfill all the conditions except protection, because, 
if every time a couple of regions succeed in building up a competitive advantage in a new sector, 
eventually all regions will be developed. However, there are also very few newly emerging 
sectors that simultaneously fulfill all the other conditions except protection. As I noted in 
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chapter 2, with a few exceptions, it is market leaders in existing sectors that diversify into 
adjacent new sectors, and when they do that, they normally replicate existing regional 
disparities. And even when it is new firms establishing a new sector, there are still location 
factors, such as skills availability or quality of life concerns, that make it likely that the sector 
will be much stronger in the rich regions.73 
What are the lessons for regional policies that can be drawn from the preceding analysis? 
Gambling was not planned to happen in Nevada. Once it became apparent that it was becoming 
important, though, the state did start nurturing it in various ways. None of what it did involved 
the high interventionism of the old paradigm of regional policies, and certainly none of the 
socialist suggestions of the type that Holland was making. What Nevada did could be classified 
under new paradigm regional policies as improvements to the business environment, but also 
as concern for the public interest. For example, the state started fighting crime, cheating, 
corruption, tax evasion and attempts by gambling interests to exert control over various levels 
of government (Elliot and Rowley, 1987:326-337). But, as we saw, the biggest impact came 
from a regulatory change that was aimed squarely at big firms, not SMEs like in new paradigm 
regional policies. 
The decentralization of regional policies that new paradigm policies advocate seems to have 
worked extremely well in Nevada’s favor. It is highly unlikely that the federal government 
would have been as focused on Nevada’s needs as its state authorities (effectively regional 
authorities in the US) were. Still, what was crucial was the market opportunity that Nevada had. 
Prior to it, despite having state authorities for nearly a century, Nevada did not undergo 
structural transformation. 
So, it would appear that the one major case (at least that I could identify) of true structural 
transformation coming from within a poorer region, based on its own efforts, depended first 
and foremost on more than a healthy dose of luck, only later followed by reasonably well 
thought out policies. From this perspective, barring a move to the sort of socialist planning that 
Holland was arguing for, it seems that the best an underdeveloped region can do is to keep an 
eye out for the sort of opportunity that Nevada had, and have a general idea of what sort of 
                                                             
73 For example, after Apple started the App Store in 2008, there has been an explosion in the number of companies 
producing games for the iOS system in the UK (NESTA, 2014:21) – the comparatively low barriers to entry, the 
ability to access the entire world market, and the lure of striking it big made sure there would be an entrepreneurial 
boom. But, from a regional perspective, the vast bulk of the new iOS companies have opened in London (NESTA, 
2014:35). 
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policies it should pursue if one arises. Unfortunately for poor regions, based on the evidence 
thus far, it seems that most of them will be waiting for such an opportunity for a long time to 
come. 
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5. Regional disparities and separatism 
 
The preceding chapters have established that the drift towards regional inequality in 
capitalist countries is very strong, and that regional development policies have had only limited 
successes in countering it. The result is that poorer regions rely on redistribution from the richer 
ones, primarily through the public sector. This redistribution can create dissatisfaction in both 
richer and poorer regions – in the former because it takes away their resources, and in the latter 
because it may be seen as insufficient to help them develop or as too small a compensation for 
their underdevelopment. Various other inter-regional economic conflicts that are rooted in 
regional development disparities can emerge, such as conflicts about tariffs. In addition, 
regions may also come into conflict not with each other, but with the central government. 
When talking about separatism, it is not economic, but nationalist, religious, linguistic or 
ethnic conflicts that first spring to mind. Indeed, as Bookman (1993:36) noted in her review of 
the literature on separatism, the economic causes of separatism are mostly relegated to the side, 
if they are analyzed at all.74 She even mentions that some scholars go so far as to imply that 
separatism based on economic grievances is inferior and less genuine than ethnic separatism. 
What this chapter tries to establish is that inter-regional or center-region economic conflicts 
have often been important or even key factors in separatist conflicts. The chapter explores how 
and under what circumstances such conflicts can escalate and why some regions perceive that 
they cannot get what they want except by seceding from their country. 
One thing that is different in this chapter compared to the previous ones is that, up until now, 
I have focused on (primarily advanced) capitalist countries. However, here I will also look at 
cases of separatism in less developed capitalist countries, as well as in former communist ones. 
This is because, while the mechanisms that create regional development disparities may be 
quite different in each of these groups of countries, the economic conflicts that emerge from 
those disparities are remarkably similar. On the other hand, I have mostly excluded long-
standing violent separatist conflicts from the analysis, because normally such cases have far 
more lying at their root than economic conflicts (for example, ethnic repression). Still, I have 
included some cases – notably Yugoslavia – which ended up in violent state dissolution, but 
did not have any violence or repression at the outset, because these cases can be explained 
using the framework developed in this chapter. 
                                                             
74 As an example, see Spencer (1998), where the most economically focused of the articles is Bookman’s. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 looks at whether separatist regions have 
common economic characteristics. Section 5.2 looks at the types of inter-regional and center-
region economic conflicts that emerge, establishes that they have been important and even key 
issues leading to separatism at recessions and austerity as significant factors contributing to 
their escalation. In section 5.3, I look at the role of class and nationalism in separatism. While 
nationalist conflicts are the first that spring to mind when discussing separatism, I argue that 
nationalism is mostly used as a propaganda tool by certain classes engaged in separatist 
conflicts. It is then also shown that, while the term “region” can be an adequate short-hand, it 
conceals the social dynamics that drive separatism, by implicitly assuming that entire regional 
populations have the same ideas and interests. Section 5.4 explores in some more detail the 
common problems in separatist claims. 
It is worth noting that the major authors writing on regional development (Myrdal, 1964; 
Hirschman, 1970; Holland, 1979) saw to an extent the potential for conflicts emerging from 
regional development disparities. For example, Myrdal (1964:45) notes that national 
parliaments are a platform through which regional grievances can be heard, and as suffrage 
was expanded, including more and more of the poor population (partially concentrated in the 
poorer regions), the more such grievances had to be addressed. One important way of doing 
that was through the redistributive policies of the welfare state. He does note that such 
redistributive policies entail at least temporary sacrifices for the richer regions (1964:40), but 
points out that they interact with feelings of national solidarity, mutually strengthening each 
other (1964:47-48). However, he does not explore what happens if the redistributive policies 
are weak, and how that may weaken the feelings of national solidarity, in turn weakening the 
support for the policies, in a process of cumulative causation that may lead to dissatisfaction 
and separatism in the poorer regions. Nor does he mention that there are limits to how long 
national solidarity can keep the richer regions willing to pay for the poorer ones, particularly 
when, as should be evident from the preceding chapters, the redistribution is not likely to be 
temporary. 
Hirschman (1970:195-201) wondered if a poorer region might be better off if it separates 
from a richer one. It would lose the inter-regional trickle-down effects, but it would also be rid 
of the inter-regional polarization effects, which Hirschman saw as being stronger than the 
polarization effects between countries. The reason why the total net effect of separation may 
be more beneficial than staying within a country is because the poorer region, now an 
independent state, could use those development policy tools that are available to countries, but 
not to regions (for example, exchange rate controls or tariff protection). 
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Hirschman argued that the benefits of inter-regional trickle-down effects were greater than 
the harm coming from the inability to use these development policy tools and from the inter-
regional polarization effects. However, he based this conclusion on supposed political 
decisions to enact policies that would strengthen the trickle-down effects, and weaken the 
polarization effects. As we have seen, redistributive and regional policies have not been 
sufficient to fundamentally transform the economies of lagging regions. In any case, 
Hirschman was clear that few, if any, regions were in a position to choose their sovereignty 
status, so he thought his discussion was mostly relevant for thinking about how to design proper 
institutional settings for regional development. But, as we will see in this chapter, there are 
actually more than a few regions that both wish and potentially can choose independence, and 
the question of the potential economic benefits has been important in these cases. 
Holland did not talk about autonomy and separatist movements, but he is clearly aware of 
the potential link between regional development disparities and inter-regional or center-region 
conflicts. As he says: 
 
If modern capitalist governments are to accept continuing responsibility for regional 
employment and welfare rather than face regional disintegration, it will mean one of 
two main outcomes: either more people are paid for not working in job-less regions, or 
more jobs are brought to those regions. In either case modern capitalism as we know it 
is bound to be considerably changed. There not only is the fact that many people in 
L.D.R.s [less developed regions] prefer paid work to less well-paid unemployment, but 
also there is resistance to massive unemployment benefit from those in M.D.R.s [more 
developed regions] who see themselves as paying for them. In a federal structure such 
as the United States this could give rise to increasing strains … It could also intensify 
pressures against further interregional migration to decrease pressure on labour inflow 
areas, with the distinctly unliberal overtones of racial discrimination in both the United 
States and the main immigrant areas of Western Europe… (1979:59) 
 
This chapter can be seen as an attempt to connect the insights about the causes of regional 
disparities and separatism, which these mentioned authors merely broached on. 
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5.1 Common economic characteristics of separatist regions 
 
Bookman (1993) looked at 37 separatist regions. They were very disparate, being of various 
sizes, in different continents, at varying levels of development, with different economic and 
political systems (capitalism, central planning and self-management), different ethnic 
structures, different levels of violence, and with conflicts being either inter-regional, center-
region, or both. Examples included the former Yugoslav and Soviet republics, Scotland, 
Catalonia, Northern Italy, Flanders, Quebec, Katanga, Bougainville, and numerous others. 
Bookman was interested in whether these regions, despite their many differences, shared some 
common economic characteristics. She looked at the: 
 
a) absolute levels of development of the regions and their countries, 
b) level of development of a region relative to its country, 
c) trade dependency of the separatist regions on local, national and international markets, 
d) level of decentralization. 
 
5.1.1 Absolute levels of development of a region and its country 
 
Bookman notes (1993:36) that we can look at the level of development either of the entire 
country or of the separatist region. When looking at the entire country the well known argument 
from various modernization theories is that development helps erase ethnic differences, and 
raises the level of education, leading people to act as members of civic society, rather than 
ethnic groups. This should make separatism less likely. Conversely, people can actively resist 
the cultural changes brought about by development through reinforcing their ethnic identities. 
This can increase the chances of separatism. 
At the regional level, highly developed regions can feel that their economic viability as an 
independent state would be high, which could increase separatist aspirations. This is 
particularly the case if the region has  valuable natural resources that it could exploit. However, 
an underdeveloped region can also feel that its economic situation would improve if it were a 
separate country, for example, because it would be able to pursue economic policies that would 
allow it to tap some unused regional economic potential (Bookman, 1993:62-63). This is 
particularly the case if central government policies, or the policies of other regions, are seen as 
somehow impeding the realization of this potential. This sort of feeling can, however, emerge 
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even in highly developed regions, if they feel that they could be even more developed provided 
they were freed of the influence of the central government. Chapter 7 shows this for the case 
of Scotland, while Jacobs (2011) has set out a similar argument for Quebec in the 1980s. 
Bookman (1993:108-109) has argued this as well for Quebec. 
Bookman’s position on the balance between these opposing tendencies, either at the country 
or region level, is not completely clear. She focuses on the regional level, and argues that both 
rich and poor regions have attempted secession, that high levels of regional development 
contribute to secessionist aspirations, but also that few secessionist regions are highly 
developed (Bookman, 1993:45, 62). Looking at her data, though, there are indeed both rich and 
poor separatist regions, but what seems to be the most common regional characteristic with 
regards to absolute levels of development is that the majority of separatist regions are located 
in middle or low income countries, and, although some of them may be more developed than 
the average for their country, they are nevertheless not highly developed in absolute terms.75 
The link thus seems to be that the more developed a country, the less likely it is that separatism 
will emerge. However, as the arguments in sections 5.3 will show, this does not seem to work 
primarily through the effects of development on erasing ethnic differences, but rather through 
the fact that higher levels of development mean that there are more resources to go about, and 
thus conflicts about them are less likely to happen. To the extent that economic development 
contributes to amalgamating different ethnicities into a single nation, that too is likely to reduce 
the probability of separatism emerging. Still, as evidenced by the case of Switzerland – with 
the French, Germans and Italians coexisting as both distinct ethnic groups and as a Swiss nation 
– ethnic homogeneity is not a necessary condition to prevent separatism. And, as the case of 
separatist aspirations in Northern Italy and some Russian regions in the 1990s show, having a 
single ethnicity is no guarantee that separatism will not emerge. 
 
5.1.2 Regional level of development relative to the country average 
 
According to Bookman (1993:44) both relatively richer and poorer regions may feel that 
they are getting a bad deal from being a part of the same country. Poorer regions may feel that 
they are underdeveloped due to unfair economic policies, or because they are not getting 
enough resources through redistribution. Richer regions may be dissatisfied if they, as is 
                                                             
75 Here I am including the separatist regions in former communist countries, because even though many of the 
regions and countries were developed, they were still substantially behind their advanced capitalist counterparts. 
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usually the case, are net contributors to the central government budget, thus effectively 
subsidizing the poorer regions. Section 5.2 analyses in more depth the specific conflicts that 
arise, but the important thing to note here is that such conflicts would be unlikely to arise if 
there were no significant regional disparities, since no region would feel dissatisfied with its 
development level, and there would also be no need for much inter-regional redistribution. 
It is also possible for regions at the average level of development to become separatist, 
although that is much rarer, with Scotland and Quebec being the main examples. In these cases, 
the conflicts are center-region and the feeling is that, if the region were not held back by central 
government policies, it would be doing much better. However, these conflict then do not tend 
to revolve around redistribution. Bookman also argues that expectations about the post-
independence economic situation influence separatist aspirations. While poorer regions may 
be dissatisfied with their situation, they may also be concerned about their prospects as an 
independent economy. However, a region at the average level of development may feel that its 
prospects as an independent economy are no worse, and possibly better, than if it stays in the 
country it is part of. 
It should be noted that economic conflicts can also arise about issues that are not directly 
related to regional disparities, no matter what the relative level of regional development is. For 
example, the Scottish government is dissatisfied with Westminster for, among other things, 
allowing inequality to grow (see chapter 7).  
 
5.1.3 Trade dependency 
 
Bookman (1993) argues that the less dependent a region is on its state for its inputs and 
outputs, the more likely it is to aspire to secession, since it has reason to believe that 
independence would not have a large negative impact if it disrupts trade. However, since data 
on intra-country trade is limited, Bookman focused on exploring in some more depth a number 
of cases where data was available, categorizing them into high dependency and low 
dependency groups. Bookman studied Lombardy and the separatist republics of the Soviet 
Union as regions highly trade dependent on their states. Lombardy depends on Italy for the sale 
of its output and partially for the supply of its labor, while the various Soviet republics were 
highly specialized and economically integrated with each other in all respects. Regarding 
regions with low trade dependency, Bookman focused on Slovenia, Quebec, Bougainville, and 
a few Indian states.  
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It is not entirely evident that her case studies bear out her argument that low trade 
dependency increases the likelihood of separatism. First, there are not that many fewer 
separatist regions with high trade dependency than those with low trade dependency. Second, 
there are problems with data, and the somewhat arbitrary choice of how to categorize a region, 
which Bookman herself notes (Bookman, 1993:69). For example, in Slovenia equal shares of 
its industrial output were destined for the local, national and international markets, so whether 
this constitutes high or low trade dependency is unclear. (The situation is clearer with regards 
to inputs, where Slovenia was dependent on its local and international markets, although even 
here some data suggests that there may have been partial dependence on immigration of 
laborers from the rest of Yugoslavia.) Another unclear case is Punjab, the major grain producer 
in India, which was mostly self-supplied with agricultural inputs, but exported almost its entire 
wheat production (its principal crop) to Indian markets. So, on the side of inputs it has low 
trade dependency, and on the side of outputs, it has extremely high trade dependency. What 
then is its overall dependency? To complicate matters further, Bookman noted that there was a 
central government ban on the export of food grains. We cannot know where Punjab would 
have been selling its grain if that had not been in place. 
Overall, while trade dependency seems important, it appears that it has to be viewed in 
relation to some other factor. As we will see in section 5.4.2, this may be what separatist regions 
believe that their post-independence political and economic links to the rest of their former 
country will be. 
 
5.1.4 Decentralization 
 
Bookman (1993:48-50) look at how much autonomy regions have in their economic 
decision making. To the extent that separatist aspirations arise because a region feels that it 
cannot protect or pursue its interests, a transfer of authority to the region could mitigate that 
problem. However, it is also possible for decentralization to make it more likely for a region to 
demand secession. Decentralization involves building regional institutions that can muster 
resources and take actions towards secession. Also, the institutions that are created can 
themselves become a part of a future state’s administrative apparatus, making the post-
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secession period potentially easier, which can boost the separatists’ confidence and increase 
their aspirations.76 
There are two additional things that Bookman does not mention in terms of how 
decentralization can increase secessionist aspirations. First, a decentralized administration can 
actually be essential in creating regional interests in the first place. Namely, assessments of 
regional economic conditions, and the interests based on them, need to be created; they do not 
pre-exist in people’s minds. They can be created without regional institutions, but these make 
the process much easier. Second, similar to Anderson’s (2006) arguments about nations being 
socially constructed (explained more in section 5.3.1), a regional administration can be 
something around which a regional identity can be formed. As I already noted, identities are 
not essential for separatism, but they can certainly be a strong contributing factor. 
What sort of economic decisions can be decentralized? Today central authorities normally 
retain for themselves monetary policy, at least a part of fiscal policy (usually taxes on highly 
mobile tax bases, customs proceeds, and, on the side of expenses, regional redistribution, social 
security, defense, and similar expenses that pertain to the entire state), foreign economic 
relations (the setting of tariffs and other trade barriers, the negotiation of trade and investment 
agreements), some price controls, and the laws defining the basic structure of the economic 
system (for example, types of ownership that are allowed, the fundamentals of spatial planning, 
and so on). Other than that, depending on the level of decentralization, most other policies and 
institutions can be devolved to various sub-national levels, although in most cases the central 
government retains more for itself than just what is noted above.77 
Demands for more decentralization can be formed around any of these policies. However, 
one of the most usual demands is when richer regions wish to gain more fiscal autonomy. In 
practice, this amounts to a desire to reduce their net regional contribution to the central budget. 
Bookman (1993:80-92) provides evidence that decentralization has sometimes satisfied the 
demands of separatists, and sometimes provided a boost for further aspirations. For example, 
for several decades after the democratization of Spain, Catalan separatism was reduced by 
Catalonia’s increased autonomy. The ever increasing decentralization in Yugoslavia also 
satisfied the various demands of its constituent republics. The situation was similar in Quebec 
for a while after the initial decentralization in the 1960s. However, in all these cases, 
                                                             
76 See Bakke (2015), for example, for studies of decentralization and its effects on separatism in Chechnya, Punjab 
and Québec. 
77 On the trends in decentralization, see OECD (2010:23-41). 
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decentralization also made separatist demands easier later on. In the case of the extreme 
decentralization in Yugoslavia, for example, there were not many additional institutions that 
any of its constituent republics had to build if they wanted to become independent. This clearly 
made a drive towards independence far more viable than it otherwise would have been. 
So, it seems that decentralization on its own is not an independent factor, but it can either 
strengthen or weaken separatist demands depending on whether it helps solve the problems it 
is meant to solve or not. 
 
5.2 Inter-regional economic conflicts 
 
The previous section showed some common characteristics of many regions in which 
separatism has emerged, but what are the exact center-region or inter-regional economic 
conflicts that can happen? Regional redistribution has already been mentioned, but, in 
principle, any economic policy has the potential to impact the interests of some regions 
adversely, while being neutral or beneficial for others. Additionally, the unintended 
consequences of regional disparities, such as immigration to richer regions, can also create 
conflicts. Thus, on the one hand, economic links between regions bind them together through 
the flows of goods, services, capital and people, but, on the other, they can also create 
conditions for economic conflicts which may fuel separatism and, ultimately, state dissolution. 
The next three sections analyze state economic policies, the unintended consequences of the 
functioning of markets, and recessions and austerity78 as sources of inter-regional or center-
region economic conflicts. 
 
5.2.1 Sources of separatist conflicts: economic policies 
 
Inter-regional fiscal redistribution 
 
Perhaps the most common inter-regional or center-region economic conflict is about fiscal 
redistribution. Indeed, among the five issues that Bookman (1993:94) found to come up 
consistently in separatist conflicts, two fall into this category: “the share of central budget and 
                                                             
78 Recessions may be largely an unintended consequence of the functioning of markets, while austerity policies 
are obviously “state economic policies”. However, since these two things, particularly when they go in tandem, 
seem to be a key factor in spurring separatism, I have decided to put them in a separate section. 
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capital investment allocated to the regions” and “the proportion of input in the form of taxes 
that the region contributes to the center”. These are two sides of the same coin; in practice, 
poorer regions are often dissatisfied with their share of investment and spending, while the 
richer regions are dissatisfied with the fact that they are (or think they are) net contributors to 
the government budget. The issue of fiscal redistribution has been brought up in Quebec, 
Northern Italy, Flanders, Catalonia, Scotland, in Yugoslavia, the USSR, and in many other 
cases of separatism. 
Bookman was, of course, not the only author to notice this. For example, Hansen (1984) 
explored various regionalisms in both Western and the then communist Eastern Europe, and in 
most of the cases that he looked at, richer regions have claimed that they are being exploited 
because of having to subsidize poorer ones. Kęstutis (1991) and Plotniekis (1991) made the 
same arguments in relation to the Baltic republics of the former USSR, which were 
substantially more developed than the USSR average, and were subsidizing the central budget 
(though, due to their size, the absolute amount of subsidies was obviously very small),79 and 
claiming that they were being exploited. Seliverstov (1991) also pointed out that such 
redistribution mechanisms deprived some regions within soviet Russia of income, and that this 
was leading to inter-regional tensions. Jacobs’ (2011) analysis of Quebec is another interesting 
case, where she documents vehement arguments about whether Quebec was a net contributor 
or not to the central budget. Bookman (1993:76) similarly notes that the evidence for Quebec 
goes both ways, but that it seems that, whatever the net effect, it was not large. Still, given 
Montreal’s economic decline, and the rise of Toronto as Canada’s major economic hub, the 
possibility that Quebec was subsidizing the federal budget at all was politically explosive. 
Conflicts about fiscal redistribution do not come up only in established states. In some cases, 
attempts to constitute a new state failed partially because of conflicts about fiscal redistribution. 
Hicks (1978) focused on successes and failures in building federations. She looked at a number 
of failed attempts to create a federation (attempts to constitute South Africa as a federation, a 
failed attempt to create a federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, British attempts to build 
a Central African Federation), as well as a number of federations that were set up, but proved 
short-lived (the West Indies Federation of several of the former British Caribbean colonies and 
the federation of Malaysia and Singapore). While many factors contributed to these failures, 
economics played a role as well. For example, one of the impediments to the survival of the 
                                                             
79 Of course, the extent to which “subsidies” in a centrally planned system are the same thing as “subsidies” in a 
market one is debatable, given the different nature of price formation. 
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West Indies Federation was the unwillingness of any of the islands to pay for common 
institutions, which would have ended up with the richer islands paying more. Federal taxation 
was actually prohibited. Similarly, in the case of Singapore and Malaysia, in addition to various 
problems that were more serious than economics, conflicts came up in relation to the more 
developed Singapore’s contribution to the financing of federal institutions, as well as a 
development loan that Singapore was supposed to extend to Borneo. 
A point worth making is that both in the case of Singapore and Malaysia and the West Indies 
Federation, the conflicts about financing administrative institutions cannot be seen separately 
from the generally low absolute levels of development of the countries involved. Very poor 
countries often have problems paying for their own state administration, let alone for additional 
supranational institutions, whereas for more developed countries, the entire state apparatus 
constitutes a very small share of total government expenditures. 
 
Price controls 
 
Another set of policies that has often been a source of conflict are price controls (Bookman, 
1993:94). Capitalist countries do have them and some have used them extensively in certain 
periods, but it was in the final days of former communist countries that price controls really 
became significant points of contention between regions.80  
Bookman (1993), Woodward (1995), and Madžar (1995) noted this for Yugoslavia, where 
prices of raw materials were controlled, but prices of manufacturing products were freely 
formed, resulting in relative prices moving against the raw material producers and the (poorer) 
republics that depended on them. Seliverstov (1991:124-127) focused on the Soviet Union and 
noted that, on top of the persistent regional inequalities between the USSR republics, some 
economic policies did not take into account specific regional characteristics, thus leading to 
tensions in inter-regional and center-region relations and disintegrative processes. Here he 
focused on eastern and northern parts of Russia, and pointed out, among other things, the low 
prices set for the products of raw material industries, which made it almost impossible for 
enterprises to be profitable and local budgets to form. Bronstein (1991), in his analysis of the 
collapse of the Soviet economy, documented the same situation, except not within Russia, but 
                                                             
80 Given that, except Yugoslavia, these were centrally planned economies, price “controls” is not the most 
adequate term, since all prices were set by the state anyway, but I have decided to stick with it to avoid an 
unnecessary proliferation of terms. 
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between Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union, with Russia claiming that it was being 
exploited by the other republics because of the low prices of raw materials. Identical 
accusations were made by the Central Asian republics; one of their primary products was 
cotton, the price of which was also kept low. In the case of communist countries, such 
dissatisfaction with specific policies quickly turned into animosity against the “system” 
(Bronstein, 1991:151-152). Given that economies based on the production of raw materials 
tend to be less developed than those based on manufacturing and advanced services, these well 
known “price scissors” actually even entailed a transfer or resources from poorer to richer 
regions. 
As noted, capitalist countries do have price controls and price supports. The most important 
ones are for agricultural products, and they are usually combined with other policies that 
support the incomes in that relatively non-oligopolized sector, protecting it from price 
competition and instability. It is not inconceivable that, if these policies were not in place, we 
would see much more dissatisfaction coming from agricultural regions which, for that matter, 
would then also be significantly poorer, since relative prices would often move against their 
producers. 
 
Distribution of foreign currency 
 
Bookman (1993:94) identifies “the share of foreign exchange and external funding” as one 
of the most common interregional conflicts that arises. This was again an issue primarily in 
communist countries. In Yugoslavia, for example, conflicts about reforming the system of 
foreign currency allocation were amongst the first to arise. Foreign currency earnings could 
partially be retained by the companies that earned them, and partially had to be sold to the 
central bank.81 Attempts by the federal government to reform this system towards a more 
market based one (where foreign currency could not be held by companies, and had to be 
bought on the market) were strongly opposed by Slovenia and Croatia, which were the main 
earners of hard currencies. 
Advanced capitalist countries have not generally experienced such conflicts, because they 
usually do not centrally allocate foreign currency. Nevertheless, some have done this, either 
during wars or in periods of reconstruction. Conversely, developing capitalist countries, 
including those that have managed to join the core of the world economy, have extensively 
                                                             
81 For an explanation of how the system worked, see Bookman (1991:206). 
84 
 
rationed foreign currency for extended periods of time as part of development plans. It would 
be interesting to see if this had ever caused inter-regional conflicts, but unfortunately it was not 
possible to undertake this research for this thesis.  
 
Tariffs 
 
Tariffs are another policy that is set at the national level, but impacts different regions 
differently. Hirschman (1970) noted that the “South” (underdeveloped region) may be forced 
to buy more expensive “Northern” (more developed region) goods behind tariff walls, instead 
of cheaper imports. If the South pushes for lower tariffs on these grounds, while the North 
wishes to protect its industries, this may create a conflict. According to Chang (2003:27-28), 
this was exactly one of the major reasons for the American Civil War. Hicks (1978) 
documented the same conflict in the short-lived West Indies Federation – one of the major 
obstacles to its survival was the reluctance of Jamaica to give up the protection of its infant 
industries. 
Poorer regions may also wish to separate so that they can employ tariffs against the richer 
region, and thereby provide their own industries with a chance to grow. Reinert (2008:59-60) 
notes that this was one of the things that Norwegian separatists wanted during the time Norway 
was a part of Sweden. 
The composition of tariffs can also cause conflicts. Madžar (1995) pointed out that the 
poorer Yugoslav republics were dissatisfied with the fact that, in order to help industrialization, 
tariffs on raw materials were much lower than on manufactured goods. This meant that their 
industries were exposed to more competition that those of the richer republics. 
 
Monetary and banking policies 
 
Monetary policy can also have different impacts on different regions (Carlino and DeFina, 
1996), particularly because most nations states (if any) are not actually optimal currency areas. 
(McCann (2016) makes this point for the UK.) For example, an attempt to reduce inflation 
through restrictive monetary policies will have a worse effect on those regions which rely more 
on SMEs than on those that rely more on big firms. This is because SMEs rely to a large extent 
on external financing, while big firms can rely more on self-financing. Effectively, this means 
it will have a worse impact on poorer regions. This has been brought up in the case of Scotland 
and the United Kingdom (Cairns, Cooper and Morgan, 2014), although admittedly the issue 
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has not been taken up by the Scottish government itself in the arguments it has set out against 
the UK government. 
It is not only restrictive monetary policies that can cause conflicts. The case of Yugoslavia 
is instructive in this sense. Throughout the recession in the 1980s, many firms were facing 
bankruptcy, but were supported by banks through loans, which were, in turn, supported by the 
Yugoslav central bank. By the late 1980s, this had led to hyperinflation. However, firms in the 
poorer republics, and particularly agricultural producers, were more dependent on this sort of 
support, thus leading to conflicts between the Yugoslav republics about controlling inflation.  
 
Exchange rates 
 
Exchange rates can also become contentious. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is 
a long-standing argument that a strong pound works to the benefit of the financial sector and 
against manufacturing.82 Given the regional division of industries in the United Kingdom, this 
means that a strong pound works in favor of the Greater East and against most of the rest of 
the country. 
 
5.2.2 Sources of separatist conflicts: unintended market consequences 
 
Economic policies seem to become a source of conflict more easily than unintended market 
consequences, probably for several reasons. First, actors who decide on economic policies are 
more easily identifiable than individual market actors, and can thus more easily become a target 
for dissatisfaction. Second, economic policies can be thought of as having desired regional 
effects, whereas the actions of market actors normally do not have any such effects as their 
goal (though they do have them as a consequence). Thus, any negative consequences that the 
market produces are less likely to cause dissatisfaction than economic policies that are thought 
of as being intentionally harmful. Third, government policies are more straightforward to 
understand than the functioning of markets, and thus easier to criticize. Indeed, in capitalist 
countries it is only the radical left that consistently criticizes markets as the main source of 
various problems. Finally, policies can be changed more directly than market outcomes, so the 
aspiration to change them can form more easily. 
                                                             
82 See, for example, IPPR North (2012:76-77). 
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Nevertheless, migration from poorer to richer regions (an unintended market consequence) 
has often created significant dissatisfaction in the latter. Such migration creates pressure on 
social services, infrastructure and housing in richer regions, and it can push up rents and 
inflation. It can also create dissatisfaction because of the cultural influence of the immigrants. 
A current example is what is happening in the EU today. For many purposes, we can treat 
the EU as a state, and its member states as regions, in which case some of them are experiencing 
a marked rise in separatism, and the UK, after the result of the Brexit referendum, will soon 
start its exit negotiations. The anti-immigrant rhetoric in the richer member state that has been 
adopted by a whole slew of new right-wing parties, established center-right ones, and even 
some center-left ones, is exactly based on a concern about the cultural and economic impact of 
migrants. 
It is interesting to note, though, that the migration from richer to richer EU member states 
and from richer to poorer ones has not created any widespread resentment. This is despite the 
fact that such migration too can have at least some negative effects for the inflow countries – 
for example, it can push up the prices of housing in poorer countries, as the prices adapt to the 
higher purchasing power of people from richer countries, leaving the local population worse 
off. Similarly, while concern is often expressed in poorer EU member states that they are losing 
educated people to the richer member states, this has never been brought up as a reason to 
potentially leave the EU. 
In terms of autonomous capital flows, Jacobs (2011) noted that there was concern about 
Quebec losing capital to the rest of Canada. This related not just to the flow of new investment, 
but also to the actual relocation of some companies’ headquarters from Montreal to Toronto. 
Nevertheless, this seems to be an exception; as I already noted, separatist movements pay far 
more attention to the inter-regional flows of public funds. 
Of course, regional underdevelopment itself is largely a consequence of how markets 
function, but this is generally not recognized by separatist movements. Rather, the focus is on 
government policies that are seen as being the main culprit for the underdevelopment. Besides, 
it is anyway the case that, at least in advanced capitalist countries, strong separatism seems to 
emerge more in richer regions which do not have cause to be dissatisfied with market 
consequences. 
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5.2.3 Sources of separatist conflicts: recessions and austerity 
 
The importance of recessions and austerity does not seem to have been recognized much in 
the literature on separatism. This section uses the example of Yugoslavia to show the kind of 
corrosive effects a prolonged recession combined with austerity measures can have on state 
institutions designed to manage inter-regional and center-region economic conflicts – it is one 
thing to manage them when the amount of economic resources is increasing, but the situation 
fundamentally changes when it is constantly decreasing over a prolonged period of time. 
Indeed, it appears that the Yugoslav recession and IMF-imposed austerity in the 1980s may 
have been the key factor in destroying the country. 
Bookman (1994) explored the link between economic decline and separatism in the Balkan 
countries in the 1990s. She argues that (1994:6): 
 
In multiethnic societies, especially those in which substate divisions are drawn according 
to ethnic, religious or linguistic lines, regional economic competition is easily interpreted 
as interethnic competition. … When economic conditions deteriorate, competition 
becomes more ferocious and fuels nationalist ideology. The [economic] problems may 
become exacerbated as interethnic bickering imperils economic functioning and 
paralyzes economic institutions... 
 
Yugoslavia is the most interesting country she looked at, because it is the only one that has 
actually dissolved. However, Bookman primarily focused on the extreme economic crises in 
during the 1990s, only mentioning a few times the recession that Yugoslavia was in in the 
1980s, which is what was actually important in creating the situation in the 1990s. To 
understand its impact, we need to first note the regional disparities that existed in Yugoslavia. 
Flaherty (1988) explains that up until the 1960s, the Yugoslav federal government 
maintained substantial price controls and directed investment through controlling the banking 
sector and the investment decisions of firms, among other ways through taxing about 60% of 
the firms’ net income. This ensured that relative prices did not move against raw material and 
agricultural producers, sectors on which the poorer regions of the country relied,83 and that the 
poorer regions got a share of investment, particularly in infrastructure. Regional disparities did 
increase during this period, but not too much. However, dissatisfaction in the richer regions 
                                                             
83 Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
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with these controls, plus the fact that they were seen by many as incompatible with socialist 
self-management, led to pro-market reforms in 1961, which eliminated most import and price 
controls, allowed firms to make their own investment decisions, reduced taxes on firms’ net 
income to 15%, and reformed the banking sector to a market-based model. 
The pro-reform arguments were that this would allow the concentration of investment where 
it would be the most productive and allow for greatest efficiency and economies of scale (i.e. 
in the richer regions of the country), and that the establishment of growth poles there would 
have trickle-down effects on the rest of the country. The anti-reformists were concerned that 
relative prices would turn against the poorer regions, that they would be deprived of 
investment,84 and that growth poles might only become beneficial for the poorer regions once 
they were completely saturated with investment themselves (i.e. at some undefined point in the 
future). 
Flaherty sums up the effects of the reforms thus: 
 
The effects of reform were immediate and dramatic. In the first four months of 1962 
retail prices increased by 25%, prices of agricultural products by 18% and the balance 
of payments deficit continued to grow despite devaluation. As domestic terms of trade 
turned against agriculture and international terms against domestic producers in 
general, the less developed regions suffered disproportionately due to their greater 
reliance on agriculture for income and imports for production. Unemployment rose in 
these areas as 'countless enterprises in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia had to let workers go in the face of shortages of both operating and investment 
capital'. Planned levels of investment were not reached in the country as a whole, because 
decentralisation led to 'evasions of the laws and directions requiring contributions to the 
federal government in the form of taxes and the investment and development funds of 
enterprises'. 
Finally, receipts of the General Investment Fund, the source of supplementary federal 
funds, fell precipitously … The inability of the fund to meet its obligations was much more 
                                                             
84 This would be particularly problematic for the entire nation when it comes to slowing down improvements in 
agriculture in the poorer regions, because the need to import food was draining foreign currency reserves needed 
for industrialization. 
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damaging to the underdeveloped regions owing to their greater dependence on the fund 
for working as well as investment capital (1988:102-103).85 
 
The reforms did include one important provision to help the poorer regions, namely, the 
establishment of the Federal Fund for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions that firms 
from all regions would contribute to proportional to their incomes, but that would be used 
solely to finance investment in the poorer regions. Nevertheless, as would be expected in a 
basically market-based system, this did not prove sufficient, and regional disparities started 
rising much faster after 1961. 
Yugoslavia, like many other countries, accrued substantial foreign debts in the 1970s, and 
by the end of the decade had run into a balance of payments crisis. Woodward (1995b) argues 
that Yugoslav federal policy-makers could not choose to default, because of Yugoslavia’s 
specific international position and the need to maintain good relationships with both the 
Western and Eastern blocs. Nor could they turn to more direct control over the economy in 
order to steer it out of the crisis (as they had done on previous occasions when facing similar 
crises), because the more market-oriented approach to socialism was by then firmly 
institutionalized. The federal government therefore did the only thing it could, namely, turn to 
the IMF, which demanded austerity measures and a currency devaluation in exchange for new 
loans and debt rescheduling. Several further IMF programs followed throughout the 1980s, all 
having recessionary effects. Additionally, the federal government started rationing foreign 
currency, and imposed import restrictions, which hit importers and non-priority import-
dependent industries. Finally, the banking system was used to credit failing enterprises, which 
led to hyperinflation by the end of the 1980s. What is crucial, though, is that all these measures 
did not impact all parts of Yugoslavia equally. For example, Woodward (1995:208) notes that 
in 1984, registered unemployment was 1.7% in Slovenia, 7.2% in Croatia, 19.1% in 
Montenegro, 21.1% in Macedonia and 33.3% in Kosovo. 
This set the stage for serious economic conflicts between the republics and between them 
and the federal government. In essence, the richer republics, particularly Slovenia, were not as 
harmed by the recession and austerity as the poorer ones, and they did not want to share their 
resources, nor did they want to be harmed by those reforms pursued by the federal government 
that were harmful for them. For example, Slovenia and Croatia insisted that firms should be 
allowed to retain more of their foreign currency earnings, and resisted reform proposals to set 
                                                             
85 On regional development patterns in Yugoslavia, see also Bookman (1991:131-145). 
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up a market for foreign currency. The counter-argument was that Slovenian firms were often 
the intermediaries for the export of goods made by firms in the other republics, who should 
therefore get their share of foreign currency earnings. With regards to Croatia, the tourism 
industry benefited from federal investment when it was being set up in the 1960s (Bookman, 
1992:79-80), so it was not seen as fair that Croatian firms should retain all the benefits of that 
investment. 
Numerous other conflicts could be mentioned, but the main point is that it was the recession 
and austerity that were the key factor that put Yugoslavia on the path to dissolution. Linguistic, 
national, ethnic and religious differences had always existed in Yugoslavia, but there is simply 
no serious evidence that they ever brought the country anywhere near dissolution on their own, 
or that they were even a particular problem to begin with.86 Hence, the usual narrative that Tito 
was the “unifying” factor whose death spelled the end of Yugoslavia (a full decade later) also 
does not make sense. Nor does it make sense to say that it was the communist repression of 
nationalities that kept the country together. Nationalism (in the chauvinist sense) was repressed, 
but national identities were not. As Woodward (1995a:90-91) says: “Yugoslavia was held 
together not by Tito’s charisma, political dictatorship, or repression of national sentiments, but 
by a complex balancing act in the international arena and a mixed economic and political 
system that provided governmental protections of social and economic equality and of shared 
sovereignty among its many nations”. 
Yugoslavia did have substantial regional disparities and conflicts based on them. There were 
market factors that favored the richer regions, such as relative prices and the competitive 
advantages of their firms. There were also state policies that (unintentionally) favored them, 
such as the federal export credit fund. As Madžar (1995) reports, in 1970 the value of its 
allocations just to capital goods and ship exports (industries primarily located in the richer 
republics) was equivalent to 76% of the entire allocations of the above mentioned Fund for the 
Development of Underdeveloped Regions. But, Yugoslavia did also have some mechanisms to 
help the poorer regions, such as foreign currency sharing, and transfers through the federal 
budget and federal funds. Madžar (1995) notes that the poorer republics were always concerned 
about the effects of (socialist) markets on their development, while the richer ones were always 
arguing against fiscal redistribution. Still, this had been going on for several decades before 
                                                             
86 As a matter of fact, how “loyal” people were to their group is shown, for example, by the fact that, when attempts 
were made in Serbia to draft men to fight in Croatia in 1991, draft dogging was between 50% and 85%. 
Additionally, about 50,000 reservists that were sent to the front deserted (Lowinger, 2009:17). 
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Yugoslavia dissolved, and there does not seem to be evidence of separatism purely based on 
the regional disparities, even if they were increasing. 
What seems to have pushed the country towards dissolution were the decade-long recession 
and austerity, which kept sharpening the inter-regional and center-region conflicts, and putting 
the institutions for managing them under such strain that they could no longer cope. Of course, 
without regional disparities, the recession and austerity would not have had this effect, but the 
regional disparities were the enabling factor, while the recession and austerity were what 
actually started the chain of events ending in dissolution and war. By the time multi-party 
democracy was introduced in the late 1980s, the republican political and economic elites were 
already in continuous sharp conflicts with each other and with the federal government. Faced 
with the need to win elections, they started employing extremely nationalist propaganda, with 
accusations of exploitation exploding on all sides. This propaganda fell on fertile soil – in the 
richer republics on a population which could be convinced that its living standards were 
endangered by exploitation by the poorer republics, and in the poorer republics by a population 
which was feeling the effects of a severe recession and austerity for a decade, and was generally 
susceptible to being offered a scapegoat for this. 
Two things seem worth speculating on briefly with regard to recessions, austerity and 
separatism. First, recessions and austerity may be an important factor in determining if it is 
richer or poorer regions that want to secede. In good times, the poorer regions might think that 
their prospects as an independent country would be good, and the richer regions may not mind 
any interregional transfers as much. Conversely, during times of recession, the poorer regions 
may not be too keen on losing support from the richer regions, while at the same time the richer 
regions may become less willing to share their resources, both because they may be shrinking 
and because the poorer regions might actually need higher levels of support than before (say, 
due to a larger number of unemployed people). 
Second, Madžar (1995) pointed out that if a richer region is not particularly large in 
comparison to the entire state and other regions, then it would have to transfer a sizeable portion 
of its income for that to matter in per capita terms in the poorer, bigger regions. In relation to 
the current discussion, the implication is that in times of recession, when resources are tighter 
and the need for transfers (such as for unemployment benefits) bigger, rich regions that are not 
large compared to the rest of the state might become particularly dissatisfied. We have certainly 
witnessed a sharp rise in secessionist aspirations in, for example, Northern Italy, Flanders and 
Catalonia during the current recession. In the Soviet Union, which had been in stagnation since 
the Brezhnev era, with additional economic problems coming from the botched reforms under 
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Gorbachev, the small, but more developed, Baltic republics were the first to become separatist. 
Also, if we look at the EU as a state-like entity, with separatism in its “regions”, then there has 
been a significant increase in separatism in the richer states over the last several years of 
recession – they are large “regions”, but not overwhelmingly large compared to all the poorer 
member states combined. 
Third, a special case of the effects of recessions and austerity may be regions that recognize 
that austerity is a bad policy choice, want to escape it, and feel that the only way to do it is to 
become independent and gain control over their economic policy. We will see in chapter 7 that 
this is a part of the story of Scottish separatism, and, as I mentioned before, it was one of the 
things that drove Quebec’s dissatisfaction with being a part of Canada. 
 
 
5.3 Class, nationalism and separatism 
 
Thus far, I have been using the term region as a short-hand. This has been useful in order to 
more easily focus on regional economic characteristics and the types of inter-regional and 
center-region conflicts that emerge. However, it is obviously not regions that act. We have to 
actually look at the relevant actors if we want to explain how economic conflicts influence 
separatism. This section focuses on a class analysis of separatism, but it also allows us to 
explore how class and nationalism interact, or, more precisely, how the construction of nations 
and national interests by certain classes is a tool they use in separatism. 
To understand that, though, we first have to give a short overview of how nations have 
emerged. The important point to take away is that nationalism cannot be viewed separately 
from political economy. 
 
5.3.1 A short overview of nationalism 
 
Most people implicitly hold the view that national belonging is primordial to human nature. 
However, it is well established in the academic literature (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 2009; 
Hobsbawm, 2014) that even the oldest nations are no more than a few hundred years old. 
The feeling of national belonging is actually a puzzle that needs to be explained – how can 
so many people who have never even met each other feel a strong sense of belonging to the 
same group? Anderson (2006:6-7) calls nations imagined communities – they exist only in the 
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minds of their members, and have several characteristics. They are imagined as limited, as 
having boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. They are also imagined as sovereign, as 
having (or they should aspire to have) self-rule. Since the idea of the nation definitively 
emerged during the Enlightenment, this self-rule is often legitimized as stemming from the 
people – the members of the nation. Finally, a nation is imagined as a community, “a deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (2006:7), despite the fact that societies are composed of different 
classes of unequal power, and that relations of exploitation abound. 
According to Anderson: “What … made [nations] imaginable was … [the] interaction 
between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of 
communication (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.” (2006:42-43). At the 
time when the bases for the idea of a nation started forming – during the 16th century in Europe 
– capitalist relations were starting to develop with increasing speed. As capitalists involved in 
printing saturated the Europe-wide market for books in Latin, which was the common language 
of the learned classes, they started turning to where they could make further profits, namely, to 
printing in vernaculars, which were used by those who were literate, but did not know Latin 
(merchants, state functionaries in those states that used vernaculars instead of Latin, etc.). This 
had far-reaching consequences. 
Those literate in Latin were mostly the clergy of the Catholic Church, or lawyers, doctors 
and similar learned professions. Some of these people travelled throughout Europe, and met 
others who shared similar life experiences (knew Latin, read the same books, were of the same 
religion, visited the same places). They formed a sense of community, but, crucially, the 
boundaries of this community were not territorially limited, at least within Europe. 
The situation was very different with vernaculars. Their orthography was standardized in 
large part by the printers, in an effort to expand their markets by making sure that as large a 
section of the literate population as possible could read their books. But, this still meant only 
people in a limited territory, because, unlike Latin, there was no single vernacular that was 
spread all over Europe. Furthermore, most people were monoglot, so most readers of one 
vernacular could not read another. In addition, the people who read vernaculars were more 
likely to move within the boundaries of their state, rather than all over Europe. This was 
particularly the case with state bureaucrats, whose career progression at the time often involved 
moving around the country. All of this meant that a sense of territorially limited, sovereign 
community – a nation – could emerge. 
What is important to note is that in the initial phases of the formation of nations – roughly 
from the 16th to the late 18th century in Europe – the whole concept had little to do with the vast 
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majority of the populations that ended up as modern nations. The creation of national 
consciousness was something happening at the top of the social hierarchy, among merchants, 
bureaucrats, lawyers, top military officers, etc. 87 
From the late 18th to mid-19th century, the elites had what Hobsbawm (2014:18ss) calls the 
“revolutionary” concept of the nation. This involved territoriality, sovereignty and community, 
but, unlike today, in principle all people living in a certain territory were, or at least could be, 
a part of the same nation – their ethnicity, mother tongue, religion, or any other cultural trait, 
were unimportant, as long as they also acquired the official language of the state88 and obeyed 
its laws. Compared to the situation today: “… in this period, nations and nationalism were not 
major domestic problems for political entities which had reached the status of ‘nation-states’, 
however nationally heterogeneous they were by modern standards” (Hobsbawm, 2014:43). 
This changed dramatically from mid-19th century and onwards, when the concept of the 
nation started encompassing non-elites as well, and started including various ethnic 
characteristics. This happened for two interrelated reasons. First, mass schooling needed to be 
done in a common, standardized language, if it was to be of use in a state-wide administrative 
apparatus, and in increasingly internally connected national economies.89 Given that most 
nation states in Europe had people with different mother tongues, whichever language was 
chosen for mass schooling would leave large numbers of people disadvantaged, because they 
would have to learn an additional language. Second, democratization meant that it was possible 
to organize politically and vie for the control of the state, including for determining what 
languages were to be important. These two reasons explain why politics within nation states 
started partially revolving around languages – namely, languages determined access to 
                                                             
87 In truth, it is not really possible to know with certainty what the great number of illiterate people thought, given 
that they could not leave any written records, and those who did know how to read and write were not often 
concerned with them or their political ideas. Hobsbawm (2014, chapter 2) did actually try to determine in various 
ways what this great mass of people felt about nations, if anything. He concluded that, in many cases, there were 
some elements in the cultures of the various peoples in Europe that could be built upon to create a popular feeling 
of a national community, or that could even create some feeling of a larger community on their own. He calls this 
“popular proto-nationalism”. However, Hobsbawm concludes that, while these elements could end up as building 
blocks of modern nations, they were not the same as modern nations. Most importantly, the idea of a shared 
language and a common ethnicity was lacking. 
88 Which was not always the dominant vernacular in the state, and could even be a foreign vernacular. 
89 More precisely, in most cases it needed to make most of the population use a standard language. More than 
anything, it was this process which started eliminating spoken local dialects, many of which were mutually 
unintelligible, and replacing them with the spoken languages we know today. 
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education, state administration and jobs. This also meant that there was a strong class element 
overlapping with what language was used – those on the losing side were often excluded from 
the best social and economic opportunities. It was in this period that, as part of these struggles, 
various national myths were simply invented, when people sought to strengthen the unity of 
their groups (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2013). Cultural characteristics apart from language, such 
as religion, also started being included in these nation building projects, until finally the 
concept of the nation took its modern form – a combination of ethnicity, language, religion, 
shared invented national myths, territoriality, and self-rule. This is, not incidentally, the period 
which saw the rise of national separatism for the first time, particularly after the end of the First 
World War. 
What we can conclude from the above analysis is that ethnic, religious and linguistic 
differences do not lead to conflicts by themselves, nor are they set in stone, nor even essential 
for the formation of nations. Thus, in the context of separatism, even if it appears that many 
cases are driven by nationalist conflicts, we have to go deeper than that, and look at the 
underlying economic, political and class structures, and analyze how they interact with 
nationalism. 
 
5.3.2 The interplay between class and nationalism in separatist conflicts 
 
In this section we will use several examples – separatism in the Soviet Union and Russia, 
former Yugoslavia, and Catalonia – to illustrate the importance of class and its interplay with 
economic interests and nationalism in fueling separatist conflicts.90 As we will see, in general, 
it is broadly defined elites (intellectuals, business leaders, politicians, members of leading civil 
society organizations, journalists, etc.) that express views about regional conditions and 
interests, and undertake actions at the regional level. What is interesting is to see is how some 
sections of these elites form separatist interests, and how they in turn influence sections of 
                                                             
90 A few days before the submission of the present thesis, I was made aware of an article by Michael Keating 
(Keating, 2014). It matches the arguments in this section closely. Keating provided a rare comparative class 
analysis of several European separatist movements (in Scotland, Catalonia, the Basque country, Flanders and 
Northern Italy), focusing on class support among ordinary people, trade unions, and business organizations. Due 
to time contraints, it was not possible to integrate it into the text, as it would have required rewriting, but I 
nevertheless felt it was important to reference it, as it is an excellent article.  
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ordinary people when building up support for separatism. Ordinary people are, of course, not 
merely tools, but they can be said to be caught up in events more than influencing them. 
 
Soviet Union and Russia 
 
Let us first look at the Soviet Union and Russia. Herrera (2005:120-142) argues that it was 
difficult for regional interests to form at all in the Soviet Union, given the centralization of the 
political and economic systems (through the Party nomenklatura and central planning), in 
combination with strict controls on the public debate. But, the Gorbachev reforms in the second 
half of the 1980s saw significant decentralization. Several laws gave greater autonomy to firms 
and managers in making business decisions, for example on prices. In the political sphere, 
Gorbachev wanted greater decentralization and separation of the Party and the state. Among 
other measures, Party organs that fulfilled the same function as various state ministries, 
including those dealing with economic affairs, were abolished, and the influence of the Party 
on appointments in the ministries themselves was lessened. Additionally, numerous institutions 
that were reformed or created in the Gorbachev era were now staffed through sub-central 
selection processes.  
This combination of economic and political decentralization made it much more possible 
than before to first at all form the idea of regional interests, and then to actually define specific 
ones. The political liberalization made it safe, and potentially politically and economically 
profitable, to pursue them. All this was combined with the fact that the perestroika did not 
really reverse the long economic stagnation from the Brezhnev era, and, as far as the ordinary 
people were concerned, it even introduced some problems that were not widely present before, 
such as profiteering on scarce goods. Once free(er) elections were introduced, it was only to be 
expected that some of the new or reformed elites would seek support on a regionalist platform, 
and push for secession. We already mentioned some of the economic conflicts that emerged, 
and noted it was the Baltic republics that were the first to become separatist. The USSR is thus 
an example of decentralization in combination with an economic crisis leading to dissolution, 
and in this broad sense the country parallels the Yugoslav case.91 
The processes that dissolved the Soviet Union continued within the Russia. Herrera (2005) 
looked at the Sverdlovsk and Samara oblasts between 1990 and 1993. These were picked 
                                                             
91 Nolan (1996), comparing China and the USSR, made the point that maintaining strong authority seems to have 
been a better choice for a large and diverse country facing profound economic changes. 
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because of their similar size, history (both have been at the core of the Russian state for 
centuries), ethnic composition (overwhelmingly Russian) and, most importantly, economies 
(manufacturing-based), but a striking difference in the fact that Sverdlovsk had one of the 
strongest regionalist movements in Russia at the time, pushing for being turned into a 
republic,92 whereas there was almost no regional activism in Samara. Herrera tried answering 
why this was the case. 
Herrera (2005:52-54) noted that even talking about objective economic facts was 
problematic in that period in Russia, since the Russian statistical office was only starting to 
build up the concepts and measurements needed for a market economy, with numerous 
problems and errors along the way. This was combined with a very unclear and constantly 
shifting institutional structure for center-region relationships, and with constant inter-regional 
and center-region conflicts about fiscal redistribution, inter-regional trade barriers, prices, 
production allocations, and numerous other issues (Herrera, 2005:151-159). In other words, the 
situation was perfect for regional elites to imagine their regions’ situation essentially however 
they desired. 
Herrera showed, through a content analysis of local newspapers in Sverdlovsk and Samara, 
that the economic problems of the two regions were consistently framed in a different way. In 
Sverdlovsk the center was seen as the source of the economic problems more often than in 
Samara, and Sverdlovsk was being represented as being treated unfairly. In Samara the regional 
economic problems were generally presented as part of the Russia-wide economic decline, and 
not as being the effect of unfair treatment of Samara itself. This obviously fed into a very 
different idea about what regional interests were – the political and economic elites in 
Sverdlovsk wanted to attain republic status and take more control over regional affairs, while 
in Samara there was no corresponding desire for greater autonomy. This was so despite the fact 
that, for example, Samara seems to have been a bigger net contributor to the central budget 
than Sverdlovsk (Herrera, 2005:179). 
At least a part of the reason for the different perceptions of the economic situation of 
Sverdlovsk and Samara came from the composition of their executive elites. In Samara, the 
executive was heavily dominated by people from the Communist party who had entered local 
politics through first being appointed to the region by the central Party organs. The central 
                                                             
92 Herrera sets up a “centralization – status-quo – independence” line, where a region may desire to stay where it 
is, or move towards one of the ends of the spectrum. Being turned from an oblast to a republic, that is, more 
decentralization, is towards the independence end. 
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administration also helped local elites consolidate their power. In Sverdlovsk, there was a 
significantly higher influence of politicians who entered politics for the first time in the 1990s 
(Herrera, 2005:173, 175-176). 
Herrera’s study shows several of the points I noted thus far. Understanding where separatism 
comes from is impossible without looking at how regional elites – in this case regional political 
leadership and the media – form their interests and influence public opinion. Second, 
interpretations of a region’s economic situation, and even more the interests based on this 
interpretation, are something that needs to be constructed. Indeed, Herrera called her book 
Imagined Economies, to point out that, just like Anderson (2006) argued that nations are 
imagined communities, ideas about the economy are also something that needs to be imagined 
and shared with others. Her case studies also confirm that nationalism, or its constituent parts, 
are not necessary for separatism (or, in this case, regionalism) to arise. Nationalism was used 
as a propaganda tool in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but it played no role in Sverdlovsk’s 
drive for more autonomy. 
 
Yugoslavia 
 
Lowinger (2009) looked at Yugoslavia, and thus, unlike Herrera, had to account for how 
class and nationalism interacted. He also offered a closer look than Herrera at how the elites 
manipulated ordinary people in their pursuit of secession. 
Lowinger focused on the wave of labor strikes and unrest in 1980s Yugoslavia, during its 
recession and IMF-imposed austerity. Like Herrera, he based his analysis on newspaper 
articles. He argued that they clearly showed that the strikes were non-violent and cross-ethnic, 
and aimed against the federal government. The workers were in most cases demanding a 
restoration of their real incomes, which were constantly being eroded by the government’s 
austerity measures and high and increasing inflation.93 In a number of cases, they were also 
defending their rights in the management of enterprises (Lowinger, 2009:2). Lowinger tries to 
explain how the elites managed to turn this wave of worker dissatisfaction into violent inter-
ethnic conflicts. 
He argues that regional political elites often allied with the striking workers in order to 
bolster their own position in their conflicts with the federal government. But, from the end of 
                                                             
93 The declines came both from direct and indirect cuts, wage freezes, and soaring inflation. Inflation could happen 
together with fiscal austerity, because firms were being saved from bankruptcy through bank credit. 
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the 1980s, political elites, both the republican and provincial communist parties94 and the new 
nationalist parties that were created after multi-party democracy was introduced, were 
increasingly trying to divide the workers along ethnic lines. The purpose was to break the power 
of the working class and hold on to or gain power at their expense. In some republics – notably 
Croatia and Slovenia – this was done in order to more easily pursue separatism. In all republics 
it was also done in order to more easily destroy the system of worker self-management, so that 
economic assets could be seized by what were to become the new capitalist classes.95 
Nationalist propaganda worked best with those groups that had higher intolerance levels. 
As Lowinger (2009:13) notes, intolerance was higher among the young than the old, and 
absolutely the highest among the unemployed (with youth unemployment being a particularly 
big problem in Yugoslavia). In other words, intolerance was high among those who had either 
lost the privileges and living standards they had (due in large part to the federal government’s 
austerity measures), or who never attained the standards promised by socialist self-
management. 
The fomenting of inter-ethnic conflict was done in numerous ways. For example, in 
Slovenia there was heavy propaganda about how Slovenian workers were being exploited by 
the poorer republics, with the clear intent of building up a mood supportive of secession. In 
Croatia, the media equated bureaucratic control with Serbian control. In Kosovo, the regional 
authorities (mostly Albanian) were actually not allying with the workers, but trying to subdue 
the labor unrest (which was cross-ethnic between Serbs and Albanians) by pressuring Albanian 
workers to not strike. The authorities were implying that the strikes were nationalist, and due 
to the repression of nationalist Albanian protests in 1981, this tactic worked to an extent, as the 
Albanian workers knew that there was a passable pretext to crack down on them. The 
occasional lack of support from Albanian workers created some resentment amongst Serbian 
workers, who were a minority in the province. Simultaneously, the authorities were actually 
cracking down on the strikers. But, in those cases where Albanians did not strike, this meant a 
regional authority with a heavy Albanian representation cracking down on Serbian workers. 
While this was not done due to any ethnic hatred, it nevertheless created the opportunity for 
                                                             
94 There were nine communist parties in Yugoslavia – one for each of the six republics, two for Serbia’s 
autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which were all formally a part of the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia. The sub-central parties had great autonomy, both as parties, and in actually influencing republican or 
provincial politics, due to the extreme decentralization of the Yugoslav federation. 
95 Needless to say, the amount of corruption in the privatization processes that were started in the former Yugoslav 
republics after dissolution was enormous, as was the outright plunder during the war.  
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Slobodan Milosevic, by then the leader of the Serbian Communist Party, to present himself as 
someone who will save Serbs from Albanian repression.96  
Nevertheless, creating inter-ethnic hatred was not in any way easy. Indeed, as Lowinger 
points out multiple times, this took massive propaganda in the media, which actually came 
under stricter control after multi-party democracy was introduced.97 The last federal prime 
minister, Ante Marković, tried countering this by launching a Yugoslav wide television 
network, Yutel. It did not manage to achieve much. It is ironic that Marković was both an 
honestly staunch Yugoslav, and a supporter of IMF “structural adjustment” programs. 
Lowinger (2009:20, 25) actually argues that many federal policy-makers were simply not 
realizing that the reform measures they were implementing in the 1980s were destroying the 
fabric of the Yugoslav economy and society. 
Even the massive propaganda in the media was not always enough to destroy inter-ethnic 
cooperation and the primary identification of workers with their class. This was particularly 
the case in heavily multi-ethnic towns and areas. In such cases, brute force was applied. The 
usual tactic was for paramilitaries of one ethnicity to perform some act of violence against 
another ethnicity. This “’proved’ on the ground that ethnic co-existence was no longer safe” 
(Lowinger, 2009:112-113). It was also, as intended, invariably presented in the media of the 
“opposing” side as acts of violence of one ethnicity against another, not of paramilitaries and 
criminals against ordinary people. 
Lowinger’s analysis provides further evidence that the recession and austerity measures in 
Yugoslavia played the key role in the country’s dissolution. But, what it also shows is that their 
effects cannot be fully understood just in terms of elite conflict. Rather, we have to 
acknowledge that they create among ordinary people a feeling of insecurity, a fear of a decline 
in living standards or dissatisfaction if they have already declined, and that it is these things 
that are exploited by the elites in pursuit of their interests. 
 
 
 
                                                             
96 Up until that time, Milosevic was presenting himself as a savior of both Albanian and Serbian workers against 
the regional authorities, in his attempts to reduce the power of the Communist Party of Kosovo. In other words, 
Milosevic was a skilled opportunist politician mainly interested in increasing his own power. 
97 The republican communist parties were actually quite tolerant of critical media reporting in the 1980s, whereas 
when control over media was seized by the new nationalist, or the reformed communist parties, it became 
increasingly difficult to counter their propaganda. 
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Catalonia 
 
Orientalizing narratives of separatism, often focused on supposed “ancient ethnic hatreds”, 
are very common when discussing non-Western countries, including former communist ones. 
As we have seen, they are wildly incorrect. Separatism in the West is not normally couched in 
such extreme terms. Still, nationalism is the typical explanation given, such as in the Belgian 
case.98 Even when this is not the case, the class aspect is usually not looked at. Martínez and 
Miley (n.d.) study of Catalan separatism, though, puts precisely class at its center. 
Martínez and Miley note that support for independence in Catalonia was mostly stable at 
around 30% from 1991 until the summer of 2012, but then saw a sudden surge, rising to about 
50%. They show through survey evidence that, contrary to widespread beliefs, this was not a 
grassroots development. Rather, the support for independence started among political elites, 
before promulgating to other groups, and it is still higher among the elites. There has always 
been strong support for Catalonia’s secession among the elites, but in the entire post-Franco 
period, the more powerful section of the Catalan nationalist movement favored constitutional 
loyalty. This changed some 5 years ago due to the realignments in the party system in Spain 
caused by austerity policies of the Spanish government (Miley, 2016). 
Martinez and Miley (n.d.) describe the separatist movement as “mesocratic” – it is led by 
Catalan political elites and the heavily subsidized Catalan civil society (the two groups are 
intertwined through financial and organic links), as well as by the regional media which is 
heavily influenced by these two groups. The movement has as its core constituency the Catalan-
speaking middle classes (school teachers, regional bureaucrats, etc.) residing mostly in the 
semi-urban hinterland of Barcelona. It has made headway among other groups in recent years, 
but it is still far less appealing to the lower classes of all ethnicities, though more so to those 
who are also non-Catalan speakers (for example, first-generation immigrants). 
Martinez and Miley (n.d.) argue that it does not seem that identity was the major force 
behind the increased levels of popular support for independence. For example, support for 
independence has risen markedly more than the percentage of people who identify as strictly 
Catalan, or more Catalan than Spanish. There was, however, a major change in the rhetoric 
                                                             
98 Professor Vandenbussche (2011) made the point that, in the conflicts between Wallonia and Flanders, there are 
literally only a couple of issues that are genuinely linguistic (language being one of the most defining elements of 
nationalism in Belgium), such as the lack of Dutch speaking nurses in A&E departments in Brussels. Almost all 
the other conflicts are actually about economic transfers between Flanders and Wallonia. 
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employed by Catalan separatists, with a very marked increase of economic arguments (in 
addition to the more long-standing cultural and linguistic ones), specifically of accusations that 
Spain was exploiting and even “plundering” Catalonia (Miley, 2016:13). It has been argued 
that if Catalonia separates, it could stop subsidizing the central budget and increase spending 
at home. This, however, is a problematic claim, given that the greatest damage to living 
standards in Catalonia has come from the current crisis and the austerity measures pursued by 
both the Spanish and Catalan governments. Nevertheless, what counts is what people are 
convinced of, and the much higher increase in support for independence than in Catalan 
identity, despite the massive propaganda by the separatist movement, indicates that the appeal 
of secession for ordinary people comes less from nationalist ideology, and more from the 
prospect of reducing current or future pressure on jobs (by ensuring that the regional 
bureaucracy, schooling, the media, etc. remain Catalan dominated), and from potentially 
retaining more economic resources in Catalonia, with the hope that they will be used to improve 
living standards there. 
Interestingly, but not unexpectedly, the link between the political and capitalist classes in 
Catalonia is not clear cut. Namely, representatives of big businesses view secession rather 
unfavorably, given that they rely on the entire Spanish market, and desire certainty of access 
to EU markets. This, as we will see in the next chapter, is identical to the Scottish case. Also, 
we should note the difference between the Catalan case, and the Yugoslav and Soviet one, 
where the economic elites were more regionally based. 
The Catalan case confirms yet again that, from a class perspective, what seems to trigger an 
upsurge in support for secession among ordinary people are promises of reducing the hardships 
imposed by recession and austerity.99 And as the case of Yugoslavia, Catalonia, and (as we will 
see in chapter 7) Scotland confirm, nationalism and the construction of national myths are a 
tool used by elites in the pursuit of their separatist aspirations, and the efficacy of this tool 
cannot be understood apart from in relation to class. 
Finally, when taken together, what Herrera’s, Lowinger’s and Martinez and Miley’s studies 
show is that the same basic analytical apparatus of class analysis (with other aspects included 
as needed) can and must be used when explaining regionalist or separatist movements, 
whatever the economic and political system is. In this way, their studies provide a strong 
argument against any sort of simplistic or orientalizing explanations of secession.  
                                                             
99 How realistic and honest these promises are is a different matter. Miley (2016:17-18) argues that in the Catalan 
case the chances of an independent Catalonia actually pursuing anti-austerity are very small.  
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5.4 Common problems in separatist claims 
 
As should be quite evident by now, propaganda plays a big role in separatism. In this section, 
I look at the most common problems in the economic claims made by separatists. These relate 
to the accusations of exploitation through regional redistribution and overoptimism about post-
independence economic prospects.  
 
5.4.1 Accusations of exploitation through regional redistribution 
 
The arguments that a region is exploited through regional redistribution are most commonly 
made by richer regions. They can be problematic for several reasons. 
 
Calculating net contributions to the central budget 
 
First, it is not straightforward to determine who is a net contributor to the central budget. On 
the revenue side, it is not possible to completely objectively determine where some taxes come 
from. For example, the profit tax may be assigned to where the taxed business is registered, but 
the profits may be made in numerous regions simultaneously. Various methodologies are used 
to calculate regions’ contributions to central government revenues, but a different methodology 
can always be applied, and we would expect a separatist region claiming that it is a net 
contributor to the central budget to make higher estimates of its contributions than those who 
are arguing against separation. That is, for example, the case with Scotland – the Scottish 
government’s estimates of Scotland’s contribution to total VAT receipts, the corporation tax 
and the petroleum revenue tax, are higher than the estimates done by the HMRC.100 
There are similar problems on the expenditure side. For defense, for example, it is not 
possible to make objective regional allocations. Rather, regions’ shares are usually assigned 
based on their population shares or shares in the area of the country, which can yield very 
different results. 
Of course, the very fact that it is impossible to calculate regions’ contributions to revenues 
and shares in expenditures in a completely objective way means that there can be multiple 
reasonable methodologies to do that. The motivation of separatist regions to use those 
                                                             
100 The HMRC was not changing its methodology, but the Scottish government used different methodologies than 
the HMRC. See HM Revenue & Customs (2016a:11-12). 
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methodologies that give them a higher share is clearly based on politics, but in principle, as 
long as the methodologies are sound, it is impossible to say that using one over the other is 
wrong in some objective sense. However, it is a different matter when the truth is stretched, or 
when outright lies are made in order to garner support for secession. We saw that most recently 
in the Brexit referendum, when the Vote Leave campaign claimed that the UK is paying £350 
million per week to the EU budget, where that was the gross, not the net, figure – technically 
not a lie, but very close to one given how people would interpret the figure. 
 
Ignoring favorable redistributive mechanisms 
 
It goes without saying that redistributive mechanisms that actually favor the separatist 
regions are ignored. This goes both for state policies and institutions, such as export credit 
agencies that give more credit to firms from richer regions, and for market mechanisms, such 
as relative prices that move in favor of the rich regions’ firms. 
What is also never mentioned is that access to poorer regions’ markets is itself a benefit, 
particularly if the richer region is not internationally competitive and its firms need the 
domestic market. Rather, internal free trade is simply taken as the normal situation. In most 
cases, it is not even consciously considered. 
There is actually a deeper issue here. Even if we could calculate that a region is a net 
contributor in some broad sense, taking into account all the different redistributive 
mechanisms, it would still not necessarily mean that this is bad for the region in question. What 
really matters is how the resources are used, and how they would be used if they had not been 
redistributed. The implicit assumption is always that, had they not been redistributed, they 
would have been used in a way more beneficial to the richer region. But, it may very well be 
the case that the redistribution ends up also favoring the region that is the net contributor, 
perhaps even more than the beneficiary region. In the above example, redistribution may 
provide the richer region with demand for its products that may otherwise not have been there. 
Perhaps the demand for its products even prevents competitors from the poorer regions from 
emerging. 
We could easily think of many other examples where the region that is the net contributor 
actually also ends up benefitting from the redistribution. The point is that such considerations 
are virtually never taken into account (at least publically) by regions claiming that they are 
being exploited. 
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Lack of evidence for exploitative intent 
 
Accusations of exploitation are not just about numbers, but also about intent – the term 
“exploitation” implies calculated malice. The presence of exploitation, however, is not 
something to be asserted; rather, it has to be proven. There are cases where actual exploitation 
is going on, but this is normally combined with the repression of the exploited population, and 
the exploited regions are the poorer ones. This was the case in the internal colonial situation of 
Northern Ireland, for example. However, when richer regions make an accusation of being 
exploited, there is virtually never any evidence presented for this claim. In such cases, these 
accusations merely represent highly inflammatory propaganda. 
Mencinger (2004:73) put it in the following way for Slovenia: 
 
As the general public and many politicians continued to recite popular slogans about 
how badly Slovenia was being ‘exploited’ within SFR Yugoslavia, the Slovenian 
government was already calculating what the true cost and benefits of independence 
would be. The liabilities included a reduction in the size of the domestic market (and 
thus reduced interest on the part of foreign investors, among other things), a diminished 
supply of raw materials from the rest of SFR Yugoslavia, the termination of foreign 
trade links that Slovenia had through Yugoslav enterprises (and vice versa), and a likely 
loss of property in other parts of SFR Yugoslavia. … The benefits, in contrast, were 
more potential than actual: as an independent state, Slovenia could steer clear of SFR 
Yugoslavia’s continuing political turmoil, improve the prospects of its own transition, 
undertake appropriate economic policies, and ease its entry into the European Union. 
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Still, we should not make the mistake of thinking that poorer regions cannot also make 
baseless accusations. In the case of the Soviet Union, von Beyme (1991) argued that significant 
regional differences in development have persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s (although 
                                                             
101 It is worth noting that here we see an explicit recognition of access to poorer regions’ markets as a benefit that 
a richer region enjoys. This is not something that richer regions normally acknowledge as a benefit built into the 
union, but rather simply take it for granted. The specific situation in Yugoslavia – where the dissolution was likely 
to be extremely acrimonious, and where Serbia had already imposed an embargo on Slovenian products in the run 
up to dissolution (often evaded by routing the products through a third republic) – made sure that no one could 
assume that free trade would be set up after dissolution. 
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considering how vast the differences were in the Soviet Union when it came into existence, the 
differences in its last two decades were comparatively small). On the other hand, indicators of 
welfare were substantially more similar across the republics. Von Beyme (1991:107) 
concluded that: 
 
In periods of upheaval the indicators for the objective situation tend to be forgotten. 
The neutral observer from abroad, however, has to take the long-term trends of the 
objective social situations more seriously than the nationalistic propaganda in the 
centrifugally behaving Republics. The indicators show, that the Soviet Union has never 
managed to give the nationalities an equal share in investment, but for reasons which had 
little to do with deliberate discrimination against particular regions or ethnic groups, but 
rather with cultural traditions and the scarcity of resources. The ‘economic imperialism’ 
of the Slavic republics – so criticised by the other ethnic groups these days – was, 
however, accompanied by a kind of ‘welfare imperialism’ which has had quite positive 
effects on the social conditions of the non-Slavic groups, a fact which most of the people 
tend to forget in the heat of ethnic conflict. 
 
One particularly common accusation made in the context of exploitation is that the 
population in the poorer region is lazy. If we treat the EU as a state for the purposes of this 
analysis, then it serves as an excellent example, with all the accusations of laziness, early 
retirement and high pensions hurled at the Greek population by the media and some politicians 
in the richer member states. But, since we do have various data for the individual EU member 
states that we do not normally have for regions within countries, we do know that these claims 
are wrong – Greek workers actually work longer hours than workers in the richer member 
states, and while they do retire somewhat earlier, spending on pensions per person older than 
65 is actually lower than the EU average.102 
The situation is very similar with the extremely common accusations that migrants are 
coming to the richer regions to steal jobs and not work and live on benefits. A joke has been 
present for some time now in the UK, that the immigrants from poorer EU member states would 
have to be “Schrödinger immigrants”, who can simultaneously not work and steal jobs. 
Nevertheless, the situation is not funny, since the extent of dehumanization that happens 
through accusations of laziness and stealing is enormous.  
                                                             
102 For an effort in the media to counter the narrative of the lazy Greeks, see Coleman (2015). 
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These accusations also reveal a strong class basis for separatist appeals in the richer regions 
– the poor are denigrated as lazy, responsible for their own situation, and unworthy of help. If 
the poorer region where they are coming from is also in some way (in terms of culture, 
ethnicity, language, race or religion) different from the richer region, the situation is essentially 
perfect for fostering extreme hatred. Even the poor in the richer regions can join in on this (on 
top of being the ones to whom the propaganda about jobs is directed), because, as Miley (2017, 
forthcoming) has argued, the lower classes can project onto others the abuse that they 
themselves are otherwise receiving. 
 
5.4.2 Overoptimism 
 
Bookman (1993) argued that support for secession and the willingness to pursue it is 
influenced by what people think the post-independence economic prospects are. We would 
then expect that there would be considerable overoptimism on this point – either honest, or for 
propaganda purposes. There are several notable examples. 
One revolves around public finances. When calculating the fiscal benefits of eliminating 
transfers to the central budget, it is implicitly assumed that the taxes that a region generates 
will stay the same after secession. Estimates of the future in themselves obviously cannot be 
completely objective, but far more so if the future entails an enormous break with the present 
– the secession itself. 
Another widespread example is the assumption that trade and other economic links with the 
former country will continue more or less as before, except those links that the secessionist 
region wants to get rid of, and that these arrangements will be easy to negotiate. We can observe 
this in the case of Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, the former Soviet Union republics, the UK (in 
relation to the EU), and numerous other cases. In essence, this amounts to an assumption that 
the secessionist region will be able to get rid of the (real or perceived) costs of union, while 
retaining the benefits it considers useful. While this is quite understandable as a desire, it is 
rather more questionable how realistic it is. Usually the argument by separatists is that it would 
be in the interest of both sides to come to such an arrangement, but this ignores both political 
problems and the fact that the economics of the situation might change after secession.103 
                                                             
103 Admittedly, this may not be an actual expectation, but rather rhetoric meant to shore up support for secession, 
by making it seem less risky. It is also often used as a propaganda tool to represent the secessionist side as 
reasonable, and the other side as unreasonable. Namely, it is reasonable to continue with what is framed as useful 
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One extreme example of how the previous economic links are not maintained are the 
Yugoslav wars. Mencinger (2004:74) notes how various calculations of the effect of supposed 
future customs on trade between Slovenia and the other former Yugoslav republics proved 
pointless – trade simply ceased due to the war. 
Free trade, or the prospects of it, seem to also exert an influence on the imagination of 
separatists. In numerous cases, the plan is for the seceding region to join a free trade area, 
whether or not it also retains its economic links to its former country. A free trade area is then 
seen both as an opportunity and potentially as a safety net. This is perhaps tied to the specific 
case of the EU, but it is repeated in numerous cases of separatist regions hoping to join it, or to 
retain their membership in it: the Baltic republics of the former Soviet Union, Slovenia and 
Croatia, Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders and Northern Italy. In the case of the former Baltic 
republics of the Soviet Union and Slovenia and Croatia, they did indeed join the EU. However, 
we can look at the way the EU was seen in order to show a near total lack of understanding of 
the oligopolistic nature of capitalism, which is probably the biggest implicit case of 
overoptimism in separatism. 
Plotniekis (1991) is a good example. In the appendix to his article on Latvian secession from 
the Soviet Union, he enumerates various Latvian industries and their potential for further 
development, provided sufficient investment is made. But, when the needed investment is 
added up, we come to billions of dollars; astoundingly, no analysis whatsoever is made of 
where this huge capital is to come from. However, the general optimism clearly relies on the 
idea that the transition to a market economy and access to the free trade area of the then 
European Community would provide the conditions for Latvia’s economic advancement. 
Plotniekis did not explain how exactly Latvian firms were supposed to withstand competition 
from far stronger competitors from the advanced European countries. Indeed, there is no 
indication that he was even aware of this problem. The underlying idea, though, is clearly that 
markets create a level playing field, where everyone has a chance to succeed. This is at odds 
with reality of oligopolistic markets. Technically, of course, the playing field is level in the 
sense that everyone is allowed to try to compete, but that is irrelevant – technically, I have the 
right to try to outrun an Olympic sprinter; whether I have even the remotest chance of winning 
is a different matter. As it happened, the Latvian economy was expectedly devastated. 
                                                             
links, while seceding to get rid of “clearly unfair” policies of the center or other regions is also reasonable. 
Opposition to both can then be presented as unreasonable. 
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This lack of understanding of the oligopolistic nature of capitalism was not present only in 
the former communist countries. We will see in chapter 7 that it characterizes the Scottish 
separatist movement. Here we can mention Greece. 
Lapavitsas et al. (2012) present an argument for Greece leaving the euro. This is not 
separatism, but regaining monetary sovereignty is a demand for (far) greater “regional” 
autonomy from a state-like entity. The authors argue that the way the EU economy and the 
euro are structured and governed is damaging for EU peripheral countries (and also for the 
working class of the core countries). Reintroducing a domestic currency and nationalizing the 
banking system would, according to the authors, allow Greece to reflate the economy, devalue, 
and provide credit for investment. They understand development as structural transformation, 
and note throughout the book that the core EU countries have a big technological and 
competitive lead over the poorer member states. However, they do not offer or refer to any 
deeper market analysis of the hurdles that Greek firms would have to overcome to close that 
gap, and thus implicitly maintain the assumption that the policies they are suggesting would be 
sufficient. 
It is not impossible for macroeconomic and banking policies alone to be sufficient to 
increase the competitiveness of an economy. For example, if Greek firms were close behind 
their competitors, a push provided by cheaper and stable bank credit and devaluation might 
enable them to catch up. This was the situation in, say, Slovenia. Significant sections of its 
industries, such as in white goods, were quite advanced and already exporting to the West. 
After Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Slovenia did not have an industrial policy, but it mostly 
prevented foreigners from buying up Slovenian companies, rejected shock therapy and did not 
deal with international financial institutions, it maintained a macroeconomic environment 
conducive to investment, including preventing the appreciation of the currency, and it kept the 
banking system under state influence.104 Today, it is the most successful transition country. 
But, there is little to indicate that Greece is in the same position as Slovenia was.105 
Even if Greece left the euro, it would still be a region within the EU economy. The policies 
that Lapavitsas et al. are suggesting are a step up compared to regional development policies 
                                                             
104 See the relevant chapters in Mrak, Rojec and Silva-Jáuregui (2004). 
105 Mencinger (2004:81f) notes that shock therapy policies destroyed “domestic manufacturing and transform[ed] 
many countries, notably Russia, into providers of raw materials, and most of the other countries of the former 
Soviet Union, lacking raw materials, into a hopeless situation.” However, he does not consider whether better 
macroeconomic policies alone would have been sufficient to lead to a different outcome. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, because these, as we have seen, cannot include things like 
devaluation. But, at the fundamental level, what monetary and credit policies do is equivalent 
to subsidies – cheap and stable credit reduces costs, while a currency devaluation increases 
exporters’ revenues expressed in the domestic currency or allows them to keep the same 
revenues but reduce prices abroad and increase their market share. 
We have already seen that subsidies through fiscal and financial incentives were not enough 
to help the development of indigenous firms in poorer regions. It is true that the “subsidies” 
given through devaluation and credit expansion can easily be much higher than those that can 
be given through fiscal measures, because the costs of these “subsidies” are imposed on 
everyone through inflation, and such “inflation taxes” are, for whatever reason, more tolerated 
than fiscal taxes.106 But, the competitive advantages of market-leading firms in core EU 
countries extend far beyond costs. Besides, if Greece does not have firms in advanced sectors 
of the economy, then there is no one important for economic development to benefit from these 
“subsidies”. 
 As for the possibility that the sort of policies suggested by Lapavitsas et al. could attract 
market-leading firms to locate higher value-added activities in Greece (something which the 
authors do not actually discuss) that too would not work – we have seen that what subsidies 
attract to poorer regions are lower value-added activities (if they manage to do even that). 
Greece, like other member states of the EU, is a specific case – it is both a country and a 
region within a well integrated larger market. In its pursuit of development it does, or at least 
could, have advantages over poorer regions within countries, because of the possibility to use 
macroeconomic, monetary and banking policies. But, these are not enough. For a 
country/region like Greece, they have to be combined with activist ITT policies (which are 
forbidden in the EU). There is no other way to bounce back from being a loser in the 
oligopolistic competitive game. It is rather perplexing that Marxist authors, such as Lapavitsas, 
do not see this, given that they otherwise must be familiar with the arguments about the 
concentration of capital. As noted, we will see that Scottish separatists have made even worse 
mistakes in their suggestions for development policies for an independent Scotland. And, in 
                                                             
106 Alternatively, it is possible to use financial repression and price and wage controls to hold inflation in check. 
However, in terms of the effect on real incomes, this approach is actually equivalent to inflation – both it and 
inflation keep real incomes down. In that sense, those who do not benefit from “subsidies” provided by devaluation 
and credit expansion pay the costs for them, irrespective of whether they do so through inflation reducing their 
real incomes, or through their real incomes being held in check by various controls. 
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the next chapter, we will see that suggestions for establishing regional development banks in 
the UK in essence mirror parts of Lapavitsas et al.’s arguments, in the sense that they can be 
reduced to a desire to provide subsidies to poorer regions’ firms through cheap bank credit. 
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6. Regional development in the United Kingdom 
 
In this chapter I apply the framework and arguments from chapters 2-5 to the case of 
regional development in the UK. This will provide the background to the analysis of Scottish 
separatism in the next chapter, which cannot be understood without taking into account the 
regional development disparities in the UK. The present chapter also provides an opportunity 
to look in some more detail at how successful or not new paradigm regional policies have been.  
Section 6.1 gives an overview of the history of regional development in the UK, while 
section 6.2 assesses the current regional situation. Section 6.3 gives a short account of the old 
paradigm regional policies pursued by UK governments in the post-war period, together with 
an assessment of their effects. The period covered is roughly up until 1997, when Labour came 
to power. Section 6.4 does the same for new paradigm regional policies, going up to the present. 
Section 6.5 is devoted to EU regional policies in the UK. The chapter builds up the argument 
that the UK has long had substantial regional disparities, and that they are still very pronounced. 
The old paradigm regional policies have only been able to reduce them a little, but they did not 
lead to a structural transformation in the poorer regions. Under the new paradigm policies, 
regional disparities have even widened. 
 
 
6.1 History of UK regional development 
 
The United Kingdom is well recognized as having some of the widest regional disparities 
among developed countries (McCann, 2016). These actually go back at least a century and a 
half, and their roots are even older. 
Prior to its industrial decline, the major disparities in the United Kingdom were between 
England and what Hechter (1999) called the “Celtic fringe”: Scotland, Wales and Ireland. 
Hechter (1999:81-95) argues that the political incorporation of the Celtic fringe (Wales in 1536, 
Scotland in 1707, and Ireland in 1801) deprived these lands of economic sovereignty, including 
the ability to protect their economies. When English interests came into conflict with those of 
the Celtic lands, the former were favored by the state. Since this included favoring English 
producers, manufacturing ended up being concentrated in England, while the Celtic fringe 
mostly specialized in supplying raw materials. Such specialization brought with it the usual 
problems, such as high vulnerability to price swings and trade policy changes.  
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Nevertheless, until the mid-19th century, regional disparities were not particularly large 
across the UK. Industrialization changed this, however, and Hechter (1999:137-142) shows 
that regional economic and social differences started increasing from 1851 and continued to 
steadily widen for the next century. Building on the previous concentration of manufacturing 
in England, industrialization became geographically widespread there. Most industries were 
initially fairly widely spread across England, but this changed, as increasing specialization and 
the emergence of oligopolies made most industries regionally concentrated. Still, England as a 
whole remained widely industrialized, since most of its regions ended up with some significant 
industries, although Martin (1988) does point out that London and the South East of England 
were ahead in development, even compared to what are usually considered the former 
industrial heartlands of England (for example, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds and their 
surrounding regions). Conversely, the Celtic fringe resembled colonial countries in that it had 
a few relatively industrialized enclaves, oriented towards trade with England and foreign 
countries, and large backwards hinterlands that were supplying agricultural products and raw 
materials to England, and, through emigration, labor. 
Scotland was somewhat different compared to Wales and Ireland – it was significantly more 
diversified due to its broader industrial base in the Scottish lowlands. Still, this was primarily 
composed of heavy industry,107 coal mining, and textiles. While this did put Scotland far ahead 
of Wales and Ireland, it was nevertheless not nearly as diversified as England. Crucially, it 
generally lacked mass production industries, such as those producing new consumer goods, so 
the Scottish economy experienced repeated problems once the domestic market for heavy 
industrial products was saturated (Hechter, 1999:148-149). This specialization was to haunt 
Scotland until the 1980s, when it was “solved” through deindustrialization. In this sense, the 
Scottish lowlands were similar to areas of England that were reliant on heavy industry, mining, 
or textiles, such as Cumbria, or Tyneside. 
The geography of the UK economy at the time of the original publication of Hechter’s book 
(1975) was thus one composed of regions with diversified industrial and commercial activities 
(the East, South East, London, and the Midlands), regions reliant on heavy industries, mining, 
and textiles (the North, the Scottish lowlands), and regions reliant on agriculture or mining, 
though also containing a few administrative or industrial enclaves (the Scottish highlands, 
Wales, Cornwall, Northern Ireland). These are, of course, broad brushstrokes, but they point 
out the most important aspect for our purposes here, namely, that any negative sector-specific 
                                                             
107 Shipbuilding, locomotives, steel. 
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changes would have pronounced regional impacts. In particular, if heavy industry, mining, and 
textiles were hit, this would be a serious blow to exactly those large areas of UK territory which 
were anyway less economically developed. 
In this context, it is most important to look at the UK industrial decline, which is usually 
defined as the United Kingdom failing to keep up with the productivity growth of other major 
capitalist countries, despite its earlier industrialization. The trend started already in the last 
quarter of the 19th century. The immediate cause was that British firms from the first industrial 
revolution were slower than their foreign competitors to adopt many new technologies, even 
when they were invented and being produced in Britain (Kilpatrick and Lawson, 1980). Britain 
was also slower to establish the industries of the second and third industrial revolutions, such 
as chemicals, cars, electrical appliances, electronics, and numerous others.108 All this resulted 
in the UK gradually losing its competitive position vis-à-vis other industrialized countries. 
Numerous explanations have been given of the UK industrial decline. Kilpatrick and 
Lawson review a large number of them, such as a lack of proper technical education, or the 
failure of entrepreneurs to adapt to market changes, but argue that the most important reason 
was missing from these explanations, namely, labor relations.109 Specifically, they show that 
the basic structures of labor organization in the UK were formed before the era of mass 
production, and that the labor movement was quite powerful, but highly decentralized and had 
a strong tradition of factory level negotiations. This was different from the more centralized 
labor organizations in Britain’s competitors, where labor movements had generally formed 
after the advent of mass production and after capital had become substantially concentrated in 
fewer firms and larger, more efficient factories. What this meant was that in the UK, workers 
would very often take defensive stances at the factory-level against technological upgrading 
and consolidation for the purpose of achieving economies of scale, in order to preserve 
manning levels, pay grades, and other norms and benefits that were acquired under a less 
advanced production structure. Had negotiations taken place at the industry or national level, 
perhaps it would have been possible to both safeguard the interests of workers and allow for 
technological upgrading, simply because more tools are available to do that at a wider level. 
Or, if negotiations had taken place at the firm level, but with the unions already reflecting the 
structure of fewer, larger, and more efficient factories, that situation too may have been more 
                                                             
108 For a comparison of the industrialization of European countries until 1914, see Trebilcock (1981). 
109 On the UK industrial decline, see also Kitson and Mitchie (1996), Singh (1977), Comfort (2012). On UK 
manufacturing from the 1930s, including the decline, see Broadberry (2009). 
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conducive to technological upgrading. But, this was not the case, and the UK was falling further 
and further behind its competitors. On top of that, from the 1970s onwards, newly 
industrializing countries in East Asia were generally starting to compete not only in textiles 
and similar low-tech industries, but were setting up heavy industries, such as shipbuilding, with 
the latest technologies. All of these countries had cheap labor, and in some labor was repressed 
as well. This threatened all the older industrialized countries, but particularly the UK, due to 
the way labor was organized. 
Cowling and Sugden (1987, particularly chapter 5) agree with Lawson and Kilpatrick, but 
focus on the propensity of UK firms to invest internationally. They provide evidence that UK 
firms tended to invest internationally significantly more than firms from other advanced 
capitalist countries, but this meant that the productive structure in the UK itself was not being 
upgraded as heavily as it could have been. 
Whatever the specific order of importance of factors that brought about the UK industrial 
decline was, the UK could avoid the worst effects of this while it had access to its colonial 
markets, and at its at times protected domestic market. However, the 1970s saw a perfect storm 
– the United Kingdom joined the European Community, and was thus exposed to more 
competition in the domestic market, it had lost most of its colonies, the oil shock had increased 
inflation and pushed the country into a current account deficit and into an IMF austerity 
program, and newly industrializing countries in East Asia were becoming a threat. In other 
words, the United Kingdom was in a make-or-break situation: it would either have to find a 
way to significantly increase its competitiveness, or resort to permanent and increasing import 
controls. What was certain was that without a solution, it would lose many of its industries. 
Numerous proposals were made on how to improve the situation. Perhaps the most extensive 
one was the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES). AES was an approach to economic recovery 
promoted by the then left-wing of the Labour Party110 and other radical leftists, such as the UK 
Communist Party. Apart from reflation, the AES included “public ownership, economic 
planning, price controls, industrial democracy and import controls” (Wickham-Jones, 
1996:73). Rowthorn (1981) notes that it contained reflation, import controls, price controls, 
compulsory planning agreements between big firms and the government, nationalization of key 
industries, public ownership of financial institutions, withdrawal from the Common Market 
(because it prevents many of the policies proposed in the AES), a reduction in military 
expenditures, expansion of social services and redistribution. In a nutshell, the AES can be 
                                                             
110 Sometimes also called the “Benn” strategy, due to Labour’s Tony Benn being one of its main architects. 
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interpreted as a set of policies and institutional changes that would have given the United 
Kingdom the tools to pursue state capitalism/corporatist planning (in the hope that this would 
solve its economic problems), but also a route to socialism. In terms of its regional impacts, it 
would have been beneficial for the UK’s poorer regions, because that was where the industries 
with the most severe problems were located, but even for the Midlands, because much of UK 
manufacturing badly needed consolidation and technological upgrading. 
Kilpatrick and Lawson (1980) argue that the AES did not take into account labor relations 
sufficiently. It recognized that workers would have to be brought on board for it to work, 
because it entailed technological upgrading and consolidation. It also recognized that the 
workers would not see any immediate improvements to their living standards, as such 
upgrading was a medium-term project. But, in order to get the unions to agree to wage restraint, 
technological upgrading, and the consolidation of production, the AES was to offer them 
industrial democracy. Kilpatrick and Lawson argue that this would have hardly been seen as 
satisfactory by the unions in general, but particularly so in the 1970s. Namely, workers had 
been experiencing a severe decline in real incomes for years, and the labor unrest in the second 
half of the 1970s, culminating in the Winter of Discontent, was mainly fueled by a desire to 
restore real incomes to previous levels. Industrial democracy, unless it was extremely 
extensive, would hardly have been seen as an acceptable alternative to wage increases. Besides, 
it is also questionable how capital, and particularly multinational corporations, would have 
reacted to a strategy that would obviously be setting the UK on a path to socialism. Kilpatrick 
and Lawson argue that at the very least investment would go down. Rowthorn (1980) 
considered far more severe reactions, such as a military coup. 
We cannot know what effects the AES would have had, since it was never implemented. 
The 1974 Labour government only brought in a few token measures. Had Labour won the 
1979, or particularly the 1983 general election, it is likely that many more elements of the AES 
would have been turned into policy. However, this did not happen, and the UK took a very 
different turn. 
 When the Conservatives took power in 1979, with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, 
the well-known shift in economic policies took place – trade unions were mostly repressed, 
and any ideas about industrial democracy, protectionism, economic planning, and incomes and 
price policies were out of the picture. 
The effects of the Thatcher reforms on UK manufacturing were mixed. Employment in 
manufacturing went down 40% by 1999 (Broadberry, 2009). The share of manufacturing in 
117 
 
the GDP fell from 30% in 1978 to 21% in 1996.111 Technological upgrading did happen, and 
productivity in what remained of manufacturing did increase substantially by 1989 (by around 
50%). However, Kitson and Mitchie (1996:198-199) argue that that this increase was partially 
due to (a) decreases in employment, rather than increases in output, (b) unacknowledged 
increases in labor inputs (e.g. shortened break times, increased production-line speeds), and (c) 
inadequate price deflators used in calculations of productivity. When this is taken into account, 
the growth was smaller, at around 35%. Furthermore, the productivity growth that did take 
place resulted disproportionately in increased profits (which went disproportionately into 
dividend payments, not investment), rather than decreased prices. Had prices gone down, that 
may have enabled UK firms to get a higher share of the domestic, but also international 
markets. The opposite happened – the UK surplus in manufacturing trade became a deficit 
already in 1983 and has there since. However, what is particularly relevant for regional 
development is the effect of the UK industrial decline and the Thatcher reforms on specific 
industries, because, as we have seen, the UK economy showed a significant degree of regional 
specialization. 
It was exactly the areas that were less developed to start with, and reliant on traditional 
industries – shipbuilding, mining, textiles – that were hit the hardest, mainly due to cuts in 
various subsidies. These industries essentially disappeared, with very adverse effects on the 
Scottish lowlands, the North East, Cumbria, Merseyside, Cornwall, and west Wales. 
Other industries, such as engineering, motor vehicles, steel, utilities, and others, did 
consolidate and survive, though most were eventually sold off, primarily to foreign 
corporations. Nevertheless, due to their survival, some parts of the UK, such as the West 
Midlands, are faring better than the more deindustrialized areas. However, technological 
upgrading and consolidation did cause a reduction in employment, which was neither always 
compensated by increased employment elsewhere, nor, when it was, did the other employment 
always offer equally good living standards. There was, for example, a large increase in the 
number of small firms in the 1980s (from 2.4 to 3.7 million from 1980 to 1989), but Armstrong 
and Taylor (2000:269-272) note that many firms were established due to push factors – 
basically, a person having to find a way to survive after losing a job in manufacturing. This is 
sometimes called “employment of last resort”. 
Finally, those areas that had anyway been more advanced – the South East, London and the 
East of England – and boasted industries that were internationally competitive, such as 
                                                             
111 Based on the Office for National Statistics Historic economic data for regions of the UK (1966-1996) dataset. 
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pharmaceuticals, food and beverages, knowledge-intensive services, finance, and others, have 
continued doing well. In the case of finance and accompanying services, they actually benefited 
enormously from the Big Bang reforms of the Thatcher government.112 The regional disparities 
have not disappeared since. Let us look at the current situation. 
 
 
6.2 Current UK regional situation 
 
6.2.1 Widening regional disparities 
 
The UK regional disparities can be seen from several types of indicators. We will look at 
those reflecting the absolute and relative levels of development of the UK’s regions, as well as 
some evidence on internal trade and migration. 
 
Absolute and relative levels of development 
 
There are consistent time series for a number of indicators relevant for regional development 
generally going back some 20 years. This is also the time during which the UK has pursued 
new paradigm regional policies, so this section will not only give an overview of the current 
regional situation, but can also partially serve as an assessment of the success of these policies 
in narrowing regional gaps in the UK. On that account, there has been little success. 
Table 6.1 show the regional GVA per head indices (UK=100) for the regions and countries 
of the UK. The disparities have not only not been reduced, but have actually widened, as 
evidenced by the increasing coefficients of variations for 1997, 2007 (the last year before the 
start of the global financial crisis) and 2015. Several things stand out. There are now just two 
regions that are above the UK average: London, the obvious outlier, that is now even further 
ahead of every other region than it was before, and the South East, which is still better off, 
although its position is a little worse than it was. The East of England has fallen below the 
average in the observed period. Second, Scotland is the only region that has maintained its 
position. Finally, apart from London, there are only two regions that have improved, the North 
East and the North West, although their improvements were marginal, far smaller than 
                                                             
112 On the geography of UK deindustrialization, see Martin and Rowthorn (1991), Foresight - The Government 
Office for Science (2013:123-131).  
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London’s, and, unlike London, their position has worsened after the onset of the recession, 
whereas London’s has continued improving. 
 
Table 6.1 GVA per head (UK=100) 
Region/country 1997 2007 2015 
GVA per head, annualized 
growth rate (%), 1998-2015 
North East 73 75 75 3.4 
North West 85 87 86 3.4 
Yorkshire & The Humber 85 86 80 3.0 
East Midlands 90 84 83 2.8 
West Midlands 90 84 82 2.7 
East of England 100 97 95 2.9 
London 159 166 172 3.7 
South East 112 109 110 3.1 
South West 94 92 91 3.0 
Wales 74 73 71 3.0 
Scotland 93 94 93 3.3 
Northern Ireland 82 83 73 2.7 
     
coefficient of variation 0.24 0.26 0.29   
Source: Office for National Statistics, Regional Gross Value Added (Income Approach) dataset, own calculation 
for annualized growth rate 
 
Behind the differences in GVA per head are regional differences in productivity (GVA per 
hour worked and GVA per filled job), as shown in Chart 6.1. Only London and the South East 
are above the UK average, and the East of England is almost exactly at the average. Scotland 
is also very close to it, but an inspection of sub-regional data shows that the high productivity 
in Aberdeen and to an extent in Edinburgh113 are largely responsible for Scotland’s relatively 
favorable position. Most other Scottish areas are below the UK average, some drastically so. 
All other regions are below the UK average, with Wales and Northern Ireland being as much 
                                                             
113 Aberdeen (at 115% of UK average productivity) is, of course, where a large part of the oil industry is located, 
while Edinburgh (108% of the UK average) is one of the succesful UK cities. 
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as 20% worse off. Furthermore, there have been few changes in the relative rankings of regions 
in terms of their productivity since 1997, and the gaps have even widened a bit. 
 
 
Chart 6.1 GVA per hour worked (UK = 100) 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Subregional Productivity: Labour Productivity (GVA per hour worked and 
GVA per filled job) indiced by UK NUTS2, NUTS3 subregions and City regions dataset 
 
Many other indicators show the wide UK regional economic disparities. For example, 
according to ONS data,114 London, the South East and the East account for 52% of total R&D 
spending in the UK, while accounting for 36% of the UK population and 46% of total UK 
GVA. Patent applications per million inhabitants are also higher in the South East and East 
than in the rest of the country (European Commission, 2014, map 1.15). Additionally, neither 
R&D expenditures nor patent applications fully reflect the type of innovation that goes on in 
the advanced service sector in London (Adams, Robinson and Vigor, 2003:62), so the 
concentration of innovative activity in the richer regions is probably even higher. The general 
picture of wide disparities is also confirmed by various composite indices of regional 
competitiveness, which consistently show areas in London, the South East and East as being 
more competitive than areas in the rest of the UK (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013, Huggins and 
Thompson, 2016). Firms in the richer regions are also more productive than firms in the same 
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sector but located in the poorer regions (Office for National Statistics, 2017). This either 
implies that the poor regions have weaker firms, or that it is the same firms located in both 
richer and poorer regions, but they keep lower value-added activities in the latter.  
 
Internal migration 
 
In terms of migration, there are no particularly large internal population movements between 
regions, as shown by Table 6.2.115 This is confirmed in more detail by McCann (2016:272ss). 
Actually, London has the biggest outflow of internal migrants, probably reflecting congestion 
and rents. However, it also has more than three times higher net long-term international 
migration flows than the second and third highest regions, the East and the South East. 
 The data does show that most internal migrants move in early adulthood, so for the regions 
(or areas within a region) that are losing population, this may be an economic problem. There 
is no official ONS data on the education and skills of internal migrants, but research shows, for 
example, that the North East and North West are losing over 30,000 graduates per year net 
(Homes for the North, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
115 Unlike in the past, females are actually more likely to move, albeit only slightly, at 52% of all internal migrants. 
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Table 6.2 Migration in the UK regions (mid-2014 to mid-2015)1 
 Net internal migration 
Net long-term international 
migration 
North East -0.01% 0.24% 
North West 0.05% 0.31% 
Yorkshire & The Humber -0.04% 0.39% 
East Midlands  0.20% 0.47% 
West Midlands  -0.04% 0.42% 
East 0.24% 0.45% 
London -0.89% 1.54% 
South East 0.18% 0.40% 
South West 0.54% 0.28% 
Wales 0.03% 0.19% 
Scotland  0.16% 0.36% 
Northern Ireland -0.04% 0.15%  
Source: Own calculation based on Office for National Statistics, Migration Indicator Tools and Population 
estimates datasets. 
1) The percentages were calculated by taking the number of net migrants and putting them in relation to regional 
populations. 
 
 
Internal trade 
 
Data on intra-UK trade is very limited, but some information does exist in regional input-
output tables. Estimates for Northern Ireland are that in 2012 it had a trade deficit with the UK, 
equivalent to almost 30% of Northern Irish GVA. Also, 74% off Northern Irish imports came 
from the rest of the UK (rUK), and 50% of its exports went to rUK, indicating high trade 
dependency on the rUK.116 Scotland too ran a deficit with the rUK in 2013, but much smaller 
than Northern Ireland, at 5.5% of Scottish GVA. However, its trade dependency on the rUK 
was very high, with the rUK being the source of 60% of Scottish imports and the destination 
for 60% of Scottish exports. The more widely used Global Connections Survey, which the 
                                                             
116 See Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency (2016). 
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Scottish government runs to estimate Scottish exports, produces very similar results.117 
McCann (2016: 295-296) references Welsh input-output tables, noting that Welsh exports to 
the rUK amounted to 65% of Welsh regional GVA, while its imports from the rUK accounted 
for 76%, resulting in a trade deficit of over 10% of regional GVA. 
Data for trade within England is even more limited. McCann (2016: 295) references South 
West Input-Output tables, which show that the South West has balanced trade with the rUK, 
with both its imports from, and exports to, the rUK amounting to about 60% of its regional 
GVA. Interestingly, though, he also notes that estimates are that London runs a trade deficit 
with the rUK (although a surplus internationally). This probably reflect the location of most 
manufacturing in the UK being outside of London (and obviously does not account for any 
income flows back to London). 
Overall, the data that does exist suggests that internal trade is as we would expect in a 
situation with high regional disparities – less developed regions are running trade deficits with 
the more developed ones. Still, only when and if internal trade data estimates are produced for 
within England can we make any firmer conclusions. 
 
Capital 
 
To my knowledge, there exist no recent attempts to estimate regional capital flows within 
the UK. The only regional monetary and credit data that we seem to have is the value of loans 
and overdrafts to SMEs in the different regions of the UK, except Northern Ireland. To 
determine if the banking system extends more or less credit to certain regions than their share 
should be, we can compare regional shares in the number of SMEs and the total value of 
outstanding loans and overdrafts to SMEs. The data is presented on Chart 6.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
117 The Scottish input-output tables are available at www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Input-
Output, while the Global Connections Survey can be accessed at 
www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication. 
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Chart 6.2 Outstanding value of overdrafts and loans to SMEs (Q1 2016) and regional shares 
in total UK GVA (2015) 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on: a) British Banking Association, SME Statistics data, b) Department of 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population Estimates dataset 
 
As we can see, the shares match almost exactly. This indicates that the banking sector is not 
giving extra support to either poorer or richer regions, at least when it comes to SMEs. This is 
in line with McCann’s (2016: 297s) reference to, among other things, studies that show that 
credit availability seems to be fairly equal across UK regions. Still, we should be extremely 
careful in drawing any conclusions about capital movements from these very limited 
observations, and also be particularly mindful that the definitions for SMEs used in the two 
datasets that underlie Chart 6.2 are not the same.118 
 
Assessment 
 
The picture of significant regional economic disparities is clear. Still, a few arguments are 
sometimes made that the relative position of UK regions and countries is not as bad as it appears 
                                                             
118 For the loans and overdrafts, they are defined as companies with up to £25 million in yearly turnover, whereas 
for the number of SMEs, the definition is companies with 0-249 employees. 
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at first glance. For example, the North East, North West, Yorkshire & The Humber, Wales and 
Scotland have had equal or higher growth rates of GVA per head than the East of England and 
the South East, and they were not far behind London. Also, some regions were doing better 
prior to the financial crisis, particularly Norther Ireland. Nevertheless, while there is something 
to such arguments, we should not read too much into them. 
It is true that reducing disparities between regional growth rates, not the regional disparities 
themselves, has been the objective of Labour governments’ regional policy (HM Treasury, 
2007, Adams, Robinson and Vigor, 2003). Subsequent governments have also not committed 
to reducing absolute regional economic gaps. But, reducing growth rate disparities is 
admittedly not a very ambitious objective. For example, achieving that goal is completely 
compatible with the continued widening of regional disparities, just as long as they widen less 
quickly than before. With the actual regional GVA per head growth rates that we have 
witnessed over the last 20 years (see Table 6.1), it would literally take decades, or even 
centuries, for some of the regions to close the gap with the East and South East. As for decades, 
we should remember that there are entire countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, that have 
been able to develop into world class economic powerhouses in that time, on par with the old 
core of developed countries, while starting from positions much worse than those of the poorer 
regions of the UK. With regards to centuries, that is not even worth discussing. Other regions 
would never close the gap with the South East and the East. All the while, London would keep 
pulling more and more ahead of all the other regions. This certainly does not sound like a 
solution to the UK regional problem. 
Two additional remarks should be made. First, the reported numbers are for the NUTS 1 
level of aggregation and can be misleading, in that in a number of regions there are very 
significant intra-regional disparities, with one or a couple of areas being significantly above 
the regional average, and most or all others significantly below it. As we will see in the 
discussion about regional policies, such intra-regional differences have been used to argue that 
there is no broader regional problem, but that what we are dealing with is localized deprivation. 
However, I would argue that, quite the contrary, the intra-regional disparities clearly show the 
extent of the wider regional problem. What we are observing is usually a few urban centers 
doing well,119 through a combination of successful economic activities and public spending, 
whereas the rest of their regions have suffered due to deindustrialization or a lack of 
development in the first place. 
                                                             
119 Though most also have pockets of extreme deprivation. 
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The North West is perhaps the most interesting example in terms of its NUTS 1 and NUTS 
2 data.120 The region contains both prosperous areas (parts of Manchester, Cheshire), areas that 
used to be reliant on heavy industries and mining but lost them (Cumbria), and areas that have 
undergone deindustrialization (parts of Manchester, Lancashire and Merseyside). This is 
almost like a mini-version of the UK, and is clearly visible in the data. The GVA per head in 
the North West in 2015 was almost £22,000 (compared to the UK average of £25,600). But, in 
Cheshire and Manchester it was £30,000 and £32,000 respectively, while, for example, in 
Cumbria and Liverpool it was around £22,500, and in both Wirral and Sefton it was as low as 
$14,500, one of the lowest in the UK. What this shows is not that we are dealing with local 
problems, but that parts of Manchester and Cheshire are hiding the extent of the regional 
problem by pulling up the regional averages. 
Second, the numbers also reflect the influence of the global financial crisis, recession and 
austerity. Kitson, Martin and Tyler (2011) have shown that the financial crisis, the ensuing 
recession and austerity have impacted the poorer regions more adversely than the richer ones 
in numerous countries. And, indeed, a number of UK regions were faring better in 2007 than 
in 2015, so it could be argued that, had it not been for these negative developments, things 
would have gone better for the poorer UK regions. However, an adverse economic event can 
either impact a poorer or a richer region, or it can impact both, but with one region suffering 
more. The reason why it is consistently poorer regions that suffer more and are impacted by 
more negative events is not because they are unlucky, but because their weaker economic 
structures make them more susceptible to negative events, and make them less able to deal with 
them. Thus, it makes little sense to consider negative economic events as something external 
to regional development. Rather, they are one of the mechanisms that keep the less developed 
regions in their position. Therefore, saying that “but for the crisis/austerity, the poorer regions 
would be better off” is really like saying “if the mechanisms that cause regional disparities 
were weaker, then regional disparities would be smaller”. 
Of course, we should also not forget government policy during economic shocks. 
Governments are often willing to help what are considered key sectors, but these are mostly 
located in richer regions. Thus, not only do adverse events affect poorer regions more often, 
and these regions are less able to deal with them, but, on top of that, they can except to receive 
less help during difficult times. London is the perfect example of this. It too was affected by 
                                                             
120 See ons.gov.uk (2017) for an explanation of the changes in regional boundaries for statistical and administrative 
purposes. 
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industrial decline, but it also had numerous successful sectors it could rely on. In addition, it 
contains most of the UK’s financial sector, which effectively has several institutions dedicated 
to keeping it afloat whatever happens (most notably the Bank of England). And, in the recent 
financial crisis, the financial sector received enormous state aid to keep it afloat – at its peak, 
cash outlays and guarantees totaled over £1tn (National Audit Office, 2011). This is far in 
excess of any help ever offered to any other sector. 
 
6.2.2 Regional disparities in living standards 
 
The differences in regional living standards in the UK are well known. On most social and 
health indicators, there is a clear North-South divide. However, at least according to one of the 
main indicators of material living standards, the regional Gross Disposable Household Income 
(GDHI),121 the differences are not as large as would be expected based on disparities in 
economic development. Table 6.3 shows regional GDHI per head, relative to the UK average, 
for 1997 and 2013, the latest year for which data is available. The coefficient of variation in 
2013 was 0.14, less than half of the 0.29 for regional GVA. Furthermore, regional disparities 
in GDHI have barely grown since 1997, unlike GVA per head disparities. 
The actual differences in regional household incomes might even be somewhat smaller than 
the GDHI figures imply, because they include imputed rents, which are not an actual money 
income. Unfortunately, no data which excludes them is available. However, since they are 
calculated based on regional market rents, they must be higher in London, the East and South 
East. Thus, if they were excluded, the regional disparities in GDHI would be even somewhat 
smaller. It is also worth mentioning that, even though there are intra-regional disparities (at the 
NUTS 2 level) in GDHI per head, they are much smaller than the corresponding disparities in 
GVA per head. 
The GDHI data does not deny that living standards are worse in the poorer parts of the UK. 
They are, but a question does arise – why are we not observing larger regional disparities in 
                                                             
121 GDHI measures the disposable income of the household sector (individuals, sole traders, and non-profit 
institutions serving households, such as trade unions, charities, or universities). The GDHI is a net of: a) on the 
“resources” side, mixed income of owners of businesses, compensation of employees, received income from 
property (including imputed rents), social benefits and other transfers, and, b) on the “use” side, of payments for 
the use of property, interest rates, taxes, social contributions and other benefits paid, and other transfers. 
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incomes? The answer seems to be because of regional redistribution, primarily through the 
public sector, which is the topic of the next section. 
 
Table 6.3 Gross Disposable Household Income per head (UK=100) 
Region/country 1997 2013 
North East 87 85 
North West 91 88 
Yorkshire & The Humber 90 87 
East Midlands 92 90 
West Midlands 91 89 
East of England 106 105 
London 122 128 
South East 116 113 
South West 102 101 
Wales 86 88 
Scotland 94 97 
Northern Ireland 81 82 
   
coefficient of variation 0.13 0.14 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Gross Disposable Household Income dataset 
 
6.2.2 Regional redistribution between UK countries and regions 
 
To determine if there is regional redistribution going on in the UK, we would need to 
compare the regions’ shares in total UK public revenues and expenditures. Unfortunately, this 
is not so easy. Although the UK does produce detailed statistics for public expenditures broken 
down by UK countries and regions, regional breakdowns of public revenues are much more 
limited. 
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Redistribution between UK countries 
 
Full data on all types of HMRC receipts exists only for Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales 
and England, back to 1999, but not for the English regions.122 Chart 6.3 shows the differences 
between the countries’ contributions to HMRC receipts and their shares in total public 
expenditures. What it implies is that there is regional redistribution going on in favor of 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Whether the existing redistribution is large or small can 
be debated. Still, it is important in relative terms, because, due to the small populations of the 
three beneficiaries, even a percentage point of redistribution ends up being significant in per 
head terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
122 For the four countries, the numbers vary a bit, depending on whether the Petroleum Revenue Tax and the 
Corporation Tax (offshore) are allocated based on territory or population. For Scotland, allocating them based on 
its population share gives a lower estimate for its contribution to HMRC receipts, while doing the allocation based 
on territory gives a higher estimate. This is because Scotland accounts for about 8% of the UK population, but for 
the vast majority of UK oil and gas fields. In England, given its dominant population share (84%), but a far smaller 
share of the oil and gas field, allocating the taxes based on population gives a higher estimate for its contribution. 
In both England and Scotland, changing the method of allocation results in their contributions changing by around 
0.5pp-2pp depending on the year. However, given that in the last two years oil prices fell drastically, the changes 
resulting from using different methodologies first became smaller (0.3pp) and then almost non-existent. Wales 
and Northern Ireland only show a negligible contribution if the allocation is done based on population (due to 
their very small populations), and no contribution if the allocation is done based on geographical share, because 
they do not have any oilfields. For the methodology of how tax receipts are disaggregated between the UK 
countries, see HM Revenue & Customs (2016a). 
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Chart 6.3 Percentage point difference between a country’s contribution to public revenues 
and its share in public expenditures, 2015-16 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on a) HM Treasury, Country and Regional Analysis, b) HM Revenue & Customs, 
A disaggregation of HMRC tax receipts between England, Wales, Scotland & Northern Ireland, and c) Office for 
National Statistics, Population Estimates dataset 
1) Total public expenditures were calculated by taking the total identifiable public expenditures for each country, 
and then adding to them non-identifiable expenditures, expenditures outside the UK, and accounting adjustments, 
and allocating them to each country based on their population shares (mid-year 2015 estimates). 
2) The contribution to HMRC receipts was done based on population. 
 
However, a different picture emerges if we look just at the revenue side. We can compare 
countries’ contributions to HMRC receipts with their shares in total UK GVA. This is given in 
Table 6.4 below. The numbers are nearly identical, implying that the total UK tax system taxes 
regions proportionately to their incomes. This conclusion is consistent with Office for National 
Statistics (2013) which analyses the total effects of the UK tax system on household incomes, 
and shows that, when direct and indirect taxes are taken together, the whole tax system directed 
at households ends up being proportional, if not slightly regressive. Since income taxes, 
National Insurance Contributions, the capital gains tax, the VAT, and various duties on alcohol 
and fuel, all directed at households, together make up almost 80% of total HMRC receipts,123 
the Office for National Statistics (2013) analysis can be taken as quite representative of the 
entire tax system. All in all, the evidence seems to suggest that, regionally, the tax system is 
proportional, but expenditures favor the poorer countries of the UK. 
                                                             
123 According to the HM Revenue & Customs HMRC Tax & NIC Receipts dataset. 
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Table 6.4 Countries’ contributions to UK public revenues (2015-16), share in total UK GVA 
(2015), % 
 
 
Contributions to UK 
public revenues 
Share in total UK 
GVA 
Northern Ireland 2.1 2.1 
England 86.4 86.0 
Scotland 8.0 7.6 
Wales 3.3 3.3  
 
Source: Own calculation based on a) Office for National Statistics, Gross Value Added (Income Approach) 
dataset, and b) HM Revenue & Customs, A disaggregation of HMRC tax receipts between England, Wales, 
Scotland & Northern Ireland  
 
Redistribution between UK countries and regions 
 
 For the English regions, public expenditures per head do favor the poorer regions, although 
they also favor London, as can be seen from column 1 in Table 6.5.124 Furthermore, as is 
evident from columns 2 and 3, the incomes in the poorer regions rely more on contributions 
and transfers than do the incomes in the richer regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
124 Identifiable public expenditure is expenditures which can be regionally allocated more or less unambiguously, 
such as infrastructure, healthcare, education, etc. It comprises about 85% of UK public expenditures. The 
remainder, non-identifiable public expenditure, is that which benefits the entire UK, such as defense or 
international representation. It would make no sense to add the non-identifiable expenditures on a per-head basis, 
as it would not change the per-head ratios. 
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Table 6.5 Public expenditures (2013-14) and transfers in the UK regions (2013) 
 
Total identifiable 
public expenditure 
per head 
(UK=100) 
Social 
contributions and 
benefits, share in 
total resources 
Other current 
transfers received, 
share in total 
resources 
North East 104 23.4 4.8 
North West 103 22.8 4.1 
Yorkshire & The Humber 97 21.7 4.3 
East Midlands 91 20.5 4.3 
West Midlands 96 21.6 4.3 
East of England 90 18.2 3.7 
London 112 12.6 2.6 
South East 88 17.6 3.3 
South West 92 21.2 4.0 
Wales 110 24.1 5.0 
Scotland 116 20.2 3.9 
Northern Ireland 121 22.5 5.6  
Source: a) Office for National Statistics, Gross Disposable Household Income dataset, b) HM Treasury, Country 
and Regional Analysis 
 
The importance of public spending for poorer regions can be seen from a few more 
indicators. Table 6.6 shows data on public sector earnings, private sector earnings, their 
difference, and on public sector employment.125 Private sector earnings are higher in the richer 
regions and lower in the poorer ones, which is as we would expect based on their productivity 
                                                             
125 Data for Northern Ireland was not available for 2013 either for public or private sector earnings. The available 
data shows considerable growth of 7.5% in public sector earnings there for 2014-2015, so, assuming the same 
growth in 2013-2014, it would mean that the annual public sector earnings per employee in 2013 in Northern 
Ireland were around £23,700, much more in line with all the other regions. Doing the same calculation for the 
private sector, except with a growth rate of 6.8% which was the growth rate in 2014-2015, gives the annual private 
sector earnings per employee in 2013 of around £19,000, again more in line with the other regions. As is the case 
with almost all other indicators, it also puts Northern Ireland squarely at the bottom of the UK. 
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differences. Conversely, public sector earnings are much more similar across the regions. This 
too is as we would expect. The effects of this are shown in column 3 – effectively the public 
sector counteracts the effects created by the market, providing poorer regions with higher 
incomes than they otherwise would have had. The effect is compounded by the fact that poorer 
regions rely more than the richer ones on public sector employment, as shown in column 4. 
(McCann (2016:312), though, does point out that while public sector wages have long been 
higher than private sector wages in the poorer regions, it is only recently that the share of public 
sector employment in total employment there has grown to beyond what it is in the richer 
regions. As a matter of fact, until the 1990s, it was always lower.) 
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Table 6.6 Public sector earnings vs. private sector earnings and public employment 
 
Public 
sector, 
mean 
Private 
sector, 
mean 
Public - 
private 
Share of public 
sector employment 
in total employment 
(December 2013) 
Wales 25,200 21,000 4,200 23.8 
Northern Ireland 27,300 21,600 5,700 27.3 
North East 25,600 22,200 3,400 22.7 
Yorkshire & The Humber 24,500 23,500 1,000 20.1 
South West 24,900 23,700 1,200 17.7 
North West 26,400 23,700 2,700 19.9 
East Midlands 25,200 24,200 1,000 17.4 
West Midlands 25,000 25,000 0 19.1 
Scotland 26,800 25,500 1,300 22.3 
East of England 24,800 25,600 -800 16.1 
South East 25,800 28,900 -3,100 16.0 
London 35,900 44,500 -8,600 16.1 
     
coefficient of variation 0.12 0.24   
Source: a) Office for National Statistics, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings and Public Sector Employment 
datasets, b) Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings dataset 
1) Figures for the salaries have been rounded to the nearest one hundred pounds. 
2) Data for salaries for Northern Ireland is for 2015, for the other regions for 2013. If the numbers for Northern 
Ireland were adjusted to 2013 (see footnote 125), the coefficient of variation for the public sector would be a bit 
lower, and for the private a bit higher. 
 
However, as noted, the revenue side is much harder to determine for the English regions. 
Still, there are some partial sources, and inferences can be made from some indirect data as 
well. The evidence seems to suggest that, like with the UK countries, the tax system within 
England is taxing the same proportion of all regions’ incomes. 
The only official data on the contribution of the English regions to HMRC receipts is on the 
income tax. Income tax rates are progressive,126 so we would expect that richer regions, which 
                                                             
126 See the section on the income tax in Pope and Waters (2016). 
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have more rich households, would make a higher contribution to these taxes than the poorer 
regions. This is indeed what we observe in Chart 6.4, where London in particular makes a much 
higher contribution to the income tax than its share in the total number of taxpayers eligible to 
pay them. The South East and the East are the only two other regions for which this is the case. 
However, a different picture emerges if we compare regions’ shares in GVA and their 
contributions to the income tax, also shown on the same chart. As we can see, there is very 
little difference between the two shares. 
 
Chart 6.4 Percentage point difference between contributions to the income tax and a region’s 
share in the number of taxpayers 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on: a) HM Revenue & Customs, Table 2.2 Number of individual income taxpayers 
by marginal rate, gender and age, by country and region, 2013-2014, Table 3.13, Income and tax by country and 
region, and b) Office for National Statistics, Gross Value Added (Income Approach) dataset 
 
What the above chart seems to imply is that, while direct taxes are progressive, for the 
effects of that to show up in the regional aggregates, the richer regions would have to have a 
very high share of taxpayers who are liable for the higher and additional income tax rates. Chart 
6.5 shows that, while indeed in the richer regions a higher share of taxpayers are liable for these 
rates, the difference between the regions is not that large. There is also the fact that many well-
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off taxpayers are not so well off that a large share of their incomes is taxed at the higher rates, 
and, of course, there is also tax evasion by the super rich (Syal, 2016; HM Revenue & Customs, 
2016). When all of that is combined, the income tax system seems to be largely proportional 
to regions’ incomes. 
 
Chart 6.5 Share of regional taxpayers liable for the higher and additional income tax rates 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on HM Revenue & Customs, Number of individual income taxpayers by marginal 
rate, gender and age, by country and region, 2013-2014 
 
Looking at GDHI components provides more evidence on this. Chart 6.6 shows the ratio of 
total secondary uses (see footnote 121) to total resources, or, roughly, what part of all the 
incomes of the household sector are paid out in taxes on incomes, and in contributions and 
other transfers.127 The ratios are remarkably similar across the UK. Of course, the secondary 
                                                             
127 Various taxes make up 40% of the total secondary uses, with the most important being personal income taxes, 
taxes on unincorporated enterprises, on capital gains, and the Council Tax. Employers’ and employee’s social 
contributions account for another 47% of total outgoings (Office for National Statistics, 2014:41s). 
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uses do not encompass all the taxes paid to the HMRC, but they may be fairly representative 
of the entire tax system, given that they account for about 50% of them. 
 
Chart 6.6 Ratio of secondary uses to total resources in GDHI 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Office for National Statistics, Gross Disposable Household Income dataset 
 
There is some counter-evidence that points to richer regions paying more than their share in 
UK GVA. For example, McGough and Piazza (2016) calculate that London alone contributes 
30% of total UK taxes, well above its share in total UK GVA of around 23%. They do not 
explain the basis for their estimates in detail, however. Morrill (2017) does explain his 
methodology for estimating various taxes that London generates, and ends up showing a very 
proportional tax system.128 McCann (2016:297-310) references a number of studies that show 
different results, though most agree that most UK regions (and countries) run fiscal deficits. In 
the end, only when and if official estimates are made will we be able to say with some certainty 
how much regional redistribution there is between the English regions, but the bulk of the 
evidence we do have seems to imply that public redistribution from the richer to the poorer 
regions is happening, though only through public expenditures. 
 
                                                             
128 For a summary table, see Table 7 on p. 24 in Morrill (2017). 
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6.3 Old paradigm regional policies 
 
This section explores how various UK governments have attempted to apply old paradigm 
regional policies to help the development of the poorer UK regions. Section 6.3.1 gives an 
overview of the evolution of policies from the perspective of the areas that were covered, the 
policies pursued, and total expenditures. It should be noted that this does not exhaust all efforts 
at regional development, because a number of policies that are not primarily regional 
nevertheless do have pronounced regional effects, such as infrastructure investment or 
subsidies to certain industries. These have been mentioned to the extent possible. Second, in 
section 6.3.2, an evaluation of the policies is given. 
 
6.3.1 The evolution of regional policies 
 
Pre-WWII period 
 
The first regional policy measure in the UK was undertaken in 1928, when the Industrial 
Transference Board was established. It was an example of the workers-to-work approach, its 
purpose being to provide financial assistance to workers to move away from jobless areas to 
areas where there were vacancies. Its establishment was prompted by the over-capacity and 
unemployment in heavy industries and mining (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:214), its target 
regions being the North, Scotland and Wales (Scott, 2009:344). By 1938, when the Board was 
terminated, around 20,000 workers had moved per year, but this could not make a big dent in 
either total or regional unemployment, given that, for example, total unemployment in 1933 
stood at 3,000,000. The workers-to-work approach has never again played a big role in regional 
development policies in the United Kingdom. 
A different, work-to-workers, approach was taken with the 1934 Special Areas Act. It 
designated South Wales, West Cumberland, and Clydeside/North Lanarkshire, all depressed 
coal-mining areas, as Special Areas (Yuill, 1980:187). A number of policy instruments were 
envisaged, specifically “loans to private industry, the provision of factories on industrial 
estates, and subsidies to offset firms’ tax, rent and rates (local-tax) liabilities” (Yuill, 
1980:193). This reflected the idea that the more developed parts of the country had an 
advantage because of the development of industrial estates and the availability of capital (Scott, 
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2009:345). However, expenditures under the Special Areas Acts were small, and not many new 
jobs were created (Yuill, 1980:193, Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:214, Scott, 2009: 345). More 
importantly, the policies from the Special Areas Act were to form the basis of many future 
regional development policies. 
 
1945-1964 
 
The basis for post-WWII regional policies in the UK were set in the first few years after the 
war. In 1945, the Distribution of Industry Act was passed (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:215, 
Scott, 2009:345), establishing a number of assisted areas (called Development Areas). They 
covered the same areas as the previous Special Areas: South Wales, West Cumberland, and 
Clydeside/North Lanarkshire, and their coverage was 18% of the British population in 1953 
(Scott, 2009:345). 
Except the tax concessions, the same policy measures from the Special Areas Acts were 
envisaged: the building of factories, loans to industrial-estate companies, and capital subsidies 
in the form of loans and grants to commercially viable projects (Yuill, 1980:193-194). The 
Distribution of Industry Act also provided for government investment in transportation and 
infrastructure in the Development Areas, though this was not undertaken to any large degree. 
Another important policy tool, the Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs), were 
introduced in 1948.129 These were location controls in the form of licenses, and were a part of 
British regional policy until 1981. Manufacturing firms that wanted to invest had to apply for 
an IDC with the Board of Trade and its successors. An IDC was only needed if the investment 
involved the creation of new factory floor space above a certain size. The stated purpose of the 
IDCs was to ensure “the proper distribution of industry, bearing in mind the need for providing 
appropriate employment in the assisted areas” (Wettman and Nicol, 1981:51). The idea was to 
refuse IDCs if the planned investment was to be made in already developed parts of the country 
(the Midlands, London, East and the South East), and to approve them otherwise, thus steering 
investment to the Development Areas. The reason why manufacturing was chosen was because 
it was considered to be generally mobile, and, as Wettman and Nicol (1981:88-89) argue, the 
                                                             
129 Office Development Permits (ODPs) were also introduced in 1965. They functioned similarly to the IDCs, but 
related to investment in new office floor space, not manufacturing floor space, and they were primarily meant to 
limit the expansion of office space in London, and to divert this expansion intra-regionally, not to other regions 
(Wettman and Nicol, 1981:52s). 
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mobility criterion was indeed the most important one when IDC applications were being 
considered – if the investment project was planned for the developed parts of the United 
Kingdom, but could be moved elsewhere, then the IDC application would generally be refused. 
Still, the stated intent behind the IDCs was purposefully vague, as neither the “proper 
distribution of industry” nor “appropriate employment” were ever defined. This allowed the 
government130 significant discretion when deciding when to approve and when to reject IDC 
applications (Wettman and Nicol, 1981:51). For example, it could approve more IDCs in times 
of recession, when any investment was seen as desirable. It could also approve them for 
projects in New Towns,131 even when these were not in Development Areas. Finally, it could 
approve them if the investment was considered important enough, wherever it happened to be 
located. 
Throughout the post-war period, British regional policy essentially revolved around 
modifying the coverage and definition of assisted areas, the types of incentives offered, the 
strictness of the use of IDCs, and, of course, around how much was spent on regional policies. 
Cutbacks were made to regional policies already in 1947, because of a balance of payments 
crisis. The Conservative governments in the 1950s did not acknowledge a broader regional 
problem, but insisted that what was being observed were cases of localized high unemployment 
(Scott, 2009:349-351). Expenditures on regional policies stayed low, and there were almost no 
IDC refusals. 
This changed somewhat in 1958, due to rising unemployment, particularly in the 
Development Areas. Expenditures on regional polices were increased somewhat, and a few 
additional grants and depreciation allowances were introduced. The IDCs also started being 
used much more actively again, the refusal percentage going up from some 2% in 1957 to 
almost 15% already in 1958, and then rising to around 25% by 1964. Furthermore, the 
government intervened in the location of some very large-scale projects. A giant new steel 
factory was split between Ravenscraig in Scotland and Llanwern in Wales, and leading car 
manufacturers were forced to undertake major expansions in the Development Areas. 
However, while this may have tackled unemployment problems to an extent, it also contributed 
                                                             
130 Specifically, and in most cases, the regional offices of the Department of Industry, except for very large, or 
politically sensitive projects, in which case the decisions were made at the headquarters (Wettman and Nicol, 
1981:93-94). 
131 These were towns built throughout the post-war period around major existing urban centers, such as London, 
Manchester, or Glasgow, to help decongest them. 
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to the UK industrial decline, because it led to production being broken up between too many 
factories to achieve efficient scales of production, despite the fact that the new plants were very 
advanced for the time (Scott, 2009:351). 
 
1964-1979 
 
When Labour came to power in 1964, it started introducing some important changes to 
regional policies. The previous Conservative government had defined the assisted areas based 
on local unemployment rates, but the 1966 Industrial Development Act replaced them with 5 
broader Development Areas which included “declining localities and localities of potential 
growth [leaving] more scope for natural economic forces to operate, as well as giving firms … 
a wider locational choice” (Yuill, 1980:188). There was an element of growth pole thinking in 
this (Scott, 2009: 352). 
In 1967 Special Development Areas were introduced, for places expected to suffer high 
unemployment due to colliery closures,132 and in 1970, Intermediate Areas were also 
introduced, which bordered the Development Areas. They were offered some level of aid, due 
to the fear that they neither had the locational advantages of the developed regions, nor were 
they receiving any assistance, thus making them potentially unattractive for investment. 
Together, all the assisted areas covered some 40% of UK territory, and around 20% of the 
population (Scott, 2009:353), making the coverage significantly higher than in most other 
European Community countries (Yuill, 1980:189). These areas continued being the basis for 
UK regional policies for the next two decades. 
With some modifications, capital subsidies remained the mainstay of the policies directed 
at the assisted areas. However, an innovation was introduced in 1967 with the Regional 
Employment Premium (REP), which was a straightforward wage subsidy payable to 
manufacturing firms in the assisted areas. Together with the capital subsidies, the REP 
provided, on average, a 5% annual operating cost reduction for manufacturing firms in the 
assisted areas (Scott, 2009:353). 
The biggest change that Labour introduced was in total expenditures on regional policies. 
Combined with the continued building of factories and industrial estates, expenditures on 
regional policies increased sixteen-fold in real terms from the 1962/63 fiscal year (the last 
                                                             
132 The expected “high” unemployment rate was 8%. It is interesting to observe that such an unemployment rate 
used to be considered unacceptably high not so long ago. 
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before Labour took power) to the 1969/70 one (the last before Labour lost power) (Thorpe, 
1997:166). Investment in infrastructure also increased substantially, and subsidies were given 
to numerous industries. The only reduction was in the use of IDCs, where after the refusal rate 
initially jumped to around 30%, it dropped to around 10% by 1970 (Armstrong and Taylor, 
2000:217). 
The Conservative government that came to power in the summer of 1970 initially 
announced a cutback in interventionism, including in regional policies, but made a U-turn 
already in early 1971 due to rising unemployment, particularly in the problem regions (Yuill, 
1980:195, Scott, 2009:353). 
The Special Development Areas were extended to include Glasgow and Clydeside, 
Tyneside, Wearside and more of South Wales. A month later, the Intermediate Areas were 
extended as well. 
The 1971 budget contained provisions for extensive public works projects in the assisted 
areas, while the 1972 Industry Act provided significant additional aid to assisted areas and 
problem industries. Apart from introducing a virtually automatic 20% investment grant, called 
the Regional Development Grant (RDG), it also introduced the Regional Selective Assistance 
(RSA), discretionary, project-related finance in the form of a soft loan or an interest relief loan. 
The RDG was later reduced and then abolished by the Conservative governments in the 1980s, 
but the RSA remained the main policy tool for assisted areas until 2010, and still exists in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The 1972 Industry Act also provided for extensive aid 
to the shipbuilding industry, which was concentrated in the assisted areas, and allowed the 
government to provide financial aid to any other industry as well, which it soon did, for 
example, for coal and steel (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:354, Yuill, 1980:195). 
The 1974-1979 Labour governments initially made no significant changes to regional 
policy, but they did increase expenditures, which came to around 0.7% of GDP. However, in a 
replay of 1947, a balance of payments crisis and a recession forced a cut back on regional 
policies. The REP was eliminated in 1976, and other expenditures were reduced, so that the 
total fell to 0.3% of GDP by 1979, with the bulk of the cuts moreover coming in one go in 
1976-77 (Scott, 2009:354, Taylor and Wren, 1997:841). 
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1979-1997 
 
Like in other areas of economic policy, the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher in May 
1979 heralded drastic cuts in regional policy, both in terms of its coverage, measures and 
expenditures. 
The assisted areas, which due to various increases covered 45% of the population by 1979, 
were reduced to 30% of the population over several years, and again became focused on local 
areas of high unemployment. Compared to other countries of the European Economic 
Community at the time, the United Kingdom ended up with a less than average coverage of 
assisted areas, although it had greater than average regional disparities. 
Most existing policy measures were reduced or eliminated by 1988. The RDG was abolished 
in 1988, while eligibility criteria for the RSA were tightened already in 1979 (Scott, 2009:355), 
by introducing the criterion of need, namely, the applicant had to show that the funding was 
necessary to enable the project to go ahead (Yuill, 1980:197). IDCs were abolished in 1982, 
though admittedly they had seen little use for a number of years. Still, their abolition did mean 
that potentially important investment projects were no longer being brought to the 
government’s attention, which was the reason why they were kept at all until that point (Yuill, 
1980:197). 
All this effectively left only the RSA and government building of factories and land 
reclamation as important parts of UK regional policy. The effect on expenditures was a steady 
decline, from around 0.3% of GDP in 1979 to less than 0.1% by 1990 (Taylor and Wren, 
1997:840-841), with this level being maintained since, even though, for example, in the 1996-
98 period, it was 70% lower than the EU average (Scott, 2009:356). 
But, on top of all the mentioned cuts to regional policies, a subtler change was taking place 
as well. Namely, the causes of the regional problem were starting to be redefined in the second 
half of the 1980s, with the focus shifting from a weak industrial structure and lack of 
infrastructure, to supposed supply-side market rigidities, and a lack of entrepreneurial skill and 
innovation in the deprived areas. This then also implied a change in policies, from building 
infrastructure and attracting inward investment, to deregulating and fostering the development 
of small indigenous firms (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:219; Scott, 2009:355-366). Then, in 
the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the Conservative governments also started arguing 
that the goal of regional policy was to improve the competitiveness of all regions (seen as a 
part of a policy of improving national competitiveness). All of this was consistently couched 
in “help people help themselves” terms, and policies such as the Regional Enterprise Grant, 
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“designed to improve managerial skills, business strategies and innovation” (Scott, 2009:220), 
were introduced.133 
Now, this entire approach was primarily a change in rhetoric. First, it was still the assisted 
areas, not all regions, that were the recipients of aid. Equally importantly, the RSA remained 
the main policy tool, and its funding did not at all reflect the new rhetoric about small 
indigenous firms. For example, in the 1991-1994 period, of the total value of RSA grants, 
around 63% went to firms with more than 250 employees. Moreover, of the entire value across 
all size categories, around 41% went to foreign firms. Actually, large foreign-owned firms were 
the single biggest recipient of the RSA, at 35.5% of the entire value of RSA grants paid out in 
this period (Taylor and Wren, 1997:843). This shows that the real change from the preceding 
period, apart from the drastic cuts, was a shift towards relying more and more on FDI for 
regional investment, and not on small indigenous firms. Nevertheless, while the rhetoric had 
no large immediate impact, and was even diametrically opposed to what was actually being 
done, it did have the important effect of changing the vision of policy-makers and politicians 
across the political spectrum. As we will see in section 6.4, this had a profound impact on the 
types of regional policies that Labour started pursuing after it won the general election in 1997. 
 
6.3.2 Evaluation of old paradigm regional policies 
 
The discussed policies have either supported industries clustered in the poorer regions, or 
attempted to get existing companies from elsewhere to invest in the development areas. In 
either case, the main focus was on creating or safeguarding jobs. How successful have the 
policies been? 
 
Pre-Thatcher period 
 
Some assessments have been negative. Broadberry and Leunig (2013) are a good example, 
and are representative of a general anti-interventionist stance applied to traditional regional 
policies. The authors note that post-war regional policy was based on the work-to-workers 
approach, and was “determined primarily by unemployment, not by industrial needs” 
(Broadberry and Leunig, 2013:35-36). While they do mention the policies that supported 
regionally clustered industries, they focus on those that tried stimulating investment in the 
                                                             
133 For details on the Regional Enterprise Grant, see Taylor and Wren (1997:841). 
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development areas by outside firms. Their argument is that getting firms to disperse their 
production harms agglomeration economies, thus reducing the firms’ efficiency. So, even 
though they do admit that there have been successes in getting firms to move to assisted areas, 
noting a study that shows that some 500 firms relocated to the assisted areas in the 1960s, they 
question such successes by saying that they need “to be seen at best in the context of a trade-
off between industrial efficiency and regional equity” (Broadberry and Leunig, 2013:37). 
However, their argument about the loss of efficiency through harming agglomeration 
economies is not backed by empirical research, but by references to New Economic 
Geography. As I noted in section 3.3, NEG is a problematic approach to understanding regional 
problems. But, even if Broadberry and Leunig had referenced other theories, that would still 
have not been enough – empirical claims require empirical evidence. Which specific 
agglomeration economies are important for which specific industries? Are they tied to close 
geographic proximity of different producers, or will ease and cheapness of communication and 
transportation negate any negative effects of dispersion? How close is close enough for 
agglomeration economies to arise, and how far is far enough for them to start disappearing? 
Are plant-level economies of scale important, but can individual plants operating at efficient 
scale be dispersed geographically? These are just some of the questions that would need to be 
answered – for particular industries at particular times – to be able to claim that dispersing an 
industry will adversely affect it. But, Broadberry and Leunig do not even ask such questions, 
let alone answer them.134 
Actually, at the time it was questioned whether it was even possible to quantify the extra 
costs imposed on firms by making them move, but on the available evidence, policy-makers at 
the time were doubtful that the costs were large (Wettman and Nicol, 1981:65). Holland 
(1979:151-159) also looked at the available evidence, and concluded that it seemed that 
dispersal was not really detrimental at least to big firms, and if there were extra costs, they were 
not high. 
The arguments of Broadberry and Leunig seem to be based more on an anti-interventionist 
position, than on empirical evidence. This is clearly shown when, at one point, they change 
their argument mid-way in a paragraph, from talking about the adverse effects of dispersal on 
agglomeration economies, to saying that “persuading firms to locate in areas other than those 
in which the firms wish to expand would be likely to adversely affect industry in some way” 
                                                             
134 For an exhaustive attempt to try to ascertain the importance of different agglomeration economies, see Holland 
(1979:196-235). 
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(Broadberry and Leunig, 2013:36). These two arguments may look similar at first glance, but 
are actually quite distinct. Namely, persuading firms to locate their new investments 
somewhere where they do not wish to locate (dispersal) does not have any necessary logical 
implications for agglomeration economies. If new investments are located away from existing 
capacities, the effect on agglomeration economies at the already existing locations will depend 
on the specific configuration of those agglomeration economies – there may be positive, 
negative or neutral effects, or some combination thereof. Additionally, new agglomeration 
economies can be created in the areas were firms are being persuaded to invest. The point is 
that we cannot know any of this without empirical research, and neither can Broadberry and 
Leunig. 
Furthermore, the authors’ argument that firms are persuaded to locate where they do not 
wish to locate is not logical, at least when it comes to persuasion through incentives. Without 
incentives, a firm may locate in region A, but with incentives, it decides to locate in region B. 
In both cases, it is locating where it wishes to locate, but in the latter case, its decision has been 
influenced by government policy, which is apparently what Broadberry and Leunig have a 
problem with. When it comes to IDCs, it does make logical sense to say that firms were being 
forced to do something against their will, but that is a problem per se only if we adopt an anti-
interventionist stance. 
Interestingly, Broadberry and Leunig do refer to empirical research when assessing the 
effects of IDCs, concluding that they were unsuccessful, but they misused their only source 
(Wettman and Nicol, 1981), which in fact shows that the IDCs were fairly successful in getting 
firms to move to development areas. Discussing this in detail is not necessary here, but, in a 
nutshell, Broadberry and Leunig point to the fact that only 18% of the firms that had their IDC 
applications refused actually moved their projects. A full 50% of projects proceeded in their 
originally intended area, by exploiting loopholes in IDC regulations.135 However, Wettman and 
Nicol (1981:119-123, 169s) note that a formal IDC refusal was not the only way that IDCs 
could steer investment to the assisted areas. Actually, this was among their least important 
effects. One other possibility was that a firm would expect a refusal for various reasons, and 
then simply plan the project from the beginning outside of the Midlands and the Greater East. 
                                                             
135 Since IDCs were required only for investment above a certain size of new floor space, firms could either build 
smaller new floor space, or use existing floorspace. Holland (1979:270) notes a particular use of the first loophole 
– building new floor space below the controlled size next to existing floorspace, and later connecting the two 
spaces. 
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An IDC application outside the richer regions would almost always be approved, but that would 
obviously not show up in the refusal statistics. Most importantly, the officials deciding on IDC 
applications could use the process to notify the firms about available incentives in the 
development areas, leading many firms to voluntarily switch their planned locations, and 
withdraw their original IDC application. The limited research that was conducted actually 
shows that such “verbal steering” (which, admittedly, did not always happen during the 
application process for an IDC) was the most important reason why firms chose to invest in the 
development areas. 
Unlike Broadberry and Leunig, Scott (2009) and Armstrong and Taylor (2000) provide an 
overview of the existing empirical research on the effects of the old paradigm regional policies. 
Armstrong and Taylor (2000:216) show that the number of firms moving to the development 
areas varied from around 20 to around 140 moves per year from 1945 to 1978, and the upswings 
and downswings happen at times of more and less active regional policies. Scott (2009) has 
given an overview of the existing evidence on job creation in the assisted areas, and concluded 
that it seems that the various regional policies – factory building and land reclamation, IDCs, 
free depreciation, various capital and labor subsidies – were successful. Estimates are that they 
created around 450,000 net manufacturing jobs in the assisted areas between 1960 to 1981. 
Assuming a multiplier effect of 1.4, a further 180,000 service sector jobs should be added to 
that figure (Scott, 2009:362-363). Admittedly, not all policies were equally effective, nor 
equally cost-effective, with labor subsidies (basically, the REP) turning out to be the least cost-
effective by a large margin. 
Macroeconomic aggregates seem to confirm that the regional policies have been successful 
to an extent. Table 6.7 shows that some of the poorer regions prospered, although the decline 
of the West Midlands is striking. 
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Table 6.7 GDP and personal disposable income per head (UK = 100) 
 
 GDP per head 
Personal disposable income per 
head 
 1966 1979 1972 1979 
North 84 92  90  94 
Yorkshire & Humberside 97 94  94  94 
East Midlands 97 96  98  98 
East Anglia 96 94  93  94.6 
South East 115 --  119  118 
Greater London -- 128  107  107 
Rest of South East -- 106  98  98 
South West 92 93  100  96 
West Midlands 108 96  97  96 
North West 96 96  91  95 
Wales 84 87  93  94 
Scotland 89 95  77  82 
Northern Ireland 63 73  90  94  
Source: Office for National Statistics, Historic Economic Data for Regions of the UK (1966-1996) dataset 
 
However, Scott is completely right to not stay focused just on jobs, but to look at the broader 
effects of the regional policies on structural transformation. From that perspective, the results 
have not been particularly good. The focus on quickly getting jobs to the development areas 
meant that all post-war governments were far less committed to trying to get higher value-
added activities there. For example, from 1944 to 1948, all but one application to open 
corporate R&D plants in the already developed areas were approved. Sometimes, firms would 
be allowed to do pilot production and R&D around London, on the condition that later 
standardized production took place in the assisted areas. It was these sorts of choices that, 
although being helpful in generating jobs in the short-term, merely reinforced the regional 
disparities in the UK. They helped entrench a spatial division of labor, with high-skill jobs, 
high value-added activities, and dense linkages between firms being located in one part of the 
country, and routine, branch plant production in another (Scott, 2009:366). This not only 
created less potential for development in the assisted areas, but at any time made them 
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vulnerable to plant closures, because it is normally peripheral branch plants, doing standardized 
production, that are closed first when firms cut costs and production, say during a recession. A 
reliance on branch plants combined with the regional concentration of traditional, declining 
industries, meant that the situation was essentially hopeless for the long-term structural 
transformation of the poorer regions of the UK. 
 
The Thatcher period 
 
The deregulations, privatizations, and cuts to regional policies and industrial subsidies under 
the Thatcher government have already been discussed. They did not lead to an improvement in 
the economic situation of the poorer regions. Table 6.8 shows the evolution of regional GDP 
and personal disposable incomes during this period compared to the UK average. The North, 
Yorkshire & Humberside, North West, and West Midlands, all hit hard by industrial decline, 
have fared particularly poorly, while London, the South East and the East of England have 
increased their leads. We can also see the benefits that Scotland has had due to the development 
of the oil industry and the Barnett formula. The only poor region whose situation has 
substantially improved is Northern Ireland, but that has been a long-term trend, only broken 
recently, and Northern Ireland always kept special arrangements for regional policy, due to its 
political situation. 
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Table 6.8 GDP and personal disposable income per head (UK = 100) 
 GDP per head 
Personal disposable income per 
head 
 1980 1994 1980 1995 
North 94 89  95 89 
Yorkshire & Humberside 93 89  95 93 
East Midlands 97 96  97 96 
East Anglia 96 102  97 100 
South East 115 117  120 123 
Greater London 128 126  106 107 
Rest of South East 107 111  100 96 
South West 94 96  95 96 
West Midlands 93 93  96 92 
North West 97 90  93 86 
Wales 86 84  95 98 
Scotland 95 100  81 94 
Northern Ireland 73 82  95 89  
Source: Office for National Statistics, Historic Economic Data for Regions of the UK (1966-1996) dataset 
 
The role of foreign direct investment 
 
The shift towards FDI helped mitigate the effects of what was happening. As already noted, 
by the early 1990s over 40% by value of RSA funding for manufacturing firms was given to 
foreign-owned businesses,136 and in some sectors this was even higher. For example, in the 
case of electrical engineering, the number was 72% (Taylor and Wren, 1997:843). Yet, while 
large FDI projects did create thousands of jobs (though they certainly did not halt the decline 
in manufacturing employment as a whole), they mostly did not establish strong linkages to the 
domestic economy (Scott, 2009:362; Brand, Hill and Munday, 2000; Turok, 1993). Branch 
plant managers do not generally have too much autonomy in choosing their suppliers, and in 
less developed regions, they would anyway find it difficult to make more complex connections 
                                                             
136 In services, the amount going to foreign-owned companies was much lower, at only 13%, but of all RSA 
funding, services received less than 8%. 
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to the local economy.137 In other words, a regional economy dependent on footloose foreign 
firms that have been attracted by cheap labor and incentives, may seem better off than it 
actually is, given the constant risk of firms choosing to leave if better conditions spring up 
elsewhere. 
A particularly cautionary tale is that of the Silicon Glen, a triangular section of Scottish 
territory, with the points roughly in Edinburgh, Dundee and the estuary of the Clyde. The 
Silicon Glen was home to a growing electronics industry in the post-war period. The industry 
grew particularly in the 1980s, its gross output increasing fourfold, due to inward FDI, which 
primarily revolved around assembly operations. However, Turok (1993) showed that it was not 
strongly embedded in the Scottish economy. For example, firms sourced only around 12% of 
material inputs by value from Scotland, with foreign firms (who accounted for 80% of the gross 
output) sourcing half as much as UK firms. He argued that this was akin to a dependent 
development model found in developing countries, rather than a self-sustaining one, and that 
it posed the risk of these companies moving away. Mccann (1997) argued that the situation 
was not as bad as Turok suggested, and that it was possible that the industry was slowly 
becoming more embedded in the Scottish economy. 
History, unfortunately, proved Turok to be overwhelmingly right. A recent new article noted 
an array of troubling official Scottish data (Fraser, 2016). In 2002, the value of Scottish 
electronics exports was £5.6 billion, or 28% of total Scottish exports. By 2014, the numbers 
were down to £1.1 billion and 4%. In real terms (at 2013 prices), the output of the sector had 
dropped from £16 billion in 2000 to £2 billion in 2013, and its share in total Scottish 
manufacturing had dropped from 32% to 8% in the same period. Employment had dropped 
from 16% of all manufacturing jobs, or around 50,000 jobs in 1999, to 9%, or around 28,000. 
There is some indication that some firms have moved up the value chain, but these are 
obviously the exceptions. In other words, the Scottish electronics industry underwent a steady 
and large contraction over the course of a decade due to foreign firms deciding to move away. 
This started, not incidentally, around the same time that China entered the WTO, and when a 
number of East European countries joined the EU. Both events opened up the prospect of 
                                                             
137 With the global business revolution, the reduction in the number of suppliers and an increase in their size, and 
the ever increasing demands made by leading systems integrators (Nolan, Zhang and Liu, 2007b), the relative 
position of less developed areas has become even worse. 
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producing in countries with labor far cheaper than in Scotland, and then exporting fairly 
securely to developed countries.138 
Overall, it seems that old paradigm policies before the cuts in the 1980s have been successful 
in maintaining or even somewhat improving the economic situation of the poorer regions, and 
in generating jobs there. However, they did not engender a structural transformation. After the 
cuts, the position of the poorer regions worsened. As regards the role of FDI, they have 
mitigated the job losses to an extent, but have also not helped poorer regions fundamentally 
develop. Thus, the poorer UK regions never really had a chance to become self-sustainable. 
 
 
6.4 New paradigm regional policies 
 
As noted, the Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s changed the perception of 
the underlying causes of the UK regional problem. But, while this was mostly a rhetorical 
matter for them, Labour actually put this rhetoric into practice after the 1997 general election. 
It moved the UK into an era of new paradigm regional policies, which are still dominant today. 
By 1997, Labour had shifted so significantly rightwards that it could easily define the 
regional problem as being due to a lack of “knowledge, skills, innovation and enterprise” 
(Scott, 2009:356), essentially a rephrasing of the Conservative governments’ position. The 
policies they designed for this revolved around support for the development of SMEs, 
entrepreneurship, and R&D. Additionally, Labour started a process of decentralization and 
devolution. (It should be noted that, after more than 20 years of this, the UK is still the most 
centralized state in Western Europe. See McCann (2016). Within England, nine Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) were established in 1999 and 2000, covering the entirety of 
England (see map in Appendix A). At the same time, the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments were 
created, and Home Rule was reinstated in Northern Ireland. Control over most regional policies 
was transferred to the devolved authorities. Thus, regional policies were implemented on an 
all-region basis. This too is characteristic of new paradigm policies, with all regions being 
eligible for support, but the poorer ones perhaps getting more favorable terms. A few words 
will be said about the devolved administrations in section 6.4.4, but let us first look at what 
happened in England, as there are no fundamental differences to the rest of the country. 
 
                                                             
138 For the influence of the EU enlargement, see Danson, Helinska-Hughes and Hughes (2003). 
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6.4.1 Regional Development Agencies 
 
The RDAs were tasked with developing their own regions. In order to do so, they had control 
over a number of policies (Allen, 2002:31s). These were divided into several categories: 
regeneration, business competitiveness, and skills and other. 
The first, “regeneration”, initially accounted for the bulk (87%) of RDA expenditures. These 
policies consisted mainly of urban regeneration projects. If we see development as structural 
transformation, such policies may sometimes be enabling for development, but they are not 
developmental themselves. They were actually just a transfer of existing departmental 
programs to RDA administrations. 
Policies related to “business competitiveness and skills” – funding of innovation, provision 
of venture capital, various training programs, management of Business Links (one-stop shops 
for business support policies), etc. – can be considered developmental, and there was a whole 
plethora of them. It was not just the RDAs pursuing them. Indeed, at one point, when the RDAs, 
local authorities, central government departments, and others are taken together, there were 
nearly 3000 different policies in place aimed at SMEs, innovation and training (OECD, 
2010:297). Adams, Robinson and Vigor (2003:74) note that regional development was 
fundamentally expected to happen through SMEs, and when all the different sources of funding 
for SME’s were added up, they totaled almost £8 billion per year. The RDAs themselves all 
had a strong focus on SMEs and entrepreneurship as the key driver of regional growth.139 
Nevertheless, as argued in chapter 4, such policies are likely to help further the development 
of already developed regions, not help create structural transformation in the poorer ones. 
Finally, the “other” policy category included a few policies that could be of some more 
direct help to poorer regions, such as through the promotion of inward investment (for example, 
organizing tours and visits to the region, or providing information about investment 
opportunities) and management of RSA140 grants of up to £2 million (Allen, 2002:31s). But, 
given the limited funding for promotion, and the fact that the RSA was the only remnant of old 
paradigm regional policies, this “other” category could not achieve much. Besides, as we have 
                                                             
139 See the strategies of the various RDAs, accessible at their individual websites. The links to their websites can 
be found at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/webarchive/regional-development-agencies.htm. All the 
strategies focus broadly on SMEs, skills, innovation and the business environment. None talk about oligopolies.  
140 The name was later changed to Selective Finance for Investment and then to Grant for Business Investment. 
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seen, even the old paradigm policies were not successful in creating structural transformation 
in the lagging regions. 
As we can see, it was Labour, through the RDAs, that actually implemented and 
institutionalized the all-region approach and firmly shifted the focus towards “tapping regional 
potentials”,141 as if the regional potential of, say, London or the South East is the same as that 
of deindustrialized Wales or the North East. 
The decentralization that the RDAs represented was in itself supposed to be useful for 
regional development, because they were supposed to have better knowledge of their regions’ 
conditions than central government departments. We should not underestimate this claim, as 
well as the institutional continuity that can be provided by regional bodies. Furthermore, 
perhaps the RDAs had an effect that Hirschman (1970) speculated about, namely, that regional 
institutions increase the confidence of policy-makers and reduce the feeling of despondence in 
poorer regions. Adams, Robinson and Vigor (2003:96), for example, note that the RDAs 
became quite good at organizing amongst each other in their negotiations with the central 
government. They certainly got more and more autonomy in spending priorities as time went 
by, and moved further from being merely a conduit for central government policy. Still, as 
valuable as this may be, it is only really relevant if there is an opportunity for structural 
transformation to be seized. But this did not materialize. 
The Coalition government abolished the RDAs in 2010. During the time they existed, they 
did receive what seems like quite substantial funding at first glance. From 1999/2000 to 
2006/2007, for example, they received a total of over £15bn. Their annual funding increased 
from £825 million in 2000/2001 to £2.3 billion in 2006/2007. Furthermore, as their funding 
increased, a smaller percentage of it went to regeneration. In the period from 2002-03 to 2006-
07 period, only 32% went to regeneration, whereas spending on business development and 
competitiveness increased to 17%. For people and skills the number was 8% (Department for 
Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 2009a:17).142 Additionally, per capita funding was 
much higher in the poorer regions, for example, six times higher in the North East than in 
London (OECD, 2010:297). However, all this was actually equivalent to a bit less than 1% on 
average of total identifiable public expenditures in each region (Department for Business, 
Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 2009a:7), and, as noted, was certainly dwarfed by the state 
support for, say, the financial sector (and thus London) during the recent global financial crisis. 
                                                             
141 Expressions such as these are used liberally in documents related to the RDAs. 
142 The RDAs were also delivering programs on behalf of the central government. 
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6.4.2 Assisted areas 
 
The RDAs were responsible for their entire regions, but the UK governments still defines 
specific assisted areas, in accordance with EU rules, which makes them eligible for regional 
aid-related exemptions to EU state aid rules.143 The exemptions mostly relate to the ability to 
give investment incentives, though the latest rules have generally made it more difficult for 
large firms to receive aid. 
It is fairly obvious that the assisted areas are defined according to the view that their 
problems are those of localized deprivation. First, they are defined at the ward level. Second, 
the criteria used for choosing the areas144 show that structural transformation is not on the 
agenda. For example, when defining the areas in 2007, the criteria used were the employment 
rate, adult skills, incapacity benefits claimants, and manufacturing share of employment. Those 
areas that were significantly worse off than the UK average on one of these indicators, or 
somewhat less worse off on at least two, were considered for being given assisted area status 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2006:12-13, also Annex F). Now, there is little doubt that 
poorer areas will generally be worse off on the selected indicators than more developed ones, 
but it is abundantly clear that the indicators do not directly bear on the question of industrial 
structure145 or the potential for economic development. The focus is squarely on local 
unemployment and deprivation. This is quite visible on the map (see Appendix B), where there 
are few larger regions covered, and some wards are not even in the poorer regions of the UK. 
The assisted areas were changed again in 2014, and they now cover 27% of the UK 
population, up from 24% in the previous period (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
2013:6). As before, there are several categories – “a” areas, which are the most disadvantaged, 
“sparsely populated ‘c’” areas, and “other ‘c’” areas (see map in Appendix C). The criteria 
used for the designations were, however, not explained clearly in the consultation papers, and 
changes from the previous map are evident. Nevertheless, the focus is still clearly local. 
In terms of policies aimed at assisted areas, the Grant for Business Investment, a successor 
to the RSA, was discontinued in 2014 (Gov.uk, 2015a). It was the last major policy tool aimed 
                                                             
143 For the latest guidelines, see European Commission (2013). 
144 Except for Northern Ireland, which is always included in its entirety due to its political situation. 
145 The last indicator, manufacturing employment, is a partial exception, but it is too broad. Besides, a higher than 
average share in manufacturing employment is considered problematic. 
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specifically at assisted areas.146 A different scheme, running from 2010 to 2015,147 was the 
Regional Growth Fund (Gov.uk, 2015b). It offered discretionary grants, loans or loan 
guarantees for all types of costs and projects, in all regions of England, but with better 
conditions for the assisted areas, graded according to how disadvantaged they were. Over 5 
rounds of funding, the total amount disbursed was £3.4 billion, of which only some 10%-15% 
went to the more developed South East, Greater London and the East of England (Ward, 2016). 
Some tax breaks are also offered in the assisted areas – allowances on expenditures for 
converting or renovating unused business premises, and the enhanced capital allowances in 
Enterprise zones (section 6.4.3).148 Overall, as is evident, the policy toolbox for assisted areas 
has become rather small. 
 
6.4.3 Local enterprise partnerships 
 
The Coalition government set out its vision of what should now be called local, rather than 
regional, development in HM Government (2010) (and the current Conservative government 
has continued with the same approach). After abolishing the RDAs in 2010 it established Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs).149 
LEPs are organizations whose relationship to the UK governance structures is not entirely 
clear. They are business-led organizations of businesses and local authorities, usually formed 
as companies limited by guarantee or voluntary partnerships. They are not a part of the state 
administration, nor are they state funded,150 but they can apply for government, EU and other 
funds, while aiming to attract private investment. They are sub-regional, although the 39 LEPs 
in existence do cover the whole of England (see map in Appendix D), and some local 
authorities even belong to more than one LEP. LEPs have a minimal number of permanent 
staff (on average 8 full-time equivalent staff), and thus they rely heavily on local authorities 
for staff and expertise.  
                                                             
146 See its in guidelines Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (2008). 
147 When it was included in the Local Growth Fund. See section 6.4.3 of this thesis. 
148 See more detailed explanations of the aid available in the assisted areas in Department for Business Innovation 
& Skills (2014a). 
149 See National Audit Office (2016) for a detailed review of the LEPs. 
150 Except £500,000 for every LEP for administrative costs. 
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Between 2010-2015, LEPs received around £1.5 billion in central government funding. 
Between 2015-16 and 2020-21, they are planned to receive far more, specifically £12 billion 
from the government’s Local Growth Fund established for this purpose,151 through so-called 
Growth Deals signed between the government and the LEPs. £7.3 billion have already been 
allocated. 
It seems that the policies they are pursuing are not directly developmental. Around 60% of 
their expenditures thus far have been allocated to transportation projects, although they do also 
have a range of business support projects, through training, and support for innovation. Overall, 
it does look like they fall into the new paradigm of regional policies. Nevertheless, it is probably 
too early to try and assess their impact, given that the LEPs have only recently gotten significant 
funding. Still, for now, it does not seem like there is anything unexpected going on – ONS data 
for productivity in the different LEPs,152 for example, shows that those LEPs in the poorer areas 
of England are doing worse than those in the richer areas. 
An institution that has existed since the 1980s are Enterprise zones153 that currently offer a 
100% tax break for business rates, quicker planning permissions and a promise of fast 
broadband for firms that locate in them. For the Enterprise zones located in the assisted areas, 
there are additional tax breaks in the form of 100% capital allowances (the above mentioned 
enhanced capital allowances). The enterprise zones are currently under LEP responsibility. 
 
6.4.4 Regional policies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
 
Finally, a few words need to be said about Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. The reason 
I have left this until now is that there has not been anything fundamentally different between 
them and England throughout the post-war period in terms of regional policies. The main 
difference has always been in who was implementing them. 
In Scotland, in the first several decades after the end of the Second World War, it was the 
central government that was responsible for regional policies. In 1965 the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board was founded, and a decade later the Scottish Development Agency 
                                                             
151 This is not extra funding, but a rechanneling of various existing funding sources, including from the Regional 
Growth Fund. 
152 Subregional Productivity: Labour Productivity (GVA per hour worked and GVA per filled job) indices by Local 
Enterprise Partnership dataset. 
153 See information about them at http://www.enterprisezones.communities.gov.uk. 
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(called Highlands and Islands Enterprise and Scottish Enterprise since 1991). The two 
institutions basically implemented government policies. After devolution, authority over them 
was passed to the Scottish government. Together with institutions such as Skills Development 
Scotland, and the policies of the Scottish government, the two Scottish Enterprises form the 
development apparatus of Scotland. 
It would not be incorrect to view the two development agencies as the equivalent of the 
English RDAs, at least in terms of the latter’s business support programs, and we should not 
underestimate the institutional continuity and expertize that they have provided to Scottish 
development efforts. For example, Scottish Enterprise has a range of support policies for 
different industries (grants, loans, equity financing, and so on, but also “soft” support, such as 
networking events), and still provides the RSA grant for assisted areas. Several Enterprise 
zones also exist in Scotland, with very similar policies to the English ones, except that each 
zone is meant as a cluster for firms in the same industry, whereas in England the Enterprise 
zones are not planned with only one industry in mind. 
In Wales, the situation was the same as in Scotland, with the central government first directly 
implementing regional policies, before passing a part of the implementation onto the Welsh 
Development Agency that was founded in 1965. The authority over it was transferred to the 
Welsh government after devolution, but the Agency was abolished in 2006, with its functions 
passing to the Welsh government. The Welsh government has a range of development policies 
similar to the rest of the country, including Enterprise zones, and still has the RSA for its 
assisted areas (called Welsh Government Business Finance). 
In Northern Ireland, regional policies were first conducted by its government. Scott (2009) 
notes that Northern Ireland actually had more generous and consistent regional policies, though 
the type of policies were the same as in the rest of the UK. After home rule was abolished in 
the early 1970s, regional policies were passed back to Westminster and then devolved back to 
Northern Ireland in 1998. The situation is now essentially the same as in Wales, with a range 
of development policies as elsewhere and a version of the RSA (called Selective Financial 
Assistance) still in existence. One enterprise zone was also recently established. 
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6.4.5 Assessment of new paradigm regional policies 
 
Assessments have been made of the numerous new paradigm regional policies.154 Generally, 
they have been able to create jobs and help the formation of new enterprises. However, the 
assessments do not focus on whether the policies have led to structural transformation. As we 
saw in section 6.2, there are wide and in some respects growing regional disparities in the UK, 
the poorer regions are not particularly innovative, and their firms are less productive, so there 
has clearly been little in the way of structural transformation. This section explores in some 
more detail why that has been the case. There are essentially two question we can ask: a) has 
there been more SME growth in the poorer regions, and b) does this matter for development? 
The answer to the first question is mixed, while the answer to the second is mostly no. 
 
Regional SME growth 
 
Table 6.9 shows that the number of private businesses in the UK grew by 58% from 2000 
to 2016 (the period for which we have comparable data), outpacing both the 32% real GDP 
growth in the same period and the 10% population growth. Moreover, the entire growth was 
accounted for by SMEs (conventionally taken to be businesses with 0-249 employees). It is 
highly likely that the policies to support SMEs and entrepreneurship, including those pursued 
as part of regional development initiatives, have played a role in this growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
154 See Ward (2016a, 2016b), National Audit Office (2016), Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform (2009a, 2009b), Department for Business Innovation & Skills (2014b). 
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Table 6.9 Number of private businesses in the UK 
Size (no of employees) 2000 2016 % of total growth 
No employees (unregistered) 1,497,500 3,044,000 76.16% 
No employees (registered) 858,400 1,128,200 13.29% 
1 199,100 156,700 -2.09% 
2-4 512,600 683,100 8.40% 
5-9 202,600 241,600 1.92% 
10-19 109,400 133,400 1.18% 
20-49 53,500 70,100 0.82% 
50-99 16,100 22,000 0.29% 
100-199 9,000 9,400 0.02% 
200-249 1,700 1,900 0.01% 
250-499 3,500 3,700 0.01% 
500 or more 3,700 3,500 -0.01% 
    
All businesses 3,467,200 5,497,700 100% 
Source: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population Estimates 
1) Own calculation for % of total growth. 
 
However, a closer look at this growth from the regional perspective shows a somewhat 
different picture. Table 6.10 shows the increase in the number of SMEs per 10,000 resident 
adults across the regions of the UK for two periods, 1999-2009 and 2010-2015. The two periods 
are not comparable, because of a change in methodology.155 However, the periodization is 
extremely convenient in that comparisons between regions are possible within the two periods, 
and the break happens a few years after the start of the recession, and in the same year when 
the Coalition government abolished the RDAs and started pursuing austerity measures, all of 
which impacted poorer regions more (Kitson, Martin and Tyler, 2011; Experian, 2009). Thus, 
we can see the regional effects of austerity, and, within England, also of the elimination of the 
RDAs. 
 
                                                             
155 While total enterprise counts have been recalculated according to the new methodology back to 2000, for 
regional SME counts this goes back only to 2010. 
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Table 6.10 Increase in the number of SMEs per 10,000 resident adults 
 1999-2009 2010-2015 
North East 50% 18% 
North West 32% 16% 
Yorkshire & the Humber 26% 14% 
East Midlands 20% 15% 
West Midlands 22% 11% 
East of England 31% 11% 
London 15% 30% 
South East 15% 16% 
South West 18% 17% 
Wales 33% 11% 
Scotland 34% 8% 
Northern Ireland 33% -2%  
Source: Own calculations based on Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population 
Estimates and SME Statistics datasets 
 
The abolishment of RDAs, the recession and the austerity measures seem to have played a 
role in how well regions were doing in terms of the growth in SME numbers. In the 1999-2009 
period, the poorer regions generally had a higher increase than the richer ones. London and the 
South East actually had the lowest growth. In the 2010-2015 period the opposite is true, 
namely, it was the richer regions that generally saw better growth, and London in particular 
outstripped all the other regions. The Spearman correlation coefficient156 for the two arrays is 
-0.48, confirming that there was a switch in the regions that were doing well in terms of SME 
growth. Thus, the most active period of new paradigm policies seems to have helped poorer 
regions to an extent to establish more SMEs than they otherwise would have managed to. 
Of course, both regional and national SME policies are far from blind to the fact that it is 
important not just to get new firms, but also to ensure their survival. The policies prior to 2010 
(and probably the lack of a recession and austerity measures) seem to have had an effect in that 
                                                             
156 The Spearman correlation coefficient is done on ranks, not on the data itself. In this case, each region is assigned 
a rank, depending on its relative position among all the regions in terms of its SME growth rate. Then, an ordinary 
Pearson correlation coefficient is done on the rankings for the two periods. A positive value means that the the 
ranks correlate directly, while a negative one means that the correlation is inverse. 
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respect. As we can see from Charts 6.7 and 6.8, the survival rates for firms157 established in 
2004 are higher than for those established in 2010. But, new paradigm policies have not 
generally been successful in helping poorer regions more – regional differences in the survival 
rates are almost non-existent in both periods. London actually fares the worst, but not much 
worse than other regions, and there is very little difference between these other regions. 
 
Chart 6.7 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5-year survival rates of firms established in 2004 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Business Demography dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
157 How many firms established in a year are still in existence after a set period of time. 
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Chart 6.8 1, 2, 3,4 and 5-year survival rates of firms established in 2010 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Business Demography dataset 
 
We get the same picture if we look at the regions’ shares in high-growth enterprises.158 The 
analysis is limited only to firms with 10 or more employees, so as to avoid smaller firms 
distorting the results by adding on a couple of people, or even just one person. There is only a 
small number of high growth firms – in 2010, only 5% of the existing stock of firms with 10 
or more employees was high growth, and in 2014 that percentage was 6%. These specific years 
were picked because the RDAs were abolished in 2010, so the numbers for 2010 reflect the 
effects prior to their abolishment, and the numbers in 2014 to after. As we can see in Chart 6.9, 
the numbers for the two years are nearly completely identical, and they also correspond almost 
exactly to regions’ share in total UK GVA. This is in line with the findings in NESTA (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
158 Defined in this data as enterprises which have had an annualized growth rate in employment of at least 20% 
for the past 3 years, which translates to a bit more than a 70% increase. 
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Chart 6.9 Regions’ share in the number of high-growth enterprises and in UK GVA 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Office for National Statistics, Analysis of High Growth Enterprises from 2010 
to 2013 and Gross Value Added (Income Approach) datasets 
 
Overall, it seems that SME policies have generally been able to promote SME growth and 
survival, but have had limited success in helping poorer regions more than the richer ones. 
Thus, just like in the past, presently the richer regions have a larger stock of firms per 10,000 
resident adults in all size-bands, as can be seen from Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 Number of firms per 10,000 resident adults (mid-2015) 
 None 1-49 50-249 250+ All sizes 
North East 498 175 5 1 679 
North West 669 221 6 1 896 
Yorkshire & the Humber 670 218 6 1 895 
East Midlands 728 236 6 1 972 
West Midlands 659 226 6 1 892 
East of England 863 259 6 1 1,130 
London 1,145 309 8 2 1,464 
South East 967 267 7 2 1,243 
South West 877 260 6 1 1,144 
Wales 659 207 5 1 872 
Scotland 515 206 5 1 728 
Northern Ireland 616 223 6 1 845 
Source: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population Estimates dataset 
 
 
Are SMEs important? 
 
A bigger problem than the limited success in promoting higher SME growth in the poorer 
regions is that this promotion seem to be the wrong tool for improving regional growth. To 
determine this, we need to somehow compare the importance of big firms and SMEs to a 
region’s economy. 
Thus far we have been using the number of firms as a proxy for their importance. However, 
here we cannot do this for two reasons. First, these counts are based on where firms are 
registered. We should not underestimate the importance of employment and expenditures 
generated by the headquarters of big firms (mostly located in rich regions), but we know that 
that this is not their only presence in the UK, and that many of them have various operations 
across the country and abroad. Focusing only on where their headquarters are would be 
insufficient. Second, we cannot use counts for purely arithmetical reasons. Namely, the number 
of SMEs and the number of big firms are not opposed to each other. We need an indicator that 
shows the importance of big firms and SMEs relative to each other, that is, if one group is more 
important, the other one is less so. 
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Two indicators seem to solve both these problems – the share of private sector employment 
and the share of private sector turnover accounted for by big firms in a region. First, these 
indicators will pick up big firms’ operations anywhere in the country, not just in the region 
where their headquarters are located. Second, since all businesses are divided into big firms 
and SMEs, these indicators move in different directions for SMEs and big firms – the higher 
the shares for one category of firms, the lower they are for the other. The data is presented in 
Table 6.12, together with two measures of regional prosperity. The relevant Spearman 
coefficients of correlation are given in Table 6.13. 
 
Table 6.12 Importance of big firms to regional economies 
 
% of private 
sector 
employment 
accounted for 
by big firms 
% of private 
sector 
turnover 
accounted for 
by big firms 
GVA per 
head 
(UK=100) 
GDHI per 
head 
(UK=100) 
North East 28 42 75 85 
North West 28 46 86 88 
Yorkshire & the Humber 38 49 80 87 
East Midlands 40 53 83 90 
West Midlands 37 58 82 89 
East of England 42 54 95 105 
London 44 54 172 129 
South East 33 60 110 113 
South West 22 42 91 101 
Wales 21 41 71 88 
Scotland 32 52 93 97 
Northern Ireland 20 27 73 82  
Source: Own calculations based on: a) Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business 
Population Estimates dataset, b) Office for National Statistics, Gross Value Added (Income Approach) dataset, 
Gross Disposable Household Income dataset. 
1) GVA per head values are for 2015. 
2) GDHI per head values are for 2013. 
3) Employment and turnover shares are for the start of 2016. 
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Table 6.13 Spearman correlation coefficients 
 GVA per head GDHI per head 
% of employment 0.61 0.58 
% of turnover 0.68 0.67 
Source: Own calculations based on data in Table 6.12. Regions were assigned a rank for the four different 
variables, and a correlation coefficient was calculated for each pair of ranks. 
 
As we can see, there is a strong correlation between the economic importance of big firms 
in a region and relevant indicators of household incomes and economic development. Of 
course, the correlation is not perfect. The numbers would even be lower, at around 0.5, if the 
correlation were done on the actual shares, not on regions’ rankings. So, it is clear that reliance 
on big firms is not some sort of magic solution to regional prosperity. This is consistent with 
what we know about the regional distribution of high and low value-added activities of big 
firms in the UK. Still, it shows that big firms provide benefits – enormous ones in the richer 
regions, due to the direct and spill-over effects from their headquarters and R&D departments, 
and more modest ones in the poorer regions, through employment and salaries in branch plants, 
distribution centers, call centers, and the like. 
Those regions that rely more on big firms are also more successful in ensuring a share of 
high-growth firms. If we rank regions according to the share of turnover and employment 
accounted for by big firms, and according to their share in the total number of UK high-growth 
firms, we will see that these number correlate. For turnover shares the number is 0.68, while 
for employment shares it is 0.61. That is, on average, if a region is more reliant on big firms, it 
also has a higher share of high-growth firms. This is consistent with arguments set out in 
Adams, Robinson and Vigor (2003:74-75). The authors provide evidence that entrepreneurship 
does not quite work how it is usually imagined. The most successful entrepreneurs seem to be 
people in their 30s and 40s, with skills and work experience, not young inexperienced people. 
Getting relevant work experience and skills is, of course, easier when there are big firms with 
established training structures and regular uptakes of inexperienced workers. Furthermore, if 
some of the entrepreneurs wish to enter the supply chains of big firms, that is going to be easier 
in regions where there are more such firms, particularly if the entrepreneurs actually worked in 
those firms before and retained links to their former employers. 
Another, and perhaps starker way, to look at all of this would be to show the same 
coefficients of correlation, but with shares of employment and turnover accounted for by 
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SMEs. Since SMEs and big firms’ shares are arithmetically tied and add up to 100%, the 
correlation coefficients would be identical to the ones above, just with a negative sign. In other 
words, if a region wants to not do well economically, it should rely more on SMEs than on big 
firms. 
 
Is the UK oligopolized? 
 
Of course, it could be argued that there is something else behind all of this. Perhaps the UK 
does not have an oligopolized economy, and it is not the dominance of established giant firms 
that has prevented the emergence of successful new market entrants in the poorer regions. 
Perhaps it is not the decision of big firms to keep high value added activities in some parts of 
the country, and branch plants and the like in another, that is responsible for the correlation 
between the regional importance of big firms and regional measures of prosperity. However, 
the evidence convincingly shows that this is not the case. 
Table 6.14 is instructive in this sense. As we can see, truly large business, those with 500 or 
more employees, of which there are a mere 3,500 (0.07% of all UK businesses), accounted for 
35% of total private sector employment and 42% of total private sector turnover at the start of 
2016. If we include firms with 250-499 employees (another 0.07% of all UK businesses), the 
numbers go up to 40% and 53% for employment and turnover, respectively. Of course, there 
are considerable variations between sectors, but there is no sector where firms with 250 or more 
employees make up more than 0.5% of all firms, and less than 6% of employment and 8% of 
turnover.159  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
159 Even these figures, both for agriculture, forestry and fishing, are clear outliers. 
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Table 6.14 Businesses by employment size in the UK (start 2016) 
 No 
% of 
no. 
Employment 
% of 
empl. 
Turnover 
% of 
turn. 
With no employees 
(unregistered) 
3,044,025 55.4  3,306 12.6  104,554 2.7  
With no employees 
(registered) 
1,128,160 20.5  1,230 4.7  149,991 3.9  
1 156,690 2.9  350 1.3  27,575 0.7  
2-4 683,095 12.4  1,972 7.5  234,256 6.1  
5-9 241,640 4.4  1,656 6.3  201,590 5.2  
10-19 133,430 2.4  1,839 7.0  242,850 6.3  
20-49 70,120 1.3  2,132 8.1  317,938 8.2  
50-99 22,005 0.4  1,517 5.8  227,012 5.9  
100-199 9,375 0.2  1,304 5.0  248,795 6.4  
200-249 1,930 0.0  429 1.6  70,138 1.8  
250-499 3,695 0.1  1,282 4.9  407,157 10.5  
500 or more 3,505 0.1 9,188 35.1  1,629,015 42.2  
       
All businesses 5,497,670 100.0  26,204 100.0  3,860,870 100.0  
Source: Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Business Population Estimates dataset 
 
However, even the above table does not really describe the level of market concentration in 
the UK, because it does not show the concentration within the “500 or more” size band. We 
can go to a far higher band – those with 10,000 or more employees.160 There are only 250 such 
businesses in the UK (0.0045% of all businesses). If each of them had only 10,000 employees 
they would account for almost 10% of total UK private sector employment. But, they of course 
employ more people than that. In lieu of official statistical data, we can surmise something 
about the importance of such super-big businesses from the annual reports of some of the 
biggest UK companies. For example, Tesco’s annual report for 2016 (Tesco, 2016:168) notes 
that the group’s UK and Irish operations had 225,000 full-time equivalent employees (of which 
                                                             
160 The argument is based on data from the Office for National Statistics Analysis showing the count of VAT and/or 
PAYE based Enterprises in the United Kingdom by UK SIC2007 Section Letter and Employee Size Band dataset. 
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almost the entire number is certainly in the UK), meaning that the number of individuals 
employed must have been higher.161 The UK operations also had a total revenue of £41 billion 
(Tesco, 2016:163), equivalent to 1% of total UK private sector turnover. These numbers 
indicate that it is very probable that, if we were to start adding up the revenue and employment 
numbers for the very biggest UK private sector firms, probably only a few hundred firms would 
account for a substantial proportion of the totals for the entire UK private sector,  
The dominant position of big firms can be seen in numerous other ways. For example, R&D 
expenditures and employment, both very important elements of competitiveness, are 
phenomenally concentrated among the top firms in the UK. The top 5 private enterprise groups 
by R&D expenditures, so, less than one millionth of all UK private sector businesses, accounted 
for 20% of total UK business R&D expenditures and 25% of total private R&D employment 
in 2015. For the top 100, the numbers were 60% for expenditures and 43% for employment.162 
There is other data on the advantages of big firms over small ones. For example, Awano, 
Heffernan and Robinson (2017) show that firms with better management practices are more 
productive, and that bigger firms have better management than smaller ones. We also know 
that big firms are significantly more likely to be exporters (ons.gov.uk, 2015). 
However, instead of adding on data and research to show what we already know, perhaps 
we can draw the obvious dismal implication for the UK poorer regions. We would either need 
to get big firms to invest massively in the poorer regions, and not just in assembly and such 
simpler activities, or we would somehow have to overcome their market power to help actual 
indigenous development in the poorer regions. Without fundamental changes to the political 
economy of the UK, both possibilities seem at least as unlikely today as they were when 
Holland first made this argument 40 years ago. 
These points seem to have been missed in current debates about UK regional disparities. 
This is the case even with an author such as McCann, who wrote (McCann, 2016) what is easily 
an encyclopedic work on the UK regional problem. For example, he writes extensively about 
the regional location of advanced sectors, but does not really go into too much depth on market 
                                                             
 161 We can perhaps infer the number of individuals in the following way. Tesco reports the total number of full-
time equivalent employees for their entire group at 358,000, while the number of individuals employed is 482,000, 
i.e. 34% higher. If we assume that the ratio is the same for the UK and Ireland, then this would imply a workforce 
of some 300,000, or more than 1% of all employees in the private sector. Given the prevalence of part-time 
employment in low-skilled service sector jobs in the UK, it is quite possible that the number is higher. 
162 The data is based on the Office for National Statistics’ UK Business Enterprise Research and Development 
dataset. 
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structure, and certainly not on the power of big businesses. Most of his policy analysis is then 
also focused on regional governance, public investment, and “light-touch” industrial policy, 
not on the political economy framework of current capitalist markets. If the UK regions are to 
have any hope of significantly upgrading their productive structures, the debate needs to be 
broader than this. 
 
6.4.6 A note on cluster policies and regional banks 
 
Clusters 
 
Apart from SME promotion, some RDAs, LEPs, city authorities, and academics have argued 
for, or actually pursued, cluster policies. Martin and Sunley (2003) have criticized the concept 
of clusters as being vaguely defined, empirically problematic and of questionable policy 
relevance. But, let us define cluster policies here very broadly, as basically a focus on attracting 
big firms to establish higher value-added activities in a city or a region, and then attempting to 
create strong links to domestic companies, most often SMEs. This definition should encompass 
a broad set of attempts to strengthen domestic innovativeness and supply chains. The way that 
big firms are to be attracted is not necessarily through fiscal and financial incentives (though 
these may play a role), but rather through providing skills, infrastructure, and various forms of 
“soft” capital, such as institutions to foster close links between universities, local companies 
and the market leaders. We shall look at three examples to see how this approach generally 
recognizes the importance of market-leading firms, but not necessarily their power. That is, it 
focuses primarily on what regional policy-makers can do to foster clusters, but it does not say 
much about how the prospects of success in poorer regions are affected by having to compete 
against already developed regions. 
A good example is IPPR North (2012). The focus of the report is on setting out the economic 
strengths and weaknesses of the North of England,163 and on giving suggestions for how the 
region can prosper. Its analysis of the importance of innovation and the business environment 
is the most interesting (2012:57-97). A number of priority sectors for the North are presented, 
some general, such as “low-carbon”, others specific, such as “orthopedic manufacturing”. Their 
potential contributions to the Northern economy are generally measured by how quickly the 
sectors are growing globally, and how quickly some of the markets that the North is exporting 
                                                             
163 In the report, the North is defined as the North East, North West and Yorkshire & The Humber. 
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to are growing. While this makes sense as an analysis of growth opportunities, the report does 
recognize that the North could be much stronger in creating local supply chains and innovation, 
so that it could benefit more from this growth. In other words, it recognizes that the market-
leading firms that are located in the North need to link up to the local economy. But, how 
exactly that is to be done is problematic. 
The report juxtaposes traditional and modern industrial policy, saying that “The purpose of 
industrial policy … is to work with the market to overcome barriers to growth, rather than for 
government to dictate its operation. … industrial activism today is very much based on the 
premise that government can support the market without actually owning firms or necessarily 
making investment decisions” (IPPR North, 2012:57-58). In other words, firms are to be asked 
and incentivized to make investments that are beneficial to the North. The incentives should 
come from improving skills, creating institutions that link up universities and businesses, 
attuning local institutions’ policies to the needs of investing firms, and building other sorts of 
“soft” capital. This effectively amounts to improving the Norths’ location factors. 
These are not bad suggestions per se. However, as Holland (1979:239) pointed out a long 
time ago, attracting advanced private investment to poorer regions does not hinge on simply 
creating some investment opportunities, but on creating better investment opportunities than 
exist elsewhere, particularly in the richer regions. IPPR North (2012) recognizes that English 
regional institutions have not only competed, but even undermined each other, in attempts to 
attract investment, but it does not really recognize the full implications of the far greater 
problem, namely, that all these poorer regions have to compete against London, the South East, 
the East and rich regions in other countries. Exactly how good would “soft” capital and skills 
have to be in the North to make it more attractive than those regions? 
Adams, Robinson and Vigor (2003) is another interesting example. In chapter 6, the authors 
point out that regional policies should not be focused so much on SMEs, and that firms of all 
size are important. They also note (in chapter 5) that most new and cutting edge technology is 
created in a few countries, and at that by a few world-leading companies and research 
institutions, and then disseminated to other users. However, lacking an analysis of the actual 
market power of big firms, their suggestions fall short of what would be needed to 
fundamentally alter the UK regional situation. 
For example, it is argued that the government should increase its R&D investment in the 
poorer regions by reserving a part of its R&D funding solely for projects conducted in those 
regions, and by transferring some government R&D centers there. This would be valuable in 
raising employment and incomes, but would also create a basis for further development, say 
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by creating a regional skill base. In this sense, the suggestions are a bit more radical than in 
IPPR North (2012), recognizing the need for larger scale government action to change the 
location factors in the poorer regions. However, it is questionable what the final results would 
be. Unless the transfer of R&D to the poorer regions were very large indeed, market-leading 
firms would still probably find it more attractive on average to invest in the established clusters 
around, say, Cambridge, Oxford and London. And if the more realistic smaller transfers are 
enough to spur the development of some firms in the poorer regions, what is to prevent market 
leaders from destroying them if they feel threatened, or from buying them up and potentially 
hollowing them out? 
Finally, Bailey, Cowling and Tomlinson (2015) is not just an interesting, but also a 
perplexing example. The authors argue for an industrial strategy for lagging UK cities and also 
see that as the key to regional development. Unlike the above texts, though, they fully recognize 
not only the importance, but also the power of big firms. However, there is a strange 
contradiction in their arguments. 
The authors note the dominant position of big firms within their supply chains and the fact 
that they are often footloose and can switch locations if there is enough incentive to do so. A 
consequence of this is that such firms follow their own strategic interests, and are not 
particularly interested in the effects that that has on their smaller suppliers or on the localities 
into and from which they move. They also play off city and regional authorities against each 
other when trying to get as many incentives as possible. The bigger and more global a firm is, 
the more power it has. The authors also note the example of the much lauded Italian industrial 
districts, which they argue are no longer so characterized by diversification, technology sharing 
between firms, and equal relationships between authorities, big firms and small firms, as they 
used to be. This is due to the globalization and centralization of production. The districts have 
become more specialized, and the big firms have become the dominant players. 
However, the authors see the key to city development exactly in establishing in them 
structures similar to how the Italian industrial districts used to be. How is that to be achieved?  
First, there is the usual set of proposals for supporting private and public R&D, building 
“soft” capital, and supporting SMEs. There is even the suggestion of funding for SMEs and 
micro-enterprises “perhaps along the lines of the Grameen bank tailored to the needs of the 
European city” (Bailey, Cowling and Tomlinson, 2015:279), and having lots of SMEs which, 
while operating at small scale individually, together have large scale. Paradoxically, this 
suggestion is made in the same article in which the authors clearly recognize that the increasing 
complexity of modern production has led to increasing centralization of production, and to 
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large firms pressuring their suppliers to cut costs and increase quality. If SMEs (and micro-
enterprises) were somehow able to jointly fulfill such demands, or compete on equal footing 
against market-leading firms, it is highly likely that they would have done so already 
somewhere. But, they have not.164 Actually, the direct opposite has happened – a reduction in 
the number, and an increase in the size, of individual suppliers in the supply chains of market-
leading firms, and a vast centralization of production in a few global market leaders (Nolan, 
Zhang and Liu, 2007a, 2007b). 
Second, the authors suggest a “reform of underlying economic governance structures” and 
“more democratic frameworks to include wider ‘public interests’ within the hierarchical 
structures of large corporate firms” (Bailey, Cowling and Tomlinson, 2015:277). They argue 
that this can be achieved partially because the proposed diffuse and SME-heavy economic 
structure would by its nature be more democratic than structures heavily dominated by large 
corporates. However, as argued, such a proposed structure is progressively less and less likely 
to materialize in capitalism, as the concentration of capital progresses further. As for the more 
important question of how large corporate firms could themselves become more democratic, 
one does not get the impression that the authors fully appreciate the enormity of their 
suggestion. They note that this democratization of large corporates would require: “a degree of 
monitoring to ensure compliance” (Bailey, Cowling and Tomlinson, 2015:277). I would argue 
that it would require far more than that. 
Unless we are talking about fundamental changes to capitalism,165 then these “more 
democratic frameworks” would at the very least have to entail nationalizing some companies 
and introducing heavily interventionist laws. This would not be impossible. Nationalizations 
have been done in the past, state owned enterprises have been used to make investments in 
lagging areas, and some countries did have location controls and mandatory investment 
agreements between big capital and the state (though, to repeat, even all this was not enough 
to develop the poorer regions). We could also imagine introducing capital controls to prevent 
the transfer of profits around the globe, and then taxing firms’ incomes very heavily, so that 
they simply do not have the resources to make large investment decisions. This would 
                                                             
164 One possible example is Lloyd’s. It is not an insurer itself, but rather a group of around 150 insurance 
“syndicates” (themselves groups of individuals and corporations) which partially mutualize risk. However, none 
of the syndicates are small, and the top 10 of syndicates by value of insurance account for around 45% of the 
value of the underwritten insurance of Lloyd’s as a whole, while the top 20 account for 65% (Standard & Poor's, 
2016). 
165 Say, by introducing joint management of companies by workers and city authorities. 
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automatically give the state a large say in how investment is made. All of these, and probably 
many other policies could be conceived and potentially implemented. But, what we can be 
certain about is that, without some such form of heavy-handed intervention combined with 
public ownership, big firms will simply never pay much attention to anyone else’s interests but 
their own. From their perspective, why would they? At a more general, economy-wide level, 
this argument has been made in significant detail by Cowling (1983, 1994) and Cowling and 
Sugden (1987), who argued that only introducing some form of economic democracy could 
overcome the power of big businesses. What specific combination of local, national and worker 
control this would entail is up for discussion, but far-reaching reforms would certainly be 
needed. There is no reason why this should be any different in relation to city or regional 
development. Since such changes are likely not forthcoming any time soon, the position of 
poorer regions and cities is extremely bad, because their interests routinely end up being at 
odds with the self-interest of large corporates. 
We have to understand that democracy is not the normal state of affairs in systems where 
actors have vastly different amounts of power. One actor’s power is limited by another actor’s 
power, not by asking the more powerful actor to be nice.166 In the case of attempts to develop 
lagging cities and regions, the only real power available to weaker actors (local firms and 
authorities) is legal force. No amount of asking large corporates to be nice will help.167 Thus, 
democratizing city and regional development means either curbing the power of large 
corporates through legal means, or by setting more powerful actors against them, which can 
only mean giving central governments the leading role. 
                                                             
166 On the evolution of political democracy, see Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens (1992), Moore (1993). 
Today’s political democracy is based on past (often literally bloody) struggles of the weak (workers, peasants, 
women, etc.) to organize and collectively fight the powerful (mainly, but not solely, capitalists, the landed class, 
the state, and men). A crucial aspect was the fight to remove the possibility of the powerful to indiscriminately 
use force, for example, to break strikes. By now, political democracy is partially maintained by the fact that its 
power balance has been internalized as “values”, as well as by institutional inertia. But, it is maintained much 
more by the actual power balance between the different actors. Incidentally, this power balance is currently being 
skewed more and more in favor of capitalists, exactly because of some of the issues that Bailey, Cowling and 
Tomlinson (2015) identify, such as the ability of firms to relocate production, which puts those dependent on it in 
a weak position to make demands. 
167 Besides, even if some large corporates actually wanted to be nice and make the substantial effort and outlays 
needed to help poorer regions truly develop – say, by taking the time to nurture local suppliers, even if they already 
have suppliers elsewhere – it is likely that competition would sooner or later force them to cut costs and abandon 
such goals (at least temporarily). 
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Regional banks 
 
One final suggestion that needs to be addressed briefly is the fairly recent and increasingly 
heard suggestion that regional development banks should be set up (Martin et al., 2015, 
Werner, 2013). This has even been picked up in politics, and was recently suggested by the 
team of the current leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn (Elgot, 2016). 
The suggestion is based on several facts. First, the UK bank market is more concentrated 
than in some other countries, notably Germany. Second, only some 35% of total bank lending 
in the UK goes to SMEs according to Bank of England data,168 again lower than in many other 
countries. Finally, Germany’s system of regional public banks and the KfW are brought up 
repeatedly as a model that supports lending in all regions, across sectors, and particularly to 
SMEs. The argument goes that all these facts point to setting up public banks with a mandate 
to provide loans to SMEs, and to serve only their regions. There is nothing wrong with these 
suggestions, but, they need to be put into perspective. 
First, Germany’s state public development banks, in particular the KfW, actually engage 
massively in selective industrial policy. They do this by picking sectors that they wish to 
support, and navigating EU state aid rules to be able to provide cheaper financing to them than 
the private sector is willing to provide. (This, however, is of more use to already developed 
regions.) They also provide cheap export credit that ultimately benefits large German exporters 
(Naqvi, Henow and Chang, n.d.). Billing them as fitting into light-touch industrial policy, 
which does not pick sectors or winners, only makes sense if we consider the obfuscation of 
heavy interventionism, something which all these banks attempt to do, to be “light-touch”. 
Second, providing cheap money to SMEs is not sufficient to help them go up against 
established market players. Whatever loans they are given are going to be smaller than the 
funds that large firms have access to. Besides, large firms often self-finance, and thus have no 
interest to pay, so no matter how subsidized the loans to SMEs are, some interest and a principal 
to repay is still larger than no interest and no principal. Most importantly, though, the 
competitive advantage of big firms is not based solely on their access to finance. So, even 
Germany, with long-existing regionally based finance for SMEs, is as oligopolized as the UK. 
Looking at registered firms and employees covered by social insurance, in Germany only 
                                                             
168 Bank of England Bankstats (Monetary & Financial Statistics) Monetary financial institutions' loans to non-
financial businesses, by size of business dataset. SMEs are defined as those businesses with less than £25 million 
annual turnover on their main debit account. 
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0.38% of firms are big (defined as having 250 or more employees), but they account for nearly 
half of the turnover, and just under 45% of employment, according to data from the German 
Federal Statistical Office. Also, German poorer regions are still failing to catch up to the richer 
ones, despite the regionally based finance. So, the German model cannot really be used as an 
example of how regional banks funding SMEs help the development of poorer regions. 
 
 
6.5 EU regional policies in the UK 
 
A discussion of regional policies in the UK would be incomplete without looking at the EU. 
However, as we shall see, there is nothing qualitatively different that the EU adds to the picture. 
The UK joined the EU in 1973. It has since had access to various EU funds, which are either 
explicitly regional in nature, or simply have regional effects. The European Social Fund (ESF) 
funds worker training, mobility, and other labor market policies. Soon after joining the EU, the 
UK actually started receiving a full third of total ESF funds. The UK also gained access to the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), the Guidance part giving 
loans for diversifying into non-farming activities, and the Guarantee part for price support. 
Funding from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), obviously targeted at regions 
dependent on those industries, was important for the UK. ECSC support consisted of favorable 
loans for investment and restructuring of coal and steel industries, for the development of new 
industries in its target regions, and aid for redundant workers as wage supplements, for 
retraining or rehousing. UK organizations could also receive loans from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), offered on favorable terms to industrial and infrastructure projects in 
depressed areas. In 1975, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created, 
offering grants and interest rebates for investment projects in poorer areas, in industry, services, 
infrastructure, and for small firms (Scott, 2009:221, 324). 
The growing funding from these various sources proved important throughout the 1980s, 
because it partially compensated for the cuts made by the UK government. By 1990, UK 
government funding for regional policies had become practically equal to the funding from a 
number of EU funds, and due to further cuts in the UK, and increases in EU funding, by the 
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1995/96 fiscal year, EU funding was almost double that of the UK government (£922 million 
vs. £474 million) (Taylor and Wren, 1997:841).169 
It was not just the UK that got increased funding. As a matter of fact, in the 1989-1993 
period, the ERDF, ESF and the Guidance section of the EAGGF were brought together under 
the name Structural Funds, and their funding was no less than doubled in real terms. Then it 
was doubled again for the 1994-2000 period (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:222) and continued 
to grow since. But, we have to understand the reasons why these funds were increased so 
massively. Let us first analyze these, before briefly looking at the current situation. 
It was recognized that the creation of the Single European Market (SEM) in the 1989-1993 
period would adversely impact some regions. Armstrong and Taylor (2000:309) offer a good 
summary of why that could happen: 
 
Regions at the geographical centre of the EU are able to exploit their natural positional 
advantage of being closest to the main population centres. … this positional advantage 
may be being reinforced by advantages flowing from the economies of scale which have 
resulted from the increase in market size. … Other economic processes may also favour 
the central regions … [they] contain the majority of the major urban concentrations as 
well as the financial and administrative capital cities. A whole series of agglomeration 
economies and external economies favour the further concentration of firms and 
industries in these central regions. … the central regions may become the principal 
beneficiaries of a process of cumulative growth as capital and labour are attracted into 
these areas from the periphery. … [Conversely] the peripheral regions are characterized 
by small uncompetitive microeconomic firms, which are simply unable to compete with 
the large multinational firms located in central regions. The freer trading conditions of 
the EU pose a severe threat to [them]. 
 
Similarly, when the European Monetary Union (EMU) was being planned, it was recognized 
that the loss of monetary and fiscal sovereignty – for example, the loss of ability to set exchange 
rates and only limited ability to use fiscal deficits – could adversely impact some countries, 
and particularly their depressed regions. This was one of the reasons for the doubling of the 
                                                             
169 The EU funding refers to its then Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF and Agricultural Fund), while the UK funding 
refers to the Regional Development Grant, Regional Selective Assistance, Regional Enterprise Grant, 
expenditures on land reclamation and factory construction, and industrial assistance in Northern Ireland. 
179 
 
expenditures of the Structural Funds in the 1994-2000 period (Armstrong, Taylor, 2000:310-
311). Finally, there are European policies that actually favor the richer regions, such as the 
agricultural support, which mostly goes to large firms and certain types of crops, so “the already 
prosperous agricultural regions of northern Europe have been the principal beneficiaries” 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:317). 
I have already discussed in chapter 4 the disadvantages that poorer regions have, so there is 
no need to go through them here again. What needs to be explored, however, is whether the 
type of policies that the EU Structural funds support offer much hope for the structural 
transformation in poorer regions. In other words, the benefits of the policies have to be set 
against the disadvantages that poorer regions suffer. 
As Armstrong and Taylor (2000:222) note, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of 
much of the EU funds was on indigenous development. What is meant by that, though, is not 
the development of robust, diversified economies based on large indigenous firms, but rather 
the development of SMEs. The proportion of funds going towards that goal is substantial. Ever 
since the Structural Funds were created, they have operated on the basis of the “multi-annual 
financing framework” – a number of objectives are chosen for each 7 year period, and the 
Structural Funds pursue them by giving grants for projects that fit into one or more of the 
objectives. The development of SMEs has been the most important one. For example, in 1997-
1999, all British areas eligible for the then Objective 2 of the Structural Funds (“Converting 
regions seriously affected by industrial decline”, Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:326) had the 
highest proportion of funding going towards SME development, ranging from 27% in 
Industrial South Wales, to 44% in the East Midlands (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:255). 
The situation has not really changed since then. The European Structural Funds are now 
called the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), and include the ERDF, ESF, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD, the former Guidance section of 
the EAGGF), the European Maritime & Fisheries Fund (EMMF), the Youth Employment 
Initiative (YEI), and the Cohesion Fund (CF). For the 2014-2020 period, the UK has been 
allocated almost €16.5 billion from the ESIF,170 with roughly a third coming from the ERDF, 
EAFRD and ESF each, with the remaining few percentage points divided between the EMFF 
and YEI. Of the entire sum, the “competitiveness of SMEs” theme (this is the current name for 
ESIF objectives) is the single biggest funding category, at 15% of the total. “Sustainable & 
Quality Employment”, “Environment Protection & Resource Efficiency”, and “Educational & 
                                                             
170 More developed EU member states absorb almost 100% of their allocated funds. 
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Vocational Training” are close behind, at 14%, 13% and 13% respectively. There are many 
individual projects funded under these themes, but they are essentially the same as the new 
paradigm regional policies pursued by UK governments, i.e. most are not directly 
developmental.171 Those that are, are more likely to be of help to already developed regions.  
There is an additional problem in that for the purposes of ESIF funding, the EU divides all 
regions (at the NUTS 2 level) into more developed regions (more than 90% of average EU 
GDP per capita), transition regions (between 75% and 90%), and less developed regions (less 
than 75%). It provides various sources of funding for all of them, and it is just that some of the 
funding, in particular from the ESIF, is given on more favorable terms in the poorer ones. Since 
the UK is a highly developed country, most of its regions fall into the more developed category, 
and they account for around 95% of UK GVA (see map in Appendix X). This does not 
acknowledge that some of them may actually have severe structural problems, and the only 
reason why they have high GDP per capita is because of state support. For example, it does not 
really make sense to include Northumberland and Tyne and Wear into the same category as 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire. 
The picture for the 2007-2013 period is essentially the same. In that funding period, regions 
were divided into convergence regions (at less than 75% of the average EU GDP per capita), 
transition regions (at 75%-90%), and competitiveness regions (more than 90%) (see map in 
Appendix F). Like today, most regions were in the competitiveness category, even though 
many do not have similar economic structures at all. For the ERDF, for which European 
Commission (2016a:13, 16) reports the numbers,172 support for innovation accounted for 33% 
of total spending, and support for entrepreneurship and enterprises accounted for 21%. There 
was a heavy focus on SMEs. 
The entire situation is made more problematic by the fact that the EU has very restrictive 
state aid rules, which set particularly severe limits on the types of industrial policies that can 
be pursued (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000:317).173 For example, local content requirements, 
reserving public purchases for firms from a certain region, and a host of other policies that 
would be of use to poorer regions cannot be done. On the other hand, what are claimed to be 
                                                             
171 All data is from the European Structural and Investment Funds website, at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/. 
172 The operational programs for the English regions for ERDF funding can be seen at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/erdf-programmes-and-resources#contacts-for-the-erdf-programmes. All of them 
focus on SMEs and entrepreneurship. 
173 For extensive arguments on this problem and on why the EU in general favors the already developed countries 
and regions, see Holland (1980, 1993), Nicol (2010). 
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non-interventionist policies, that supposedly do not target specific sectors or firms, such as 
R&D support, tax rebates on R&D investment, aid for renewables (for example, guaranteeing 
purchases of electricity generated from renewable sources), and so on, are allowed. Such 
policies are, of course, anything but non-targeted, as they are primarily of use to developed 
countries and regions. Thus, they end up unintentionally reinforcing regional disparities. Being 
designated as an assisted area does provide some exemptions from state aid rules, but these still 
do not even remotely allow any policies that could be transformative. They generally revolve 
around allowing more investment grants, and giving some tax breaks. 
None of this, of course, means that EU regional policies are useless. Quite the contrary, the 
various projects provide positive effects. For example, it is estimated that in the UK in the 
2007-2013 period, they created some 150,000 jobs (European Commission, 2016a:20). 
Nevertheless, to expect structural transformation from them seems unjustified. 
Of course, following the result of the Brexit referendum, it remains to be seen what sort of 
agreement the UK will make with the EU, and how many of the constraints imposed by the 
common market and state aid rules will remain. Still, lest we become too optimistic, three 
things need to be noted. First, having increased possibilities for more radical regional policies 
does not mean that the possibilities will be seized. Second, there will likely be negative 
economic effects from leaving the EU. Third, the UK will be subject to other international 
treaties, particularly the WTO, that also set constraints on industrial policy. As things stand 
now, the prospects for the poorer regions do not seem particularly bright. 
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7. Scottish separatism 
 
On September 18th, 2014, the Scottish independence referendum was held, resulting in a 
45% vote for Yes (pro-independence) and 55% for No (anti-independence). No won by a 
significantly larger margin than polls had been predicting. As a matter of fact, a few days before 
the referendum, a poll (BBC News, 2014b) even predicted a win for Yes, leading to a “pledge”, 
signed by the leaders of the three main Westminster parties (Labour, Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats) that more powers will be devolved to Scotland and its funding preserved, 
if it chooses to stay in the UK (BBC News, 2014a). 
Only a few years earlier, the chance of the Yes vote winning seemed remote. When the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a (slim) majority government in Scotland in 2011, it did 
so on a platform that included organizing an independence referendum. The UK and the 
Scottish governments signed the Edinburgh Agreement174 in October 2012, obliging both sides 
to respect the referendum result and work together, whatever the outcome. There is no 
indication that the UK government actually expected the Yes side to come close to winning. 
Rather, the expectation was that there would be an easy win for No, and that the matter would 
be put to rest. However, the Scottish government took the long campaign for independence 
seriously, and when the short campaign started picking up pace in 2014, it proved to be quite 
successful, with polls showing a gradually increasing support for a Yes vote.175 
But, it was not just the SNP that was engaged in campaigning. Together with the Scottish 
Greens and the Scottish Socialist Party, it formed the Yes campaign in late 2012, which was 
soon after registered as the lead campaigner for the Yes side with the UK Electoral 
Commission. A further 20 organizations and individuals registered as official campaigners. On 
the No side, Better Together, composed of the three main Westminster parties, became the lead 
campaigner, with a further 20 campaigners registered (UK Electoral Commission, 2014, 
Appendix 2). In addition to the official campaigners, there were numerous other organizations 
engaged in the debates about Scottish independence, such as, for example, the Common Weal 
project, a network of researchers setting out their vision for a better Scotland (independent or 
otherwise). 
Ordinary people were very interested in the referendum as well. The voter turnout of 84.6% 
was the highest ever in any Scotland-wide poll since universal suffrage was introduced (UK 
                                                             
174 Available at http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence. 
175 For analyses of the impact of the Yes campaigns, see ScotCen (2014), Curtice (2016). 
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Electoral Commission, 2014:1). And, as was clear to anyone spending time in Scotland in 2014, 
this was not merely a response to the top-down debates taking place, but rather reflected a 
genuine interest and passion about the issue from both sides.176 
What did the debates revolve around? The Yes campaign’s arguments can be generally 
divided into two parts. 
The first revolved around the narrative that the Scottish nation is distinct from England in 
its identity and values. It was asserted that Scotland is more egalitarian and open (including to 
immigration) than England, that it respects the right to education more, is more peaceful, and 
has a host of other characteristics that we could generally call left-wing.177 For these reasons, 
it was argued, Scotland should pursue its own future, without being ruled by Westminster and 
parties that it did not elect (in the Scottish context, this first and foremost means the 
Conservatives). 
The second part revolved around specific policies based on these Scottish national values. 
Here it would be difficult to understate the importance of economic issues. In 2013 the SNP 
government published Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (Scottish 
Government, 2013f), colloquially known as the White Paper, setting out its arguments for 
independence, and these more or less formed the backbone of the Yes campaign’s arguments. 
The main part of the White Paper consists of ten chapters, analyzing various policy areas. All 
are structured in the same way. First, they analyze the current state of whatever area they cover 
(economics, health, education, social welfare, democracy, etc.) and the policy limitations that 
Scotland faces as part of the UK. Second, they set out the policy options that an independent 
Scotland would have. Third, they lay out the vision of the then Scottish Government of what 
policies it would pursue, if the SNP got elected post-independence. 
Even at first glance, the economy appears to be considered more important than other areas 
– two chapters (on Scottish public finances and the Scottish economy) are devoted to it, while 
other areas got one chapter each. But, the full importance of economic arguments becomes 
apparent when reading the other chapters, because most of them also focus primarily on the 
economic aspects of their topics. For example, Chapter 8 on the “Environment, Rural Scotland, 
Energy and Resources” talks primarily about funding for rural development, about agricultural 
and fisheries policies of the EU and why Scotland has missed out on their economic benefits, 
about the regulation of the energy market, the impact of rising energy bills on households, 
                                                             
176 For an analysis of the grassroots of the Yes campaign, see Black and Marsden (2016). 
177 These national myths are nothing new. See Maxwell (2013a) for a criticism of prevailing Scottish myths. 
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investment in renewables, numerous economic aspects of oil extraction, etc. Similarly, Chapter 
4 on “Health, Wellbeing and Social Protection” is focused on funding for pensions, social 
protection, housing (especially social housing), sports, NHS Scotland (where the report also 
criticizes the marketization of NHS England), etc. 
In general, the arguments are not so much focused on grievances against Westminster, but 
on how an independent Scotland would be able to build a more prosperous economy and a 
fairer society. This is contrasted with the current model, in which inequality and insecurity 
have grown, development is concentrated in London and the South East, the economy is prone 
to crises, and the government is pursuing austerity. So, the Yes campaign’s arguments can be 
broadly called left-wing or social-democratic. 
Better Together and other No campaigners did run a positive campaign to an extent, arguing 
that Scotland is better and safer with the UK. But, it was rightly pointed out by many that most 
of its campaign was negative, that is, arguing that Scotland would be worse off if it left, and 
that it would at the very least face large risks and uncertainty. This was scornfully called 
“Project Fear” by the Yes campaign.178 The Better Together campaign often relied on UK 
government analyses of the economic effects on Scotland of becoming independent.179 
However, all of these were debates between the campaigners. What were ordinary people 
concerned about? There is little doubt that the biggest debates ended up being about economics 
– who would fund pensions in case of a Yes vote, which currency Scotland would use, what 
economic impact independence would have, whether Scottish public finances would be 
sustainable in case of a drop in oil prices, could Scotland afford a bank bail-out in the future if 
it became necessary, and so on. Also, the polls that tended to be most discussed were when 
people were asked if they would vote for independence if on average they would be £500 per 
year worse or better off, or if their incomes stayed the same. Curtice (2014a) shows that 
economic issues, and people’s perceptions of how the economy and they personally would do 
after independence, did indeed play a decisive role in voting intentions. It is not that other 
topics, such as the argument that it is undemocratic for Scotland to be governed by parties that 
it did not elect, were not discussed. They were, and they were important, but still clearly 
secondary. 
                                                             
178 Incidentally, this is the same as with Brexit, except there the pro-EU campaign mostly ran a negative campaign, 
pointing out the risks and uncertainty if Britain leaves the EU. This was dubbed “Project Fear” by the Leave 
campaigners. 
179 All the documents can be obtained at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/scotland-analysis. 
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In this final chapter, I analyze three topics related to Scottish separatism. Section 7.1 asks 
to what extent is Scotland a “typical” separatist region in terms of its economy and its economic 
conflicts with Westminster, and whether these conflicts are related to the UK’s regional 
disparities. Based on a critical review of a number of Scottish government’s official documents, 
as well as some Scottish economic data, I argue that Scotland has a number of atypical 
characteristics, although it is not an isolated case. Section 7.2 analyzes why ordinary people 
supported separatism. Is it true that Scottish values are different to English ones? What role did 
identity, values and class play? To answer those questions, I partially rely on secondary 
literature, but first and foremost on data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) and 
the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (SSAS).180 I argue that all three factors played a role, but 
that it was the combination of austerity, recession, class and the economic issues brought up in 
the campaign that were decisive for the support for independence. Finally, in section 7.3 I 
analyze to what extent the Yes campaign was aware that the cause of relative Scottish economic 
underperformance is oligopolistic competition, and consequently whether its suggestions for 
post-independence economic development policies make sense or not. Based on the Scottish 
government’s documents, a number of texts published by other people engaged in the debates, 
and several interviews, I argue that there was, in fact, minimal awareness of these issues, and 
that the policy suggestions were generally off the mark. 
 
 
7.1 Scotland’s economy and economic conflicts with Westminster 
 
Following the layout from chapter 5, we can ask how developed Scotland is in absolute 
terms, what its relative position within the UK is, what its trade dependency on its own markets 
is, the rest of the UK (rUK) and other markets, and whether decentralization has helped or 
hindered separatism? We will also mention some cases of overoptimism on the part of the 
separatist movement. 
 
 
 
                                                             
180 These are considered to be the two most authoritative surveys of their kind for Britain and Scotland. The BSAS 
includes people from England, Scotland and Wales, but due to the far smaller population sizes of the latter two, it 
can be taken as quite representative of social attitudes in England. 
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Absolute level of development 
 
In terms of its absolute level of development, Scotland is clearly highly developed. Scottish 
Government (2013a) provides a comparison of GDP per capita with a number of OECD 
countries, where Scotland ranks fairly well (8th place). Admittedly, such arguments, like most 
others made by the Scottish government, assign a geographic share of North Sea output to 
Scotland, but even without that, an independent Scotland would still be among the most 
developed countries in the world. Because of this, no one has seriously posed the question if 
Scotland could be viable as an independent country. Rather, the question has been if it would 
do better or worse than it is doing now. In this sense, Scotland’s high level of development has 
made separatism more likely. 
 
Trade dependency 
 
According to Scottish input-output tables, Scotland ran a total trade deficit of around 7.7% 
of its GVA in 2013. Furthermore, it is highly trade dependent, with total exports amounting to 
58% of Scottish GVA, and total imports to 66%. Scotland also ran a deficit with the rUK of 
5.5% of Scottish GVA. Furthermore, Scotland is highly trade dependent on the UK, which 
accounts for 60% of Scotland’s imports and exports. 
Export numbers for Scotland can also be obtained from the more widely used Global 
Connections Survey. The export numbers for the rUK are very similar to the ones obtained 
from the input-output tables (62% of Scottish exports), but the survey also gives a breakdown 
of exports to the rest of the world into EU and non-EU parts. The EU accounts for 16% of 
Scottish exports, and the rest of the world for the remaining 22%. 
Overall, Scotland is both import and export dependent, and primarily on the rUK. This has 
been clearly recognized by the Scottish government, and it has always insisted that after 
independence, Scotland would continue having a single market with the rUK, and that it would 
also remain in the EU. Its position was also that it would keep the pound in an official currency 
union with the rUK, insisting that this would be in both countries’ interests (Scottish 
Government, 2013b). 
Scotland clearly has a shared characteristic with other separatist movements in being over-
optimistic about post-independence trade prospects, in that the UK government insisted that 
there would be no formal currency union, and that, even in a free trade area, borders do 
introduce transaction costs. The EU was also giving very problematic signals about Scotland’s 
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potential membership. Countries like Spain were particularly concerned about the effects on 
their own secessionist movements. The Scottish government was insisting, of course, that post-
independence everything would work out, and that an 18-month period would be sufficient to 
negotiate everything. 
The clearly unrealistic nature of the position of the Scottish government was certainly 
partially due to the fact that that was the only response that could be given by a campaigner 
insisting that there were no particular risks from independence. Still, one cannot escape the 
impression that they also to a large extent believed what they were saying. It was particularly 
interesting that, much akin to Soviet and Yugoslav separatist republics, and Catalonia, Flanders 
and Northern Italy, the EU was seen as a safe larger market that could be accessed, in case 
negotiations with the former country do not work out, even though EU membership was not 
certain either, and even though the EU was the least important export market. Here we are 
observing how free trade agreements (or a belief that they will materialize) can boost separatist 
aspirations. A world more closed to trade would have probably seemed riskier. 
 
Decentralization 
 
As regards decentralization, there is little doubt that the devolution in 1999 made the current 
drive for independence far easier. It would have been much harder for the pro-independence 
supporters to develop their ideas and organize without official Scottish institutions (see 
Keating),181 and they certainly could not have had the resources that the SNP control of the 
Scottish government has provided them. However, as we will see in section 7.2, it cannot be 
said that the devolved institutions were what drove the call for independence. Their importance 
must be seen in relation to other factors. 
 
Relative level of development 
 
Scotland is doing relatively well within the UK. It is very close to the UK average on 
relevant indicators, such as GVA per head, productivity, employment, or disposable incomes. 
However, this does mean it is doing worse than London and the South East. 
Scotland’s average level of development relative to the rUK does seem to have influenced 
its conflicts with Westminster. The Scottish government has never accused Westminster of 
                                                             
181 See Mackay (2009) on how presence in Holyrood has transformed the SNP. 
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directly underdeveloping or exploiting Scotland. Rather, it argued that Westminster policies 
have prevented Scotland from doing even better than it has, particularly in comparison to other 
small European countries. What, according to the Scottish government, did Westminster do 
that has held Scotland back? 
The grievances are that the UK government has: a) never established an oil fund, which is 
argued is a wasted opportunity to invest and to save for future generations, b) recently pursued 
austerity policies, including cutting capital spending, whereas the Scottish government thinks 
that promoting growth is both economically and socially a better option, c) allowed income 
inequality to grow substantially, d) allowed regional disparities to grow, and focused national 
economic policies on the needs of the South East and London (Scottish Government, 
2013e:26s). 
Scotland shares with a number of other separatist regions a desire to gain control over the 
revenues from an abundant natural resource. However, unlike in most such cases, and in most 
cases of separatism in general, the Scottish government has not accused the central government 
of fiscal exploitation, even though it argued that Scotland has been a net contributor to the UK 
budget over the last 30 years (Scottish Government, 2013c, 2013d). Instead, it mostly stuck to 
arguing that Scottish finances are sound and would be sustainable after independence, despite 
the reliance on oil revenues and the volatile price of oil. This is partially because the Scottish 
government was leading a positive campaign, but it was also likely a tactical move. Namely, it 
would not have made sense to base too many arguments on Scotland’s finances – the Scottish 
budget at the time of the referendum was in a smaller deficit than the UK one, but in deficit 
nonetheless,182 the UK government had just bailed out the Royal Bank of Scotland with cash 
and guarantees several times higher than the entire Scottish budget (National Audit Office, 
2011), and around 15%-20% of Scotland’s revenues were estimated to come from oil, with its 
associated volatility. Unsurprisingly, the UK government focused on these fiscal risks in its 
counter-arguments. 
Another way in which Scotland stands out from other separatist regions is its focus on 
austerity. In most cases, recessions and austerity contribute to separatism by making richer 
regions less willing to subsidize the poorer ones, but here we have direct anti-austerity 
                                                             
182 This is a notional deficit. The Scottish government receives a grant from the UK government and gathers some 
of its own taxes. It is generally not allowed to borrow, and, thus, its ability to run a deficit is very small. The 
notional deficit is the difference between what the Scottish government spends and its calculations of Scotland’s 
share of UK tax revenues. See http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/02/3623/0 for details. 
189 
 
arguments, and a desire for full sovereignty so that different policies could be pursued. This 
specific situation comes partially from the fact that, with the exception of London, there is no 
regional government in the richer UK regions to argue against regional redistribution. 
Furthermore, local taxation is very low in the UK,183 and even for the local taxes that exist, the 
central government generally collects them and redistributes them back to local authorities. 
Because of all this, there is very little scope for inter-regional conflicts about redistribution to 
arise, and for recession and austerity to contribute to separatism in that way. But, the Scottish 
situation is also specific because there are simply very few separatist movements that talk at 
all about austerity and the need for investment. Quebec (see Bookman, 1993:108-109) and, to 
an extent, Slovenia are the two other major examples. There is little doubt that the Scottish 
government’s anti-austerity platform contributed to the popularity of independence in 
Scotland, given that, prior to Jeremy Corbyn, the SNP was practically the only bigger actor on 
the UK political scene that was directly against austerity. 
The Scottish government has also argued that the cuts to welfare, labor market reforms, and 
a number of other Westminster (Scottish Government, 2013f) policies have contributed to 
increasing inequality in the UK, including in Scotland, which it argues is both socially and 
economically damaging. In this, Scotland is reminiscent of earlier separatist movements in 
poorer regions of developed countries, often ethnic in nature. But, this should actually be 
viewed as a part of the Scottish government’s generally left-wing arguments for independence. 
The arguments presented in favor of independence are that an independent Scotland would be 
a country which offers fair employment conditions, well paid jobs, free healthcare that is not 
being marketized, and proper social protection. 
Thus far, the economic conflicts between Scotland and the central government have been a 
bit different than in other cases of separatism. But, where Scotland is very similar to most other 
cases is in seeing Westminster policies, not the operation of markets, as responsible for 
Scotland’s relative economic underperformance. The only partial exception is the unstable 
financial sector, but even there, the blame was shifted to the UK government for allowing the 
banking sector to become unstable, so even here, markets escape the blame to an extent. 
Like with other grievances, nothing is couched in terms of Westminster policies being 
directed against Scotland, but as being bad per se, or at least not aligned with Scotland’s 
interests. Most importantly, the UK government (Scottish Government, 2014) is said to have 
                                                             
183 According to Eurostat and OECD data, around 10% of all government revenue in the UK is accounted for by 
local governments. 
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allowed manufacturing to decline more than it had to, which has hit Scotland particularly hard. 
At the same time, Scotland did not get enough of “its” oil revenues to rebuild its economic 
base. The UK government is also accused of allowing the banking sector to develop in a risky 
way. So, the direct benefits and the spill-overs of the growth of the financial sector are 
concentrated in London and the South East, while everyone suffers from the fallout when crises 
happen. The Scottish government has also raised an issue that Scottish farmers have not 
received as much support as they could have from the EU because of how the UK government 
has negotiated (Scottish Government, 2013f:278). A number of other, comparatively smaller 
issues, have also been brought up, such as the high Air Passenger Duty, designed with 
Heathrow in mind, but hampering the growth of airports in Scotland. In all these cases, it is not 
really analyzed whether it is perhaps the operation of markets that are actually harming 
Scotland. For example, could Scotland ever become an airport hub, with London not too far 
away, even if the Air Passenger Duty were lower? Would the oil revenues have allowed a 
hypothetical independent Scotland to save its industries? Such questions are neither asked nor 
answered. 
It is also interesting to see what arguments the Scottish government has avoided. For 
example, it did not mention monetary and exchange rate policy being determined by the needs 
of the financial sector, while perhaps damaging manufacturing, probably because it would have 
been problematic to simultaneously argue for a currency union and criticize the UK monetary 
authorities. But, also, the entire thrust of the argument for a currency union is based on a typical 
optimal currency area analysis – that Scotland and rUK have similar productivity, high trade 
and migration, and aligned economic cycles. As we will see in section 7.3, Scotland actually 
needs substantial development policies, and there is no recognition that, say, facilitating trade 
with rUK may actually be detrimental to Scottish attempts to develop domestic firms. 
Not all of the discussed conflicts stem from regional disparities in development. For 
example, the anti-austerity argument is general, not based on austerity having a worse impact 
on Scotland. The argument is actually that Scotland is doing somewhat better than the rUK, 
because the Scottish government has acted to mitigate the impact of the recession and austerity. 
But, many of the other conflicts do have regional development disparities at their root, because, 
although Scotland is at the average level of development for the UK (and thus better off than 
most other UK regions), it wishes to attain the levels of development of the most developed 
regions of the UK. Still, this desire, and it leading to conflicts, could have arisen at any time 
before as well. Why now? And, equally, most other regions in the UK would have even more 
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reason to be dissatisfied with Westminster. So, why has Scotland been the one to pursue 
independence? The next section tries to answer these questions. 
 
 
7.2 Identity, values and class as explanations of Scottish separatism 
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, many in the Yes campaign argued that Scotland 
has a distinct identity from England. This identity is conceived primarily in terms of values, 
where Scotland is argued to be what we can broadly call left-wing. But, is it true that Scottish 
people differ from the English, and do they at all hold the values ascribed to them? Furthermore, 
did these values influence people’s voting intentions in the referendum? These questions are 
explored in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. Section 7.2.3 explores the role of class, because we would 
expect that the sort of arguments that were made would have a different amount of appeal for 
different classes. Section 7.2.4 offers a tentative analysis of the intersections of identity, values 
and class in Scotland, while section 7.2.5 argues that the Yes campaign was actually a nation 
building project. 
Note that the entire section 7.2 does not ask whether economic issues – would the Scottish 
economy do better or worse, whether England or Scotland benefit more from the Union, 
whether personal finances would be improved or worsened, etc. – influenced voting intentions. 
Curtice (2014a) has shown that these were the most important immediate considerations. The 
section is rather trying to ascertain whether the more underlying attitudes of the Scottish people 
align with what the Yes campaign was claiming, and whether these attitudes made its messages 
more appealing. 
 
7.2.1 Identity 
 
Let us look first at the claims that Scotland has always had a national identity distinct from 
England.184 Like every other nation, the Scottish one has not “always” been anything, simply 
because nations have not always existed. 
In analyzing the emergence of Scottish national symbols, in particular the kilt and its 
supposed association with ancient clan history, Trevor-Roper (2013) uncovers some of the 
                                                             
184 Here we are talking about a feeling of group belonging, not necessarily connected to any shared values by 
members of the group. 
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actual history of the emergence of the Scottish nation, and particularly about its class divisions. 
Namely, after the establishment of closer links with England, and particularly after the Union 
in 1707, the Scottish lowlands were anglicized to a large extent, in terms of language and 
culture. The Highlands however, remained outside of these developments. By the 19th century, 
the view among lowland Scots was firmly established that the Highlands were a backward part 
of Scotland, and it would have been unlikely for a member of the lowland elite to express that 
he or she were of the same nation as the Highlanders. Lowland Scots did develop a sense of 
Scottishness, but as part of the British nation. The relationship to the Highlanders started 
changing only throughout the 19th century, as numerous Scottish national myths were 
constructed, creating a glorified Scottish past partially based around mythologized Highland 
culture. Thus, the idea of one Scottish nation did not exist until well into the 19th century. 
This account calls into question the most usual narrative, namely, that a separate Scottish 
identity has been maintained due to separate institutions – the church, education and Scottish 
law – that existed before the Union and have been kept after it. This is the position taken by 
Hechter (1999), and generally also Devine (1999) in their explanations of why Scotland did 
not get absorbed into the British nation, like most other ethnic groups in Britain were. However, 
Trevor-Roper’s (2013) and Davidson’s (2000) accounts offer a different story. Namely, the 
mentioned institutions did not preserve a separate Scottish identity, but helped create it, as part 
of a dual Scottish/British identity, and in such a way that it first encompassed only the 
Lowlands. Furthermore, if we are talking about a feeling of nationalism, what existed in 
Scotland was British, not Scottish, nationalism, and, contrary to the public imagination, it also 
included full participation in empire building. It was generally not until the 1930s that 
arguments were made about a Scottish nation separate from the British one. Maxwell even 
notes that many Scottish nationalists were complaining how effectively Scotland was 
integrated into the British nation and lamenting that Scotland had never been exploited by 
England, because: “If only history had treated Scotland with a less subtle cruelty, what a lion 
of a nation we might now be!” (2013c:81). 
Today, most Scottish people still express a dual identity. This can be measured on the 
Moreno scale, which asks people about how much they feel they belong to two identities. Chart 
7.1 presents the results for this question in the SSAS from 1999 onwards. As we can see, the 
sense of Scottish identity is certainly present, but close to 60% of people express some 
combination of British and Scottish identity. What is also interesting is that the feeling of 
Scottishness has actually declined from 2000 onwards. Thus, not only has the Scottish nation 
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never existed without its relationship to the British nation, but, if anything, people in Scotland 
have recently become more dual in their identities. 
 
Chart 7.1 National identity in Scotland on the Moreno scale 
 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey  
 
Did identity play a role in people’s voting intentions? Not all who felt Scottish or more 
Scottish than British supported independence. Actually, of those who felt only Scottish in 2014, 
only 50% intended to vote yes, and 31% of those who felt more Scottish than British intended 
to do the same. 
With regards to the mentioned Scottish institutions, we do not have data that splits people 
according to where they studied, but we do have information about religion. Those who 
identified with the Church of Scotland were more likely to vote No (59%) than any other 
religious group. The only other group that came close is “other Christian” (53%), with all others 
being around 35%. So, it seems that belonging to old Scottish institutions actually makes 
people favor the Union more, which is in line with these institutions’ historical role in helping 
create a dual Scottish-British identity. 
Overall, it seems that identity does play some, albeit somewhat ambivalent, role in Scottish 
separatism, but it would clearly be incorrect to say that the separatism revolves around it, and 
it would certainly be wrong to say that Scottish and British identities are mutually exclusive. 
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7.2.2 Egalitarian values 
 
What about values? During the referendum debate, as noted, it has been claimed many times 
that Scotland is more egalitarian and open than England and that it therefore should secede and 
pursue its own future, unhampered by Westminster policies, and particularly by the 
Conservatives. Overall, many of these claims have some truth in them, but not nearly as much 
as one would think based on what many in the Yes campaign were saying. 
We can compare egalitarianism in Scotland and England based on several questions in the 
SSAS and BSAS.185 For example, the proportion of people in Scotland in 2013 saying that the 
gap between the rich and the poor is too large was 83%. The number for the UK was 80%. In 
2012, 43% of the people in Scotland thought that the government should redistribute income 
from the better-off to the less well off, while that number was 40% for the UK. In Scotland in 
2013 76% agreed that “large numbers falsely claim benefits”, while in the UK (in 2012) this 
number was 81%.186 A particularly interesting example are attitudes towards university tuition 
fees. Much has been made of the supposedly deeply engrained value in Scotland that education 
should be free.187 This was particularly brought up in relation to higher education actually being 
kept free in Scotland, while fees were introduced by Labour in 1998, and have steadily 
increased since in England. But, in 2013, only 26% of people in Scotland thought that no one 
should pay tuition fees, while that number was 21% in England. 
The comparisons could go on, but on practically every comparable question that measures 
egalitarianism in some way, there seems to be some difference between Scotland and England, 
but not nearly enough to argue that Scottish values are fundamentally different than British 
ones. Even the trends are similar, with, for example, a notable hardening of attitudes towards 
unemployment benefits in both Scotland and the UK as a whole over the last decade or more. 
Furthermore, this similarity between England and Scotland is not new. Contrary to popular 
myths, Maxwell (2013c), a left-wing Scottish nationalist himself, has argued that Scotland has 
always been as inegalitarian as England, if not more. Finally, it is not evident that Scottish 
values as a whole can be called egalitarian in some absolute sense, i.e. there are plenty of 
inegalitarian people. 
                                                             
185 Both surveys produce a composite left-right index of values. However, it reflects not just egalitarian values, 
but also things like attitudes towards the death penalty, and thus it would not be useful for this analysis.  
186 In fact, in 2012-2013, only 0.7% of benefit spending was claimed fraudulently (Cowburn, 2016). 
187 Scottish Government (2013e) even manages to call its section on education “Education in our genes”! 
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Scotland’s openness can be measured by attitudes towards immigration. In Scotland in 2014, 
62% of people thought that immigration to Britain should be reduced. In Britain as a whole, 
this number was 77% (in 2013). Unfortunately, there are no further directly comparable 
questions between the SSAS and BSAS, but, based on this one, it would appear that there is 
some truth to the claim that Scotland wishes to be more open. However, saying that Scotland 
is open and favors immigration is wrong. As for cultural openness and immigration, in 2013 
49% of people in Scotland agreed that if more Muslims come to live in Scotland, it would begin 
to lose its identity, while 37% disagreed. The numbers for East Europeans were 47% agreeing 
and 37% disagreeing, and for blacks and Asians 43% agreed and 38% disagreed. While we 
cannot compare this directly to England, the results are not indicative of a very open society, 
even though the positive attitudes have been increasing over the last decade. 
A different matter is how much these values mattered to Yes voters. There are too many 
questions to list here, but we can give one example. Chart 7.2 shows people who gave different 
answers (“refused” answer are excluded) to the question “Do you agree or disagree that 
Government should redistribute income from better-off to less well off?”. Within each group, 
we can look at what percentage of people intended to vote Yes in the referendum. As we can 
see, the more egalitarian people were, the more likely they were to vote Yes. The same pattern 
is repeated for practically all other similar questions, although, like in this example, there are 
always more people who intended to vote No in all groups. 
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Chart 7.2 Referendum voting intentions of people split into groups based on their answer to 
the question “Do you agree or disagree that Government should redistribute income from 
better-off to less well off?” 
 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey  
 
Another argument at the time of the referendum was that Scotland does not want to be taken 
out of the EU against its will, as it was expected that the Leave vote could win in the EU 
referendum (as has, indeed, happened). The EU referendum results certainly confirm that 
Scotland is more pro-EU than England, with 62% of Scottish voters voting to stay in the EU, 
as opposed to around 45% in all English regions. However, the one exception to this is London, 
where 60% of people voted in favor of staying (electoralcommission.org.uk, 2016). Thus, 
Scottish values towards the EU seem to be shared with at least some English people. 
How much did the EU matter to Yes voters in the run-up to the 2014 Scottish referendum? 
In Chart 7.3, people are divided into groups according to what answer they gave to the question 
“If Scotland became independent should it be a member of the European Union?” (“don’t 
know’ and “refused” answers are excluded), and the bars represent the percentage of people 
within each group with different voting intentions. What emerges is that those who thought 
that an independent Scotland should not be a member of the EU were more likely to vote Yes 
than those who thought that Scotland should be a member. This is the direct opposite of what 
the Yes campaign was arguing. 
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Chart 7.3 Referendum voting intention of people with different opinions on whether an 
independent Scotland should join the EU 
 
 
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey  
 
All in all, there is some truth to the claim that Scotland has more egalitarian and open values 
than Britain as a whole, and these values have been important to an extent for the Yes voters. 
However, the values are not nearly as different from English ones as is sometimes claimed, nor 
where they so decisive for voting Yes or No. And, in the case of being pro-EU, the situation 
was the opposite of what many in the Yes campaign were claiming. 
 
7.2.3 Class 
 
To finalize the picture of the support for independence, we need to look at its class aspect. 
A person’s “objective” class depends on her socio-economic situation, while a person’s 
“subjective” class obviously depends on the individual’s opinion.188 Table 7.1 classifies the 
Scottish population into different classes according to a number of definitions, and looks at 
how each class intended to vote in the 2014 referendum, looking only at Yes and No votes.189 
 
 
                                                             
188 These two definitions do intersect, of course, but not quite as much as one would expect. 
189 Almost all the remaining voters in all cases were in the “not decided yet” group. 
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Table 7.1 Class and % of people intending to vote Yes or No 
   
Education Yes (%) No (%) 
Degree/Postgrad 15 46 
Higher education, below degree 24 45 
Higher/A levels or equivalent 23 45 
Standard grades 1-3/GCSEs or equivalent 22 37 
Standard grades 4-7/CSE or equivalent 24 44 
Foreign or other 29 38 
No qualification 19 38 
   
Income quartile Yes (%) No (%) 
Fourth quartile 19 46 
Third quartile 17 48 
Second quartile 22 37 
First quartile 27 36 
   
Job hierarchy Yes (%) No (%) 
Employers, managerial & professional occupations 18 46 
Intermediate occupations 21 41 
Small employers and own account workers 28 44 
Lower supervisory and technical occupations 22 36 
Semi-routine and routine occupations 20 41 
No classification 23 44 
   
Accommodation tenure Yes (%) No (%) 
Owner occupier 17 47 
Local authority renter 35 33 
Housing association renter 25 28 
Private renter 18 38 
Rentfree/squatting, etc. 31 46 
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Main economic activity Yes (%) No (%) 
Education/training full-time 19 48 
In work/waiting to take up work 19 40 
Unemployed 37 39 
Retired 14 52 
Other 32 30 
   
Self-identified class Yes (%) No (%) 
Middle class 15 55 
Working class 24 38 
Other 25 42 
None 20 42 
   
Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 
 
As is clear, however we choose to define a person’s class, support for independence was 
higher among the lower classes, although according to some definitions, the very lowest classes 
were not the most inclined to vote Yes. Among local authority renters there were even more 
people intending to vote Yes than No, and the numbers were almost even for the unemployed. 
This implies that, while the Yes campaign generally avoided class-based rhetoric, their left-
wing policy suggestions seem to have struck a chord with many people who have suffered the 
most from deindustrialization and the free-market turn in the UK over the last 35 years. 
Actual voting patterns confirm this. For example, the percentage of unemployment in local 
authority areas in Scotland actually correlates quite well with the percentage of people who 
voted Yes in the referendum, as can be seen from Chart 7.4 below. As Curtice (2014b) also 
noted, there is very substantial overlap between deprivation in general and the share of the Yes 
vote across Scotland.  
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Chart 7.4 Unemployment rates and % of people voting Yes in the referendum190 
 
Source: a) Office for National Statistics, M01 Regional labour market: Modelled unemployment for local and 
unitary authorities dataset, b) Electoral Management Board, Scotland 
 
The above data shows that class did influence ordinary people’s voting intentions, but no 
class analysis would be complete without a closer look at capitalists. We can try to ascertain 
how businesses saw independence, and it would be particularly interesting to see the 
differences between big and small firms. 
MacKay (2014) conducted interviews with 72 business leaders in medium and large 
enterprises about how they saw Scottish independence. Out of those, 43 saw no or negligible 
opportunities stemming from independence. Of the remainder who saw some opportunities, 
only 8 could identify an opportunity specific for their business. In contrast, risks tended to be 
more specific, although uncertainty was usually picked as the biggest risk. Of the total 72 
interviewees, only 7 thought that the opportunities outweigh the risks, and they mostly pointed 
to general things, such as export support, rather than a specific business opportunity. Overall, 
the impression is that business leaders thought that independence was not a very good idea. 
Still, there was a difference between businesses that mostly traded within Scotland, with the 
                                                             
190 The idea for this chart came from the slides available at 
http://www.scottishreferendumstudy.com/publications/. Unfortunately, for now, the slides seems to be the only 
output of the Scottish Referendum Study. 
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rUK, or internationally. Those focused on Scotland and international markets were less 
concerned than those trading mostly with rUK, although they still mostly saw problems with 
independence, rather than opportunities. Also, business leaders from smaller medium-sized 
companies were “the most sanguine about the opportunities” from independence (Mackay, 
2014:12). 
A survey done by Bell (2014) for the Scottish Chambers of Commerce can be taken as being 
representative of SMEs, given that its sample reflects the number of businesses, and it shows 
a very similar picture to MacKay’s interviews. Around half of firms did not see any 
opportunities with independence, and only around a quarter of firms saw no risks. Firms were 
also divided into groups according to where they trade the most – within Scotland, rUK, EU, 
or the rest of the world – and asked to identify the main risk from independence (including 
choosing no risk as an option). In all groups, around 30% to 40% of firms chose uncertainty as 
the main risk. But, of firms trading mainly within Scotland, the EU and the rest of the world, 
20%-30% saw no risks, while the number for those trading mainly with rUK was only 9%. 
Similarly, those reliant on rUK markets were more concerned about access to and business 
links with rUK, where 21% of the firms picked that as their main risk, as opposed to some 10% 
in the other groups. 
From the above studies, it would appear like there was no difference between people running 
big and small businesses. However, this is probably not true. 
First, we know that more small businesses than big businesses are locally oriented 
(ons.gov.uk, 2015), so to the extent that business issues determined people’s voting intentions, 
we would expect more small businesses to have supported independence. 
Second, we should not forget that individuals do not make decisions only based on their 
business interests. A survey conducted by the Federation of Small Businesses (Federation of 
Small Businesses, 2014) shows more or less the same results as the above two analyses when 
it comes to business concerns, but it also asked respondents whether non-business issues will 
impact their vote. 57% of respondents said that both business and non-business issues were 
important, 25% said that non-business issues will be of greater influence, while only the 
remaining 18% said that only business issues will be important. While we cannot compare this 
to any information about big businesses – MacKay’s did not ask his interviewees about non-
business issues – it does not seem improbable that well-paid business leaders in big firms will 
not be as personally concerned with non-business issues, such as public services, as a small 
business owner. If both groups are equally concerned about business risks posed by 
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independence, but one of them is more open to considering other issues as well, then that other 
group is likely to be more in favor of independence on average. 
This actually squares with the SSAS data in Table 7.1, where we can see that “small 
employers and own account workers” were the most likely among the social classes defined by 
job hierarchy to vote Yes (although most still intended to vote No), while “employers, 
managerial & professional occupations”, which are more associated with bigger firms, were 
the least likely. But, there is also more indirect evidence of a split between big and small 
businesses. 
Some time before the referendum, an organization called Business for Scotland was formed, 
to gather small businesses that were supportive of independence. It soon registered itself as one 
of the official campaigners for Yes. It grew to a self-reported membership of several thousand 
businesses, and still exists. Conversely, there was no equivalent organization of big businesses 
in favor of independence. Actually, some large businesses were even campaigning for the No 
side. For example, Oxford Economics (Oxford Economics, 2014) did a report for the Weir 
Group and the report was clearly an anti-independence document. Keith Cochrane, the CEO of 
Weir, was also openly and publically against independence. 
Additionally, one of the main business organizations in the UK, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI),191 was ostensibly politically neutral, and maintained formal neutrality in the 
run-up to the referendum as well. However, CBI was actually warned by the UK Electoral 
Commission in 2013 that its anti-independence statements were bringing it close to being 
included under the referendum campaign rules, most importantly the rules on campaign 
spending. Even more telling is that CBI actually registered with the UK Electoral Commission 
as an official No campaigner in April 2014. A scandal broke out, due to CBI’s supposed 
neutrality, but they managed to deregister (which is possible only under limited circumstances), 
claiming that an unauthorized CBI staff member in London made a mistake. Iain McMillan, 
the director of CBI Scotland, CBI’s Scottish branch, resigned, supposedly unrelated to the 
incident (Carrell, 2014a).192 
Finally, the Better Together campaign almost at the very start received significant donations 
from several important business leaders in Scotland (Gordon, 2013), while several weeks 
                                                             
191 The Confederation of British Industry does not represent only big firms, but they are certainly heavily 
represented. 
192 I attended a lecture by Iain McMillan at the University of Dundee on March 19th, 2014, as part of its 5 million 
questions initiative. There was absolutely no doubt that McMillan was personally opposed to independence. 
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before the referendum, 133 business leaders, whose companies employed around 50,000 
people, signed a public letter to argue against independence (Carrell, 2014b). It is not that no 
big business leaders supported independence – for example, Michael O’Leary, the CEO of 
Ryanair, and Willie Walsh, head of International Airlines Group, the owner of British Airways, 
were supportive because the Scottish Government said that it would reduce and eventually 
scrap the Air Passenger Duty (Bennett, 2014). But, these were clearly the exceptions. 
What this entire section suggests is that class was right at the center of the independence 
debates. Keating (2014) did recognize the importance of class in Scottish separatism, but many 
other commentators seem to have missed it. McCrone (2013) and Brown (2014), for example, 
talk about the likely effects of independence or staying in the Union on poverty and inequality. 
However, the root causes of these things cannot really be understood if the powerlessness of 
the poor and unemployed is not recognized, i.e. if class is not explicitly brought in. McCrone 
does not discuss class, while Brown, expectedly,193 approaches it in the circumscribed New 
Labour fashion. Curtice, basing his conclusions on a regression model, notes that social class, 
sex and age, were not significant independently of considerations mostly related to the 
economic questions of independence, concluding that “gender, age and class differences … 
simply reflect differences between these groups in the incidence of identity and/or perceptions 
of the consequences of independence” (2014a:59). Perhaps this is so statistically, but from the 
perspective of social structures, it is turning things on their head – it is not class that reflects 
perceptions of economic issues, but the perceptions that reflect class. The importance of class 
cannot be dismissed just because a regression model says it can be. 
What happened during the referendum debates was that the SNP and the Yes Campaign 
could represent secession as a way for some classes to improve their situation (even though 
their rhetoric was not couched in class terms),194 and the reason they could do that was because 
the UK’s industrial decline, free-market turn, inequality and regional disparities hit right along 
class lines throughout the country, including in Scotland. Simultaneously, the resistance of 
some others to secession, in particular business leaders, cannot be understood except in relation 
to their class interests. In a nutshell, Scotland provides as clear evidence as possible that 
separatism is inextricably tied to class. 
                                                             
193 Gordon Brown, the former Labour Prime Minister. 
194 It is, of course, a different matter how realistic the SNP’s platform was. This will be discussed below in section 
7.3. 
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The analysis in this section also allows us to assess the two most well-known predictions 
about Scottish separatism, namely, those by Hechter (1999) and Nairn (1981). Hechter, in the 
first version of his book, argued that Scottish separatism would likely arise among the lower 
classes, due to their internal colonial position. But, in the preface to the second edition, he said 
that he may have been wrong, because Scotland was not as much of an internal colony as Wales 
and Northern Ireland, and that the separate identity maintained through the presence of Scottish 
institutions (the church, legal profession and education) meant that separatism would more 
likely arise among the middle classes. Nairn argued that a Scottish capitalist elite, desiring 
more success and bolstered by the prospects of retaining oil revenues, would lead the Scottish 
working class towards secession, much like anti-colonial movements were composed of elites 
leading ordinary people. 
Neither author seems to have been completely right or wrong. An analysis done by Keating 
(2006) shows that in 2003 the majority of SNP, Scottish Greens and Scottish Socialist Party 
MSPs – the three major separatist parties in Scotland – had higher education and none had 
major work experience in blue or white-collar195 occupations. This indicates that, like Hechter 
predicted, the locus of the separatist leadership is in the middle class. However, as we saw from 
the SSAS data, these middle-class separatists are not representative of their class, and the Yes 
campaign’s appeal was higher among the lower classes. This then resonates with Nairn’s 
predictions, but where Nairn was wrong is that there is no leadership of the separatist movement 
by the Scottish capitalist elites. Quite the contrary, big business is strongly against 
independence. This is much akin to the capitalist classes of semi-peripheral countries, such as 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, who are well integrated into global supply chains, and 
do not seem to have a large desire to develop their countries. To the extent that the Scottish 
separatist movement has a basis among capitalists, it seems to be a basis in a (minority) part of 
the Scottish petty bourgeoisie, which perhaps sees greater potential for its own development 
from the sort of policies that the SNP was proposing for an independent Scotland. 
 
7.2.4 Intersection of class and economic issues in the vote 
 
Economic issues were dominant in the referendum debates. But, were they what people 
finally based their votes on? Furthermore, how did they interact with class? 
                                                             
195 Here, white-collar excludes professionals. 
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Post-referendum polls, such as by Lord Ashcroft,196 provide some information on this. 
Asked to pick two or three issues that were the most important in determining their vote, the 
most common choices for Yes voters were “disaffection with Westminster policies”, picked by 
74%, followed by the “NHS” at 54%, and “tax & public spending” at 33%. For the No voters, 
the “pound” was picked by 57%, and the “NHS”, “tax & public spending”, “pensions”, and 
“defence & security” were all picked by around 30%-40%. Unsurprisingly, only 4% of the No 
voters picked “disaffection with Westminster policies” as an important issue. Few people in 
both camps picked benefits, jobs, the EU or oil as important issues. We can make some 
inferences from this from these results. 
First, economic issues (dissatisfaction with Westminster policies revolved primarily about 
economic issues in public debates) and a concern for public services played the decisive role 
for Yes voters, while economic insecurity about the period after a potential Yes vote played a 
big role for No voters. Second, given that most people in Scotland are employed and do not 
receive benefits, the small number of people who picked jobs and benefits as important issues 
indicates that people were probably thinking mostly about the economic impact of 
independence on themselves and their close ones, not about the impact on other people. 
As for the influence of class, the Lord Ashcroft poll divides people into four socio-economic 
groups – from highest to lowest, they are AB, C1, C2 and DE. The lower groups were more 
concerned about public services (NHS) and pensions, and less about bigger questions, such as 
disaffection with Westminster. Interestingly, of the DE group, 44% of people voted Yes, which 
is the second lowest share after the AB group at 40%. (In the two middle groups, around 50% 
of the people voted Yes.) This seems to indicate that the perceived risk of independence for 
public services played an important role for the worst off in Scotland, and is consistent with 
some of the SSAS data in Table 7.1, which shows that in some cases, the very lowest classes 
were less enthusiastic about independence than those who were somewhat better off. 
These conclusions about the importance of economic issues, and the biggest role of class in 
how they are seen, accord with the historical patterns in support for Scottish secession. 
The SNP, as the major flag-bearer of Scottish separatism, has existed since the 1930s. 
Electorally, it was completely negligible until the mid-1960, when it climbed to about 5% of 
the Scottish vote in general elections, and in 1970 it won 10%. But, in the February 1974 
general election it jumped to 22%, and in the October of the same year it got 30% and 11 MPs, 
its best result for the next 40 years (Mitchell, 2009). However, support for independence seems 
                                                             
196 Available at http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2014/09/scotland-voted. 
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to have been very small at the time. We do not know what it was in 1974, but only a few years 
later, in 1979, it stood at a mere 7% (McCrone and Paterson, 2002). It is very unlikely that 
some sort of large swing happened in just 5 years. Even support for devolution was relatively 
low. In the 1979 referendum on devolution, the pro-devolution option won by only a small 
margin of 51% to 49% (Dewdney, 1997).197 Instead of independence, what seems to have been 
responsible for the SNP vote was their “It’s Scotland’s Oil” campaign, namely, a promise that 
Scotland would use the revenues from North Sea oil and gas to bring prosperity. 
McCrone and Paterson (2002) show that support for independence rose steadily from 1979 
over the subsequent decades, until it came to around 30% in 2000 (where it has hovered since). 
What changed in 1979 was, of course, the advent of Thatcherism, with its devastating effect on 
the lower classes, particularly through the decline of manufacturing.198 McCrone and Paterson 
argue that the relative support among different classes stayed mostly the same throughout this 
period, but their data does not actually support this. Table 7.2 shows the percentage of people 
in different classes who supported independence. As we can see, support for independence rose 
much more among the lower classes than among the higher classes, and the most in the skilled 
manual group, which is the one hardest hit by the decline of manufacturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
197 With a voter turnout of 63%, less than 40% of total eligible voters voted in favor of devolution, which was the 
other condition that had to be fulfilled apart from a majority vote in favor. The referendum was therefore repealed. 
198 We should be careful not to perpetuate myths here, though. Namely, there is an extremely powerful myth in 
Scotland that Scotland has always been against the Conservatives. This was completely deconstructed by Torrance 
(2009b). He showed that the Conservatives were actually quite popular in Scotland up until the Thatcher economic 
reforms started biting, with Thatcher personally being popular until then as well. Even in the 1980s, a section of 
the population continued supporting the Conservatives. For example, those who could afford to buy their council 
houses at hugely discounted prices due to Thatcher’s right-to-buy policy were quite satisfied with this opportunity. 
The long-term effects on egalitarianism seem to have been quite a remote consideration for them. Also, like in 
England, there was a jump in support when the Falklands war started. All that being said, though, there is little 
doubt that the economic reforms that the Conservatives did in the 1980s hugely reduced their popularity in 
Scotland in the long-run, and increased the support for parties that offered different policies. Still, political fortunes 
change – at the moment (March 2017), the Conservatives are the second biggest party in Holyrood, ahead of 
Labour, and the second most popular party in Scotland according to most polls (after the SNP). 
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Table 7.2 % in each class who supported independence 
Employment class 1979 1992 
1997 
(devolution 
referendum) 
1997/1979 
professional 7 5 25 3.6 
intermediate 8 19 25 3.1 
routine non-manual 8 19 30 3.7 
skilled manual 5 30 48 9.6 
semi-skilled manual 8 30 49 6.1 
unskilled manual 8 34 54 6.7  
Source: Adapted from McCrone and Paterson (2002) 
 
Throughout this time, the SNP had consistently argued that an independent Scotland would 
use its oil wealth in a way that serves the people, but also more generally attacked the major 
Westminster parties, including New Labour, for being right-wing. After 1999, it insisted that 
more devolution, particularly fiscal, was the only way to ensure increased spending on public 
services in Scotland (Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2009). In 2007, the SNP managed to form a 
minority Scottish government, and in 2011, after being the only party with a direct anti-
austerity platform, it formed a (slim) majority one. And, as if to further underscore that the 
biggest allure of independence for ordinary people in Scotland seems to be potential economic 
prosperity, the SNP led a pro-independence campaign in which around 60%-70% of people (in 
this case with (un)surprising similarity across classes) were consistently saying that they would 
vote No if independence would make people £500 worse off per year on average. Conversely, 
if it would make people £500 better off on average, than in general the lower classes tended to 
be more in favor than the higher ones (according to data from the SSAS). 
So, it seems clear that economics issues, seen through a class prism, have played the biggest 
role in increasing support for independence in Scotland over the last several decades, and have 
had the biggest influence on how people actually voted in 2014. Perhaps the most important 
implication of this is that it is regional disparities that are the main underlying factor generating 
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support for Scottish separatism. Independence became most appealing to the lower classes, 
only after they were hurt by the decline of Scotland’s industrial base, by the failure to rebuild 
around new economic sectors, and by other free-market reforms. However, these disparities 
were enough to create widespread support for separation only when combined with a recession 
and austerity. Given the evidence, it seems very unlikely that anything else would have been 
sufficient.  
 
7.2.5 The Yes campaign’s nation building project 
 
Even if (personal) economic issues and class structure played the biggest role in the rise in 
support for independence, is there still some truth in the arguments about the existence of a 
Scottish identity, centered around egalitarian and open values? 
To answer this, we can intersect the various questions on identity, values and class. 
Reporting all these results would take up too much space, so instead we can give a general 
comment. The picture that emerges is that Scottish identity, egalitarian values, and low class 
tend go together.199 However, neither a stronger Scottish identity, nor low class, go with more 
openness or pro-EU stances. For example, those with an “only Scottish” identity (or “only 
British” for that matter) are significantly more anti-EU than anyone with a mixed identity. The 
lower classes are also generally more anti-EU, with one exception – “small employers and own 
account workers” were more anti-EU than those below or above them in the social hierarchy. 
This shows that those on the Yes side talking about a combination of openness, egalitarian 
values and a Scottish identity were not actually representing Scotland, not only because plenty 
of people in Scotland do not even hold those values, but because there seem to be fairly few 
people whose attitudes align along all these lines simultaneously. What seems to have been 
happening is that some on the Yes side, whether they were aware of it or not, were engaged in 
a project of nation building to support the secessionist drive. They were trying to create a 
Scottish national identity based on all the values that they themselves held, and they did that 
by arguing that such an identity already exists. The Yes campaign even designated an external 
enemy of sorts, namely, England and the UK government. These are all the typical hallmarks 
of nation building projects. Of course, promoting civic nationalism, egalitarianism and 
openness is a much better nation building project than most separatist engage in, but it is still 
                                                             
199 Of course, there is no complete overlap, but rather a tendency. 
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a project based on consciously or unconsciously stretching the truth, and it still runs the danger 
of branding those who do not fit into its vision as less worthy. 
Furthermore, while class was apparently an important factor in the appeal of independence, 
the Yes campaign did not employ class-based rhetoric. This was partially a tactical attempt to 
not antagonize businesses. But, I believe it is indicative of something else as well, namely, that 
the Yes campaign was at best moderately leftist. Ignoring the class structure of society means 
ignoring power and oppression, which is not something a supposedly egalitarian movement 
should do. 
 
 
7.3 Prospects for Scottish economic development 
 
The neo-liberal economic reforms over the last 40 years, and the cut-back and then shift in 
regional policies, have made secessionism in the UK more likely. But, ironically, at least in the 
case of Scotland, the hegemony of neo-liberal ideas has simultaneously narrowed down the 
economic vision of the separatists sufficiently to make their policy suggestions for post-
independence economic development essentially flawed. The arguments here do not relate to 
immediate matters, such as forecasts of the price of oil and Scottish public finances, but to the 
basic underlying ideas of the SNP economic strategy. 
We noted before that Scotland is highly developed, but various Scottish government 
documents (Scottish government, 2010a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2014) correctly 
recognize that things are not as good as macroeconomic aggregate numbers alone suggest. 
Scotland’s business density is the second lowest in the UK (see Table 6.11). According to ONS 
data, business R&D as a percentage of Scottish GVA is around 0.7%, one of the bottom three 
UK regions, and several times below OECD leaders.200 Scotland runs a trade deficit. Its public 
finances are almost always in deficit. They are also dependent on North Sea oil & gas revenues, 
which add, depending on the prevailing prices, between £0 and £10 billion pounds per year to 
the Scottish budget,201 thus exposing Scotland to significant risks. The documents also 
                                                             
200 Excluding London, but, as IPPR argues, the type of innovation that service sector firms do can be very 
important, but is not captured by R&D expenditure or patent information. Therefore, London’s business R&D of 
0.5% of its GVA almost certainly understates London’s innovativeness. 
201 At the maximum, according to Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland, this accounts for a full 18% 
of the budget revenues. 
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recognize that more can be done to extend firms’ supply chains in Scotland. All of this is 
consistent with the patterns of regional development in the UK (apart from the oil sector 
providing significant benefits to Scotland). 
The Scottish government blames Westminster policies for this situation. It also believes that, 
despite the problems, Scotland has numerous strengths, and if given full sovereignty, it could 
build on them and become more prosperous. I already argued that, while government policies 
are important, it is oligopolistic markets that are the key factor behind UK’s regional 
disparities. However, none of the Scottish government documents recognize this. 
Unsurprisingly, the analysis of what are deemed Scottish strengths and the development policy 
suggestions are then also off the mark. 
The strengths that Scotland has are said to be a number of growth sectors, a skilled 
workforce, natural resources, world-leading university research, and a strong global brand. 
Acceptable evidence is provided for most of these claims, except for the most important, 
namely, growth sectors. Scottish Government (2013e) identifies life sciences, the creative 
industries, digital and ICT, oil & gas, food and drink, renewables, low carbon industries, 
manufacturing, financial and business services and tourism as sectors in which Scotland has 
strengths and which can bring prosperity to the country. It seems these sectors were picked 
mostly by how big a share of the Scottish economy they account for, and how fast the entire 
sector, or the sector’s exports, are growing. This is acceptable as a first pass analysis, but there 
is no further examination of the market structure of these sectors. Thus, we do not know, for 
example, how dominated these sectors are by foreign companies, what their supply chains are 
or what competitive hurdles Scottish companies in them face (such as technological gaps or 
their power within global value chains). The underlying idea seems to be that, with the right 
policies and institutional framework, achieving success in promoting these sectors will happen, 
albeit it might not be quick and easy. So, what are these policies? 
According to the vision of the Scottish government, Scotland would leave the UK, but retain 
very close links with the rUK, particularly maintaining the free flow of goods, services, capital 
and people. It would keep using the pound as part of a formal currency union. It would also 
stay in the EU. Within such a macroeconomic and institutional framework, the Scottish 
government would use a number of policies to foster development. It would first gain powers 
currently reserved for Westminster, such as taxation, welfare, or setting the regulatory 
framework for businesses, and then endeavor to create effective coordination between these 
new powers, and the ones it already has, such as in higher education. 
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A lot of suggestions are general and revolve around this better coordination, but more 
concrete suggestions have been made too. They include, for example, cutting the corporation 
tax by up to 3pp in order to attract businesses and counteract the pull of London and the South 
East, setting up institutions to foster cooperation between universities, the public sector, and 
businesses on innovation, offering capital allowances for R&D investment, coordinating 
training and employment policies with the private sector, setting up a Scottish Development 
Bank to fund manufacturing SMEs, preventing market concentration through better control of 
M&A activities, and a number of others. A whole paper is devoted to how such policies could 
more specifically help Scotland reindustrialize (Scottish Government, 2014). All of these are 
effectively typical new paradigm regional policies, for a country that would be a region 
integrated with the rUK market, and part of a wider EU market. 
As discussed in previous chapters, there are issues with such suggestions. For example, 
some of MacKay’s (2014) interviewees noted that a few percentage points difference in the 
corporation tax would be very unlikely to trigger a transfer of activities to Scotland, or to make 
firms stay there if they suddenly found themselves in a different jurisdiction to their 10 times 
larger rUK market. Besides, what the Scottish government did not discuss was that Scotland 
would naturally be competing with Ireland on taxes, and that is a hard thing to do. More 
importantly, Ireland has one of the most “competitive” tax systems among the OECD countries 
(Bilicka and Devereux, 2012), but according to OECD data it has, for example, one of the 
lowest R&D investment rates. So, it is at least questionable whether giveaways to corporates 
stimulate them to establish local innovation networks. 
Still, there is one situation in which the sort of suggestions that the SNP government was 
making could potentially work. If Scotland got lucky like Nevada did, striking on a sector that 
is not yet oligopolized, then perhaps the sort of suggested business support could help Scotland 
come out on top in the competitive struggle. However, the mentioned sectors are not like that. 
We can use the video games industry as an example. 
The video game Grand Theft Auto V, made by Rockstar North, a video games studio in 
Edinburgh, was released in September 2013. Less than a month later, Guinness World Records 
confirmed that it broke no less than seven world records, including: best-selling video game in 
24 hours, fastest entertainment property to gross $1 billion, fastest video game to gross $1 
billion, highest grossing video game in 24 hours, and highest revenue generated by an 
entertainment product in 24 hours (Lynch, 2013). Specifically, Grand Theft Auto V grossed 
over $815 million in the first 24h after it was released and $1 billion in 3 days. By May 2014, 
it had grossed nearly $2 billion (Thier, 2014). Even before this staggering success, but certainly 
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after, the video games industry has been brought up as a growth sector for the Scottish 
economy. 
However, the video games market has little to do with how it is ordinarily imagined. Due to 
the relatively low barriers to entry, combined with the rise of digital sales over the last 5-10 
years, there is an enormous entrepreneurial sector of small firms and start-ups, pushing each 
other’s prices down, and jockeying for players’ money. Many companies do not last and most 
of the few that become really successful get bought up by the market leaders, sometimes for 
astronomical prices. At the other end of the market, there are a few global leaders. The global 
market is growing very fast, and is currently valued at around £100 billion, of which the top 10 
companies (which are diversified, and make their own games, publish other companies’ games, 
organize e-sports events, etc.) account for about 25% (UKIE, 2017). Rockstar North is actually 
one of several studios owned in the UK by Take-Two Interactive, a giant American video 
games corporation.  
A NESTA (2014) report on the UK video games industry puts things into perspective. 
Scotland accounts for 5% of all video game companies in the UK. London and the South East 
account for around 50% (and also house most major corporations’ headquarters). This is the 
geographic distribution after the industry has become more evenly spread across the UK since 
the 1980s. Edinburgh and Dundee are among the 20 or so hubs of video games companies in 
the UK, but they are, for example, less consolidated (have more firms with fewer employees) 
than the hubs in Cambridge or Oxford. Now, as things stand, Scotland is not doing badly in the 
video games market, but if it wants to create a step-change in its position, at least some of its 
companies would have to become market leaders in at least some market segments 
(distribution, middleware software, publishing, design etc.), all of which are already dominated 
by global leaders. Alternatively, Scotland would have to convince some of the existing leaders 
to place more of their development activities, or their headquarters, in Scotland. There is little 
reason to believe that the sort of policies proposed by the Scottish government could do either. 
Of course, this is just one sector, but in July 2014, I had a conversation with a high ranking 
official from Scottish Enterprise.202 Of all the potential “high-growth sectors”, the official 
could only think of tidal wave energy and digital health and wellbeing in old age as not yet 
being oligopolized. Scotland actually has a lead in the former.203 In the same interview, it was 
noted that Scotland has a number of “second-tier” successful domestic companies, but very 
                                                             
202 The conversation took place on July 23rd, 2014, in Glasgow. 
203 Scottish Enterprise has a strong program of support for tidal wave energy. 
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few “first-tier” ones, and that Scottish Enterprise is keenly aware of how difficult it is to get 
such “first-tier” companies to integrate into the Scottish economy. 
This brings us to the main point of this section. Namely, it has not been recognized at all by 
most actors that the underlying cause of Scotland’s underdevelopment is the nature of 
oligopolistic markets, nor that the policy space that an independent Scotland would have – 
limited as it would be by EU state aid rules and free trade, by whatever restraints would be 
imposed because of the agreements Scotland would have with the rUK, and by the inability to 
use monetary policy for development due to a currency union204 – is simply insufficient for 
more radical development policies that Scotland would need to develop sectors other than the 
above mentioned two non-oligopolized ones. It is not impossible that independence would have 
some positive effects. The same interviewee noted, for example, that the UK government does 
not try to stretch EU state aid rules, like most other EU members do, and that representatives 
of Scottish Enterprise are often informally encouraged by people in the European Commission 
to push their policies as far as they can. Perhaps with an independent Scottish government more 
could be done. But, it seems unlikely that there could be any fundamental changes. 
Separatists in the business community also do not seem to completely realize the power of 
oligopolies. Of course, they are fully aware of the importance and power of big firms simply 
because they are so unavoidable in business activities, but they do not necessarily see the full 
implications for regional development, and are also not immune to making a mistake and 
thinking that an economic sector is not oligopolized, where in reality it is massively so. For 
example, in 2014 I conducted an interview with Ivan Mackee,205 at the time director of Business 
for Scotland, and a very experienced businessman. He agreed that it was difficult to enter 
sectors that are already dominated by market leaders, and agreed that EU state aid rules do 
impose some unwanted restrictions, but thought that Scotland should build clusters where it 
has advantages and possibilities for future growth. Tidal wave energy was brought up as an 
example, but so were video games. Also, Mackee fully recognized that Scotland needed to 
build up stronger domestic supply chains, but the suggestions for how to do that were the same 
as those generally made in new regional policies – improving location factors, such as skills 
availability. 
                                                             
204 In an act of even greater anti-developmental folly, the Scottish government insisted that it would unilaterally 
use the pound, if the rUK did not agree to a currency union. This would put even more restraints on its ability to 
use monetary policy. 
205 Interview conducted on July 21st, 2014, in Glasgow. 
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Interestingly, even commentators on the left do not seem to fully appreciate how markets 
actually work. Many people associated with the Jimmy Reid Foundation, and their Common 
Weal project, do advocate taking independence further than the SNP government was arguing 
for, for example by introducing a Scottish currency (for example, Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2012). 
But, they simply do not reflect at all on the question of market power of big firms and the 
challenges that Scotland – independent or not – faces because of them.206 Actually, Paterson 
(2014) is the only article I have been able to find that talks about the policy constraints that an 
independent Scotland would face by being a member of international trade organizations and 
the EU. 
Just how striking the lack of economic understanding is can best be seen if we compare the 
current situation with 35 years ago. At the time, the SNP had its left wing, called the 79 
group,207 named after the year in which it was formed. Stephen Maxwell, one of the group’s 
members, wrote a pamphlet in 1981 setting out some of the groups positions. On the economy, 
he wrote: 
 
… Scotland today has many features of a ‘neo-colony’ … The decline in Scottish 
manufacturing, the slow growth of Scottish services, the progressive takeover of 
Scotland’s firms and natural resources by foreign capital, the integration of Scotland’s 
financial institutions into an international system in which Scotland features chiefly as a 
location for high-yielding energy investments – all these are among the symptoms of a 
chronic sickness in the locally controlled private sector of the Scottish economy. The 
Scottish private sector is simply no longer large enough or independent enough to serve 
as the basis of a revived Scottish ‘mixed’ economy. Scottish controlled manufacturing 
firms now supply only 12% of total Scottish employment. Small firms will certainly have 
an important role in Scotland’s economic revival but they cannot carry the burden of 
economic reconstruction. In any case without a determined policy of state support, the 
most successful of the small firms would succumb to takeover bids by multinational 
companies determined to defend their market dominance. Scotland’s economic revival, 
therefore, depends on a major extension of the public sector in the form of improved 
public services, increased public finance for industry conditional on the adoption of co-
                                                             
206 The pro-UK side of the debate also never considered the issue of oligopolies when arguing that Scotland 
benefits economically from being in the Union. See, for example, McCrone (2013), Brown (2014). 
207 See Torrance (2009a). 
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operative ownership and other forms of industrial democracy, and public control of 
Scotland’s financial institutions … (Maxwell, 2013c:94). 
 
Some in the 79 group, Maxwell included, were also advocating for an independent Scotland to 
not join the European Community due to the policy constraints it was imposing on its member 
states. 
The 79 group was influential in the 3 years until 1982 when it was expelled from the SNP. 
(Most of its members, including Stephen Maxwell and, more notably, Alex Salmond, were 
later readmitted to the party). The group never managed to move the SNP towards becoming a 
radical party based on worker support, but the very fact that such debates were being had, where 
at least some people had a thorough understanding of how capitalism functions, is telling.208 
Fast forward to today, and even leftist supporters of independence in Scotland do not have 
a word to say about oligopolies, nor about the need for heavy-handed interventionism if 
Scotland wants to have an economic revival. The SNP, in the meantime, is proposing that no 
monetary sovereignty is the best policy choice, it would never talk about neo-colonialism, the 
problems of foreign ownership, or the need for interventionist industrial policy, and is 
imagining capitalism as being based on SMEs, as well as on generally benevolent big firms 
that admittedly might need some incentivizing to help Scotland develop. Most people do not 
seem to see anything particularly problematic with this situation. 
Perhaps Maxwell’s own arguments prior to the 2014 referendum illustrate best this tectonic 
change in thinking. In Arguing for Independence Maxwell (2012) sets out a number of “cases” 
for supporting Scottish independence, including an “economic” one. His general economic case 
rests on a greater feeling of self-responsibility that independence would provide, the knowledge 
and experience that would stem from having Scottish state institutions, and the fact that the 
government of an independent Scotland would be more far more focused on Scotland’s needs 
than current British ones. As more concrete arguments, Maxwel offers a few examples, such 
as greater oil revenues accruing to Scotland, the possibility to make public savings by getting 
rid of public-private finance initiatives, better fishing rights negotiations, reduced defense 
expenditures, the ability to set an own immigration policy, building off-shore renewables, and 
                                                             
208 Nor was the 79 group alone in this. For example, the left-wing of Labour, “Bennite” Labour, which briefly had 
tentative control over the party from 1979 to 1983 had leaving the EU in its policy manifesto, precisely because 
of the constraints it imposed on the ability to lead industrial policy. They also recognized the role of oligopoly in 
the economy. Indeed, Stuart Holland was one of the prominent members of Bennite Labour. 
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aligning education, welfare and other policies with economic needs more efficiently than can 
be done under the devolution arrangement. It has to be said that his analysis is much more 
careful than most similar analyses, but there is simply no inkling of the kind of analyses he 
offered 30 years earlier. The power of multinational corporations is not mentioned, how to 
counter it is not discussed, nor is the need for an industrial policy examined. There are passages 
in his book that suggest that Maxwell was consciously refraining from a more radical 
analysis,209 possibly in order to have a wider appeal. Even if that is the case, it is still quite 
indicative of a shift in political thinking, particularly so in comparison to the 1981 Maxwell 
who seemed to realize that for independence to actually matter for improving Scotland’s 
economy and building a fairer society, it would have to come with an understanding of how 
capitalism functions and with policies built on this reality.  
It is ironic that the neoliberal shift which Scottish separatists have been opposing for so long 
has managed to mold most of them in its own image, and to at least significantly affect even 
the most radical of them. 
  
                                                             
209 Particularly when discussing the “social” case for independence, which is underpinned by a class analysis.  
217 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has attempted to connect an analysis of regional development and separatism, 
and then apply it to the case of Scotland and the UK. Let us summarize the arguments on the 
three topics in turn. 
 
Regional development 
 
In chapter 2, I defined economic development as structural transformation – entering 
advanced sectors of the economy (mostly manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services), 
which have high potential for technological and organizational upgrading and consequent 
productivity increases. The benefits of such increases – higher consumption and investment, 
more free time, economic diversification, economies of scale – are useful in themselves, but 
also have positive feedback effects on productivity, creating a virtuous circle. 
Since most production goes on in firms, the generation of this virtuous circle has to be 
explained by reference to their behavior. It was shown that the virtuous circle is inseparable 
from the size of firms and the way that big firms compete. Competition forces firms to upgrade 
their technological and organizational capabilities. Such upgrades give firms various 
competitive advantages, but since they require significant investment, they also increase firms’ 
size, and size itself confers further competitive advantages. The effects of this process of ever 
increasing firm size are such that smaller firms are easily outclassed by larger competitors. 
Oligopolistic markets emerge, split up among a few large firms that can withstand each others’ 
competition. 
The emergent large firms, due to their size, have a greater need for stability. They therefore 
avoid competing against each other on prices, since price changes can easily disrupt business 
plans. Instead, they compete through oligopolistic non-price competition – the use of new 
resources, the creation of new products and improvements to existing ones, reductions in costs, 
the opening up of new markets, and so on. This competition can be fierce, but it is also 
routinized and generally predictable, and therefore suitable to the needs of large firms. 
Here the link between oligopolistic competition and economic development becomes clear. 
It is oligopolistic competition that today produces what we call economic development – 
improvements in technology and organization and the consequent productivity increases, 
diversification, the achievement of economies of scale, improvements in the quality of existing 
218 
 
products, and a host of other effects beneficial to the broader society. Of course, as discussed, 
not all the effects of having oligopolies are good, nor does development stem only from 
oligopolistic competition, but its central importance in economic development cannot be 
understated. 
The flip side of this analysis is that economies that do not have such large firms are less 
developed and face significant obstacles if they try to develop – to do that, they would have to 
enter the same sectors of the economy that are already dominated by established market-leading 
firms. This is an almost impossible prospect. Recognizing that, a number of countries have 
employed activist industrial, technological and trade (ITT) policies and have managed to help 
their domestic firms become competitive and have become developed in the process. This has 
not worked in all cases, but it is the only type of policies that have allowed late-developers to 
catch up. 
The above analysis was compared to a more common understanding of firms, which I called 
the standard theory of the firm. According to this understanding, there is a limit to how big 
firms can grow, and large firms are generally considered to be less efficient than small ones. 
Such small firms are also conceived as competing through prices, and thus markets are seen as 
operating through the price mechanism. Development policies based on this understanding of 
firms and markets, however, have generally had disastrous effects. 
In chapters 3 and 4, this analysis was adapted to regional development within countries. It 
was shown that, just as different countries can be at different levels of development, so can 
regions within a country. Rich regions have large concentrations of big market-leading firms, 
which provides them with numerous benefits such as high employment and salaries, economic 
stability or employment for people with high qualifications. Poorer regions either lack 
successful large firms, or house the lower value-added activities of the market-leaders from the 
richer regions. For poorer regions to develop, they would either have to build up their own 
market-leading firms or they would have to attract substantial investment into advanced 
activities from established market-leaders. Neither possibility seems likely to happen – the 
former because the power of market-leading firms is felt at least as strongly, if not more, within 
countries as between them, and the latter because the location factors drawing firms to richer 
regions are simply too strong to counteract easily. 
Regional development policies have attempted to help poorer regions. In comparison to the 
development policies employed by countries, the main difference is that there are a number of 
tools that cannot be used – trade protection and exchange rates being the most important 
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examples. Particularly given how important trade protection has been for late-comers, these 
limitations are actually a large hindrance. 
Old paradigm regional policies, employed generally until the 1980s and the 1990s, relied 
heavily on trying to attract investment by big firms to poorer regions, primarily through various 
financial incentives. They have had some success in generating jobs in the poorer regions, but 
have generally failed at stimulating firms to establish more advanced activities there. 
Additionally, as firms got more opportunity to invest in poorer countries, the relative 
attractiveness of marginally cheaper labor and financial incentives available in the poorer 
regions of rich countries went down. 
New paradigm regional policies have had two focuses – one is on entrepreneurship and 
stimulating the formation of SMEs in the poorer regions, and the other is on cluster policies.  
The first focus has been shown to rest on flawed ideas about how firms and markets function 
– this approach to regional development often does not recognize that development is sector-
specific, and it certainly does not see development as being inseparable from big firms. 
Regional policies in poorer regions that support entrepreneurship and SMEs should thus be 
seen effectively as welfare payments in a different guise. They have virtually no chance of 
effecting structural transformation, although they may have the effect of increasing living 
standards while they last. Thus, they should not be compared to other development policies, 
but to welfare policies. I suspect they would come out worse in such a comparison. For 
example, they are not given based on needs and their duration for individual beneficiaries is 
limited. Besides, they implicitly perpetuate the notion that the way out of underdevelopment is 
through individual effort, not collective action. 
The cluster policies are more realistic in their assessment of where development comes 
from, in the sense that they recognize that development depends on having advanced sectors 
of the economy. The importance of key investments by market-leading firms is also often 
recognized. In the context of regional development in poorer regions, cluster policies are 
mostly focused on improving their location factors in order to attract investments in advanced 
activities by big firms, the idea being to then link up those firms to local SMEs, thus embedding 
them firmly into the regional economy. 
However, cluster policies have their problems too. Martin and Sunley (2003) have analyzed 
very well a number of them. The concept of clusters itself is poorly defined, empirically 
problematic, and of questionable analytic and policy usefulness. On an immediate practical 
note, many poorer regions proclaim that they have the basis to build clusters in very advanced 
sectors of the economy, which is a highly questionable proposition. It has also been pointed 
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out that poorer regions compete and even undermine each other in their attempts to attract 
investment and create clusters. But, the most fundamental issue that is missed too often is this 
– even if it can be shown that clusters (however defined) are important for a certain industry, 
what are the chances of a poorer region creating clusters when competing against richer 
regions? Where are market-leading firms more likely to choose to embed and link up with other 
firms? 
The implications for regional development and regional development policy of a focus on 
oligopolies can be summed up thus: there is no escape from the harsh realities of capitalism, 
no safe place where the rules of the game do not apply. The concentration of production in a 
few market-leading firms, and their consequent market (and political) power, is a defining 
characteristic of capitalism, which always has to be kept in mind. If at any point we lose sight 
of it, chances are that we will end up with incomplete analyses and inadequate policy 
suggestions. 
This paints a very bleak picture of poorer regions. Without severe curbing of what 
established market leaders are allowed to do, firms from poorer regions basically do not stand 
a chance in competition against them. Similarly, from the perspective of attracting advanced 
investments from established firms, poorer regions are in a bad position. Having regional 
economic strengths is first and foremost a consequence of having won in the competitive game 
in the past, but poorer regions were the losers, not the winners, and there is very rarely a chance 
for a rematch. Such are the rules of the capitalist game. From this perspective, arguments such 
as IPPR North (2012:96) makes – “It is easy to highlight the structural weaknesses of the 
northern [English] economy; its industrial legacy and heavy manufacturing base have 
continued to shape the recent fortunes of its workforce and its economic outlook. But its 
industrial past also provides something of a launchpad for a more sustainable future” – are 
revealed for what they unfortunately are: an overly optimistic assessment of a dismal situation. 
Capitalism creates and perpetuates inequalities of all sorts, between individuals, classes, firms, 
regions and entire countries. A positive outlook is not sufficient to counter this. To actually 
reduce any of these inequalities we cannot work with markets, but need to use concerted 
political action to work against them, all the while not losing sight of the fact that this would 
also inevitably involve class conflict. 
Note that this does not mean that every single poor region is doomed to underdevelopment. 
Just like occasionally a poor individual is blessed by a stroke of luck and gets rich, so too the 
stars can align for a region, like they did for Nevada. Also, occasionally a region may succeed 
in getting substantial inward investment in advanced activities, when the interests of market 
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leading firms happen to coincide with the interests of a region seeking investment. Thus, none 
of the presented arguments mean that no poor region will ever develop. But they do mean that 
the majority will not. Regional policy making is too often focused on describing successful 
regions, with the hope of somehow copying what they did. It would be advisable to also look 
at all the failures – it would then be revealed that what may have differentiated the successful 
from the unsuccessful cases was luck. 
I have generally refrained from making policy suggestions in this thesis, because the focus 
was on understanding the problem of regional underdevelopment, not on solving it. The 
analysis of regional underdevelopment is meant as one of the building blocks for the 
subsequent analysis of separatism, and for this purpose it was enough to explain why poorer 
regions are poor and likely to remain so. But, here I will make one general suggestion.  
We need to resist the urge to see the silver lining where there is none. There is no reason to 
assume that regional policy-makers and academics interested in regional studies are any less 
competent or committed than policy-makers and academics in other areas. And yet, for more 
than half a century, they have been trying to help poorer regions develop, with very limited 
success. Compare that to the massive successes of post-WWII development policies in a 
number of formerly poor countries, such as South Korea. Thus, paradoxically, it is possible 
that the best course of action for regional policy-makers is to first admit their impotence, to say 
that they will do their job, but that they know they will fail, not because of any inability, but 
because of the constraints they are operating under. This would not entail giving up on doing 
whatever can be done to mitigate the consequences of regional underdevelopment. But, it might 
help refocus attention in the right direction, namely, towards a struggle to change the 
constraints themselves. This would add an additional task for academics, namely, to better 
explain the underlying causes of regional underdevelopment, to suggest appropriate changes 
to the institutional framework of capitalism, and to identify the forces that would be opposed 
to them and suggest how they can be tackled. 
How likely it is at the present time for fundamental changes to happen in how capitalism is 
governed is open to debate. Furthermore, there is the issue of how much a single country could 
do. The power afforded to capital in the current international trade and investment framework 
is very substantial. Still, it may be better to try to effect some changes rather than simply accept 
the situation as it is. However, for now, we can probably safely assume that regional disparities 
will continue to characterize virtually all capitalist countries for the foreseeable future. The 
implications for separatism are not good. 
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Separatism 
 
I argued that many separatist movements are driven substantially by inter-regional and 
center-region economic conflicts, which are largely rooted in regional development disparities. 
The prime example are conflicts about fiscal redistribution between richer and poorer regions, 
but, as chapter 5 has shown, numerous others can and do emerge as well. If regional disparities 
persist, as in all likelihood they will, then there will always be a potential for separatism to 
emerge on economic grounds. 
As I further argued, separatism cannot be understood without seeing it through a class prism. 
Actually, in terms of methodology, a class framework is indispensable. Just like losing sight of 
oligopolies leads to incomplete economic analyses, so too ignoring class leads to 
misunderstandings of the political economy of a society. In the case of separatism, a classless 
analysis makes us imagine common interests where there are none and it easily focuses our 
attention on the supposedly homogenous characteristics of regional populations, such as 
culture, language, religion, ethnicity or nationhood, while we ignore the actual struggles for 
economic and political power of different classes. Put more succinctly, ignoring class makes 
us do bad social science. 
The use of a class-based framework enables us to see that in a situation with wide regional 
disparities, class divisions are also regional divisions – on average, the lower classes are more 
concentrated in the poorer regions, while the higher classes are more concentrated in the richer 
regions. As I have shown, in the context of separatism this is a particularly explosive situation 
if there is a prolonged recession and austerity measures. The lower classes bear the brunt of 
their costs, making them susceptible to separatist propaganda, which tends to promise a better 
life to them. More commonly, it is the higher classes in the richer regions who become 
particularly unwilling to fund transfers to the lower classes, which in the described situation 
means an unwillingness to fund regional transfers. The fact that separatist arguments are often 
couched in nationalist terms should not make us blind to the fact that they strike right along 
class lines – their potency cannot be understood without this fact. What is more, as I have 
argued, separatism can emerge even when there are no national differences, and nations are 
anyway a social construct, so they can be reshaped. 
The fact that the contribution of recessions and austerity to separatism have not really been 
recognized too much in the literature is probably due to the fact that advanced capitalist 
countries have not had a prolonged recession or stagnation since the 1930s. But, at least in the 
EU today, we are approaching almost 10 years of austerity, low growth and high 
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unemployment, with the unemployment, of course, being concentrated among the lower classes 
and generally being worse in the poorer EU member states. It is no coincidence that we have 
seen a massive rise in separatism. 
First, we have rising separatism in entire (primarily rich) countries. Interestingly, and not 
unexpectedly, the Brexit referendum has shown that support for leaving the EU comes mainly 
from the lower classes – they have been told that their own situation would improve if the UK 
leaves the EU. It does not matter that such claims are of questionable veracity, seeing as how 
they have been made by right-wing, pro-market parties that are not exactly known for fighting 
for the improvement of the position of ordinary people. What matters is what people believe. 
Second, we have seen a marked rise in regional separatism within countries. Scotland is a 
somewhat specific case, but the other examples – Flanders, Northern Italy and Catalonia – are 
clearly richer regions within their countries. As argued in chapter 5, in Catalonia the class basis 
of the support for secession is more complex and interlinked with ethnicity, but the effects of 
the recession and austerity measures in Spain have clearly played a decisive role in the rise in 
support for secession over the recent years. In Scotland there is clear support from the lower 
classes for leaving the UK. Ironically, this is the same situation as with Brexit, except that in 
the case of the Scottish referendum, it was the UK that was blamed for the misfortune of the 
lower classes, while in England it was the EU. 
There has been no secession in the homelands of democratic core capitalist countries since 
the Irish secession in 1922.210 But, what the above analysis implies is that developed countries 
can be susceptible to separatism, given the right conditions. And, at least in the EU, for the 
time being austerity seems to be the entrenched policy choice, and it will continue hitting 
European society along class lines. With the massive regional disparities between EU member 
states, and within many of them as well, more and more conflicts between countries and of 
regions within countries are likely to emerge. 
At least in the case of Catalonia, we should not underestimate the potential for violence. The 
Catalan president has announced that Catalonia will hold a binding referendum on 
independence in September 2017, with or without the consent of Madrid (Berwick and Cobos, 
2016). If this actually happens, and the result is pro-independence, the situation could get 
extremely problematic, both due to the ethnic and class divisions within Catalonia and due to 
how Madrid would react. The Catalan government would have to start creating an independent 
                                                             
210 And Algeria in 1962, if we count it as a part of home French territory, which is, at the very least, a questionable 
proposition. 
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state, which would mean stopping to pay its contributions into the Spanish central budget, 
setting up a central bank, a separate army, and so on. Madrid would have to respond to this in 
some way, say by cutting Catalan banks from the payments system and freezing assets in Spain 
of whomever it sees as a tax debtor. What if the Catalan government seized assets belonging 
to Madrid that are in Catalan territory as a response? Is it really unimaginable that, at some 
point, one of the sides would decide to use force to assert some of its claims? In a multi-ethnic 
environment charged with nationalist propaganda, and with half the Catalan population not 
even supporting independence, is it really unimaginable to think that things could get out of 
hand? This is not an argument that violence will necessarily happen – indeed, I think it is far 
more likely that it will not – but it would be a grave mistake to think that these sorts of 
developments are reserved only for the Balkans, the Soviet Union, or some other non-Western 
part of the world. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Finally, what about the UK? Its poorer regions were in a precarious position even before 
1979. The Thatcher government reforms then dealt them a blow from which they have not 
recovered. The optimistic outlook maintained by some regional policy-makers seems 
unwarranted, and is more reflective of the sometimes very subtle dominance of neo-liberal 
ideas than of the actual regional situation. 
The UK leaving the EU is unlikely to afford it the policy space to pursue more activist 
regional policies, given that at the very least the UK will still be bound by WTO rules. But, 
apart from that, for the time being, the political situation is such that it is hard to imagine where 
the drive for more radical policies could come from. Certainly the Conservative party cannot 
be expected to become more interventionist. The Liberal Democrats are also not particularly 
interventionist, and are anyway unlikely to ever govern on their own. Jeremy Corbyn’s 
leadership of Labour is fraught with difficulty, and an attempt to more decisively push the party 
to the left, including in regional policy, would potentially lead to an eerie replay of the 1983 
split in Labour. Besides, it is questionable whether the role and the extent of the power of 
oligopolies is truly realized even by Jeremy Corbyn and his team. The first-past-the-post 
electoral system, firmly entrenched for now, is likely to prevent any other party apart from 
these three from becoming electorally important. Finally, any notion that the regional problem 
can be solved in some bottom-up way is simply incorrect. Thus, it seems it is highly unlikely 
that there will be a major shift in policy-making in the UK any time soon, so the UK’s poorer 
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regions are likely to continue being underdeveloped, and the consequent regional/class 
divisions will continue providing the potential for separatism to emerge. 
We could ask why similar developments to the ones in Scotland have not happened in other 
parts of the UK, given that many of them have been economically at least as hard hit as Scotland 
over the past several decades, but without an oil sector to mitigate the effects. It is only here 
that identity, long-existing Scottish institutions, and particularly the devolved administration 
(and the Scottish Office before it), come into play. The long-existing Scottish institutions 
allowed a dual national identity to be formed, which made it much easier for politics to be 
imagined at all as separate from Westminster. The devolved administration allowed 
secessionist interests to coalesce and organize. These possibilities do not exist in the English 
regions. 
But, of course, identities can change, and regional institutions can be formed. As a matter 
of fact, perhaps a joke, but nevertheless telling, an online petition (Stu Dent, 2014) was started 
before the Scottish referendum in 2014, for the North of England to join Scotland if it secedes. 
The reason given was that “The deliberations in Westminster are becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to the north of England. The northern cities feel far greater affinity with their Scottish 
counterparts such as Glasgow and Edinburgh than with the ideologies of the London-centric 
south. The needs and challenges of the north cannot be understood by the endless parade of old 
Etonians lining the frontbenches of the House of Commons.” The petition quickly gained some 
5,000 signatures, which exploded to 40,000 after the Conservatives won the 2015 general 
election. It is true that the electorate in the North East resoundly rejected a devolved North East 
assembly in a 2004 referendum, but, then again, the first devolution referendum in Scotland in 
1979 also returned a No result. 
In the same vein, but this time on the side of the richer regions, immediately after the Brexit 
referendum. some media published articles saying that London should leave the UK (Baxter, 
2016).211 There was also an online petition (O'Malley, 2016). A humorous one, but currently 
(March 2017) with about 180,000 signatures. A few years ago, in 2014, a poll showed that 20% 
of Londoners think that London should be independent (Moore-Bridger, 2014). On a more 
serious note, right after the Brexit referendum we witnessed demands from the one devolved 
administration in England, London, for increased autonomy, given that they saw their 
(economic and other) interests as different to those of the rest of England (Crerar, 2016). 
                                                             
211 For a more critical take on this idea, see Moore (2016). 
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Ironically, while the Coalition and later Conservative governments’ austerity policies have 
made separatism more likely, the Conservatives’ antagonism towards regional institutions, and 
the abolishment of the RDAs, has probably made sure that there would be no strong regional 
institutions in England – apart from, for now, the devolved London administration – around 
which separatist interests could form. But, we should not think that there is no potential for 
such developments in the future. New institutions can be formed, and the case of Northern Italy 
shows that even minor regional institutions (the regional councils there do not hold much 
power) can serve as a locus of separatism. Northern Italy, together with Sverdlovsk, the 
separatist Russian region discussed in section 5.3.2, also shows that a distinct national identity 
is not a necessary prerequisite for separatism.  
The regional problem in the UK, the recession and austerity measures, combined with class 
divisions, have been a key factor in increasing support first for devolution and then for 
independence in Scotland. The Brexit referendum also clearly reflected the stark class and 
regional divisions in the UK. Finally, there has already been a call for a second independence 
referendum in Scotland (Carrell, 2017), which, if it happens in 2019, would make it the third 
separatist referendum in the UK in just 5 years. Economists sometimes quip that predicting is 
hard, especially when it is about the future, so I do not wish to make any predictions. Still, the 
UK must be setting some sort of new international record in terms of its output of separatist 
referendums per year.212 It does not seem impossible at all that separatism could emerge within 
England as well at some point in the future. The political map of the British isles might well 
change significantly within our lifetimes. 
One sometimes hears that the sort of class-based analyses and criticisms of big capital that 
were common on the left in the post-WWII period no longer apply, that somehow the world 
has moved on. This view is even held to a large degree by those who otherwise reject such end-
of-history thinking, which is shown by the fact that even when conflicts are acknowledged in 
society, it is often assumed that they can be solved through better communication and 
cooperation. It is very rarely acknowledged that direct confrontation between mutually 
incompatible interests must also sometimes take place, and that in such cases there have to 
winners and losers. 
This thesis has hopefully shown that nothing has really changed since more radical analyses 
were being made. Class is as salient as ever, and big capital is at least as powerful and callous 
                                                             
212 Alhough neither the UK nor any other country are likely to top former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in this 
contest. 
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about other people’s interests as it has always been. If anything, from the 1980s onwards, 
capitalism has become more brutal than before. This applies not just to the UK, but to most of 
the world. Perhaps it is time we stop treating a victory by the powerful as the status quo, and 
try changing some of the institutional setting of the economies we are living in. Only then will 
we be able to significantly increase the chances of regional equalization through the 
development of poorer regions, and thus significantly reduce at least one potential source of 
separatism, with the consequence of reducing the chance of human suffering when regions 
secede or states dissolve. 
 
 
Contribution of the thesis and potential future research directions 
 
In the thesis itself, I have focused on setting out a coherent argument, combining existing 
work with my own original research without spending too much space on signposting what 
exactly is novel, apart, obviously, from proper referencing. Thus, at the end, a brief reflection 
is required on this. This also provides a good opportunity to note some possible future research 
directions. 
Chapter 2, on economic development, the role of big firms, and development policies, does 
not offer any arguments that have not been made before in the literature. Nevertheless, the 
connection between development and big firms is severely neglected, and thus bringing it back 
into the debate is important. This is particularly the case when we compare this understanding 
of development with, for example, the very dominant Human Development Approach (Sen, 
2001), which severely underplays the importance of economic growth and structural 
transformation (Nolan and Sender, 1992). However, even in much of the traditional 
development economics literature the link between development and big firms is not 
sufficiently appreciated. For sure, authors such as Amsden (1989) are an important exception, 
but, in general, development economics tends to focus more on macro phenomena and 
industrial policy, not on firms and market structures. This is a completely valid approach for 
many purposes, but not always. For example, the concentration of production in global value 
chains, with every part of the value chain being dominated by global market leaders (Nolan, 
Zhang and Liu, 2007a, 2007b), means that we need to question some of the typical conclusions 
and recommendations in traditional development economics. Just one of many consequence is 
that moving up the value chain in some sector over time, with substantial state support along 
the way, is no longer as valid a strategy as it used to be for late-comers, because even the lower 
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parts of the value chain in many sectors are now extremely oligopolized and not easy for new 
entrants to break into. But, the only way to learn this is to look more closely at firms and market 
structures. A macro analysis will likely not suffice. 
Chapter 3, on regional development, has contributed to the literature in several ways. For 
one, the situation with ignoring the importance of firms and oligopolistic market structures is 
even more pronounced in regional development than is the case with development in general, 
and the need to bring this analysis back into the debate is even greater. One of the contributions 
of the chapter is that it does precisely this. The other is that it has shown that an understanding 
of regional development disparities that is grounded in an understanding of oligopolies is at 
least as valid today as it was several decades ago when authors such as Stuart Holland and 
François Perroux made their arguments. The fact that their insights have mostly been forgotten, 
or, in the case of Perroux, disconnected from an understanding of oligopolies, is a great loss to 
the literature on regional development, which needs to be remedied. 
The novel arguments in chapter 4 are those related to new paradigm regional policies and, 
of course, to Nevada’s development. With regards to the former, they have not been assessed 
against the backdrop of oligopolistic markets. This is probably due to the fact that his kind of 
analysis went out of favor during the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, before new 
paradigm policies really started becoming applied. With regards to the short case study of 
Nevada, that is a novel attempt to understand why some poorer regions may have managed to 
develop based on their own, indigenous efforts, despite all odds. To my knowledge, defining 
the characteristics of newly emerging sectors that can be the basis for indigenous development 
of poorer regions, and the conditions that need to be fulfilled for such development to take 
place, in particular some form of internal trade protection, has not been done before. 
This is also one of the possible future directions of research. I have only been able to identify 
Nevada as an example of a poorer region within a developed capitalist country that has 
managed to develop a successful indigenous economic sector. It is certainly possible that there 
are other cases, current or historical ones, that should be included, albeit there cannot be many 
of them – otherwise, we would not have pronounced regional problems. A more systematic 
and comparative approach to analyzing successful indigenous regional development in poorer 
regions could yield very useful policy lessons. In similar vein (although this has not been 
discussed in the thesis), a comparative study of regions or countries that have managed to attract 
substantial external investments into advanced activities could prove useful. The focus should 
be in particular on whether the success was based on luck (e.g. a unique location, or political 
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context), or on something that the regions or countries did. My expectation is that luck played 
a bigger role, but that is something to be empirically determined. 
One of the novel contributions of chapter 5 at the more general level is the linking of the 
literature on regional development with the (limited) literature on the economic bases of 
separatism, thus showing that capitalist market integration both binds regions within countries 
together through the flow of goods, services, people, and capital, but also creates powerful 
forces that can pull regions apart. In Marxist terms, one could call this a dialectical movement. 
At a more concrete level, the chapter offered a novel class-based analysis of separatism, tied 
the use of nationalist propaganda to class and economic interests, and also explored the role of 
recessions and austerity in contributing towards state dissolution. Very little work has been 
done on these topics. They would thus offer fruitful areas of future research. For example, a 
more systematic and comparative analysis of the effects of recessions and austerity on 
destroying the institutions for managing internal economic conflicts would be a very interesting 
research undertaking, and so would a broader comparison of the class-basis of support for 
secession, covering a larger number of countries. 
The contributions of the final two chapters mirror those of the preceding chapters, except 
they do so in much more detail for the case of UK regional development and the Scottish 
separatist movement. Perhaps the biggest contribution of chapter 6 is the analysis of new 
paradigm regional policies, of EU regional policies, and of cluster policies and regional banks, 
from the perspective of market structure. A few exceptions notwithstanding, there is very little 
work done from this perspective. Most of these topics could be fruitfully extended, for example, 
by combining a sectoral and regional analysis at a higher level of detail than I have done in the 
thesis. 
As for chapter 7, arguing for the centrality of class, in relation to recessions and austerity, 
for understanding Scottish separatism is to an extent a novel contribution. Also, apart from 
Paterson (2014) and the Scottish Socialist Party, no one has pointed out the constraints on 
policy space that would be imposed on Scotland if the SNP government’s proposed economic 
policies and free-market agreements with the rUK and EU would be put in place for an 
independent Scotland. Similarly, I have not been able to find anyone whose analysis of 
Scotland’s post-independence economy is underpinned by an understanding of oligopolies. 
The same type of analysis could be applied to numerous other cases of separatism.  
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Appendix A – Regional development agencies map 
 
 
 
 
Source: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmberr/89/89we135.htm#note239 
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Appendix B – Assisted areas 2007-2013 map 
 
 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assisted-areas-in-great-britain-2007-2013 
Note: Areas under (a) coverage were entitled to the highest level of aid, the mixed coverage of the Highlands 
allowed a gradual reduction of aid to the lowest (c) level. Northern Ireland is included under (c) coverage in its 
entirety. 
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Appendix C – Assisted areas 2014-2020 map 
 
 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/assisted-areas-map-2014-to-2020-stage-2 
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Appendix D – Local enterprise partnerships map 
 
 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-enterprise-partnerships-map 
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Appendix E – ERDF regions 2014-2020 
 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/maps/#1 
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Appendix F – ERDF regions 2007-2013 
 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/maps/#1 
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